LAURENT NKUNDA SITUATION - PERSPECTIVES ON DDR OF HIS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 001237 SIPDIS AIDAC SENSITIVE SIPDIS AID/W FOR AFR/EA, DCHA/OFDA, DCHA/CMM E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MOPS PGOV MARR KPKO CG SUBJECT: LAURENT NKUNDA SITUATION - PERSPECTIVES ON DDR OF HIS TROOPS Summary. A joint USAID-UNDP Mission traveled to Goma October 16-18. The purpose was to determine: The number, composition and location of Nkunda's troops in North Kivu; the numbers expected to elect for DDR or incorporation into the FARDC; and options for managing the DDR caseload (if/when it materializes. 3,000-5,000 is the estimated total men under arms at the current time. Approximately 1,400 FARDC deserters and others who had voluntarily or involuntarily joined Nkunda have escaped or surrendered over the last two weeks, and are being transported to Kamina and Katona for ad-hoc brassage. Of the 3,000-5,000 troops, 1,500-2,000 are thought to be hard-core Nkunda Tutsi loyalists. There are 1,000 troops originally from the FARDC battalions that were "mixed" with Nkunda's forces. Finally, there are an additional 1,000 bandits, thugs, mercenaries and forced conscripts. The Nkunda forces are currently in three areas of south North Kivu. The FARDC has succeeded in interposing itself between the troop concentrations so that they are physically isolated from each other. The deserters (i.e., those troops who were originally FARDC and then were "mixed" with Nkunda's battalions, will mostly choose the FARDC over DDR. The child soldiers will choose DDR. The bandits, thugs, mercenaries and opportunists will mostly choose DDR. The forced conscripts will choose DDR. Nkunda's loyalists will probably overwhelmingly choose DDR. They would be very happy to elect to remain in the FARDC if they were guaranteed that they could stay in North Kivu, but the GDRC is not/not offering this. The total estimated DDR caseload is 2,500-3,000. The FARDC buildup continues, with daily arrivals of troops and ammunition in Goma. FARDC has 25,000 men under arms in the province. Both of their two attack helicopters are now operational. MONUC is providing heavy logistics support. Subsequent to the Mission, the team learned that the current GDRC plan is to send all of Nkunda's forces to Kamina or Kitona. They will all go into nine weeks of brassage, following which they will all receive three months of MONUC military training. Subsequent to that, they will choose to stay in the FARDC or go into DDR. This plan, if they stick to it, will mean that any DDR for those who want to go this route will be four-five months into the future. There are a number of design issues for a DDR program for these troops: A. Timing of DDR - as yet quite unclear; B. Content of the reintegration package - need to reconcile UNDP and MDRP packages; C. The role of UNDP; D. The role of NGOs in reintegration; E. Inclusion of Mayi-Mayi troops in the program; F. the role and funding of the MOD project implementation unit. Planning should move forward for a DDR program for 3,000 ex-combatants from Nkunda's forces, plus an additional as yet unspecified number of Mayi-Mayi troops. End Summary. ¶2. A joint USAID-UNDP Mission traveled to Goma October 16-18. The team was composed of: Nicholas Jenks, USAID Program Officer; Cheryl Anderson, USAID Peace and Security Team Leader; Fernando Larrauri, UNDP; and Menada Wind-Andersen, UNDP. ¶3. The team met with: MONUC/North Kivu Head of Office; MONUC Political Officer; MONUC North Kivu Force Commander; Governor of North Kivu; Commander of the FARDC 8th Military Region (North Kivu); Minister of Defense; Director of the Congolese DDR Agency; UN Agencies; and NGOs. ¶4. The purpose was to determine: The number, composition and location of Nkunda's troops in North Kivu; the numbers expected to elect for DDR or incorporation into the FARDC; and options for managing the DDR caseload (if/when it materializes. ¶5. Military Situation. The situation is tense and fragile. The fragility is in essence coming from an emerging belief that a decisive victory by FARDC is needed to resolve the stand-off between FARDC and Nkunda's forces, and that the prospects for victory are far from certain. The FARDC is fundamentally weak. In the recent battle for Sake, where the 15th and 16th integrated brigades (IBs) were used, the 15th IB essentially ran away, and MONUC had to step in to keep Nkunda forces from taking the town. However, there are a number of factors in the GDRC's favor. The 15th IB has been replaced by the 116th regular brigade; the GDRC is sending in a continuous flow of reinforcements, and with comprehensive logistical support from the North Kivu MONUC Bgde, the FARDC is poised to take Mushake. KINSHASA 00001237 002 OF 004 ¶6. Some observers believe that Nkunda is low on ammunition. If his forces cannot re-supply, the consensus is that FARDC will win, though it may take two months. Supply lines have been cut, evidenced by the fact that Nkunda is targeting FARDC ammunitions caches, while conserving ammunition whenever engaging. However, should Nkunda be re-supplied, the conflict could extend by up to a year. ¶7. Even should Nkunda be re-supplied, the dynamic is changing on the ground. Approximately 1,400 FARDC deserters and others who had voluntarily or involuntarily joined Nkunda have escaped or surrendered over the last two weeks, and are being transported to Kamina and Katona for ad-hoc brassage. The GDRC is actively encouraging this by paying surrenderees 20,000 Congolese Francs ($40). ¶8. Number of troops. 3,000-5,000 is the estimated total men under arms at the current time. It is noted that desertion (whereby Nkunda's troops steal away from the rebellious units and surrender or otherwise present themselves to the FARDC) and recruitment (both forced and mercenary recruitment) is ongoing. The desertion rates have led observers to believe that the force - at one point 6,000 strong, now comprises 5,000 or fewer. Approximately 1,400 have deserted to date. ¶9. Composition of the troops. Organizationally, the force is composed of 14 operational and two HQ battalions of between 300-400 men each. Of the 3,000-5,000 troops, 1,500-2,000 are thought to be hard-core Nkunda Tutsi loyalists. Of the remainder, 300-900 are child soldiers (although this number is on the increase); very few are female. There remain 1,000 troops originally from the FARDC battalions that were "mixed" with Nkunda's forces, which are not sympathetic to Nkunda's agenda; this is the group that is currently in the process of deserting/surrendering to the FARDC/MONUC and they are sometimes referred to as "hostages." Finally, there are an additional 1,000 bandits, thugs, mercenaries and forced conscripts. In summary form: ¶A. Nkunda Tutsi loyalists: 1,500-2,000 ¶B. FARDC troops (mixed with Nkunda's): 1,000 ¶C. Bandits, thugs, mercenaries and forced conscripts: 1,000 ¶D. Child soldiers: 300-900 ¶10. The forces are marked by a strict command and control structure, led by a small inner-circle of commanders. Four members of this top leadership have either ICC or GDRC warrants against them. They are currently divided into three groups, but all are under the command and control of Nkunda through his lieutenants. Some Rwandan uniforms have been reported. ¶11. Location of the troops. The Nkunda forces are currently in three areas of south North Kivu. The FARDC has succeeded in interposing itself between the troop concentrations so that they are physically isolated from each other. Nkunda's troops are in the areas defined as follows: ¶A. From Bunangana (on the Rwandan border) to a point east of Rumangabo ¶B. North of Sake as far as Mweso extending east towards by not reaching Rutshuru ¶C. West of Muksake extending to Gungu ¶12. Numbers that will choose incorporation into the FARDC or DDR. The various sub-groups of which Nkunda's force is composed will make different choices. The deserters (i.e., those troops who were originally FARDC and then were "mixed" with Nkunda's battalions, will mostly choose the FARDC. The child soldiers will choose (actually the choice will be made for them) DDR. The bandits, thugs, mercenaries and opportunists will mostly choose DDR. The forced conscripts will choose DDR. Nkunda's loyalists will probably overwhelmingly choose DDR. They would be very happy to elect to remain in the FARDC if they were guaranteed that they could stay in North Kivu, but the GDRC is not/not offering this. The message currently is unequivocal - if they choose the FARDC they will be brassaged, and subsequently assigned, outside - probably far outside, North Kivu.) In summary, estimated DDR caseload: 2,500-3,000. ¶13. Caveat on the above. There is a lack of consensus on how many of Nkunda's forces would choose brassage, and how many would choose reintegration. FARDC sources indicate that not more than 15%-20% KINSHASA 00001237 003 OF 004 would choose brassage, while other sources suggest that between 90% and 50% would do so. Coloring the debate is the fact that 30% of the Ituri DDR participants were expected to choose reintegration into FARDC, based on global rates under the National DDR Plan. In fact, none of the Ituri participants chose to join the army ¶14. Situation of the "deserters." They are deserting for two reasons: A. They do not back Nkunda's agenda, and/or, B. The conditions are poor (and deteriorating) in the bush were they are/were located. Nkunda's commanders and officers exercise heavy command and control of their forces, and kill deserters if they can. It is estimated (by the FARDC force commander) that 30% of deserters are killed. ¶15. The wave of deserters is being dealt with by the SMI (Military Integration Structure, the FARDC entity responsible for the logistics of forging the new integrated FARDC.) The principle of one man, one weapon, is not being applied, because many have arrived without weapons, and it is clear that Nkunda is not permitting his men to hold weapons at all times. Additionally, the FARDC tactical strategy is to reduce Nkunda's troop strength as well as weapons stores. The ex-combatants are being regrouped in Kituku transit site, and sent to Kamina once 100 persons are present. The rationale for the transport to Kamina is safety, in that Kituku is part of an active operational theatre. They are being informally registered, and although the SMI says that they will be given a choice of brassage or reintegration into civilian life once they arrive in Kamina, the element of coercion is certainly a strong possibility. The UEPN-DDR Director has proposed setting up formal registration with the IRIS system at both Kituku and Kamina using equipment which would be brought in from the Ituri DDR sites. This would allow the transition to a formal DDR process, and mitigate the coercive element. (However, this may not happen - see para 20.) ¶16. Negotiated solution or a military solution? Depends on whose crystal ball you choose. MONUC force commander (North Kivu) says that the Nkunda hard core will not give up, and it will be a military solution. The Commander of the 8th Military Region says they do not want war, and are using a combination of measured military pressure on Nkunda and negotiation. Kabila extended the 10/15 deadline for ten days, for further evaluation at that time. He has also said that this situation must be resolved before the end of the year. Finally, he said publicly that he has given the green light to preparations for a military assault if negotiations do not resolve the situation. ¶17. The GDRC is pursuing three simultaneous tactics. Against Nkunda loyalists, it appears committed to forceful disarmament. The "give peace a chance" rhetoric and lack of immediate offensive appears designed to appease the international community, allow FARDC to reinforce and regroup, and facilitate the hemorrhaging of non-loyalists elements from Nkunda. At the same time, the GDRC is actively negotiating with other negative forces in North Kivu, to prevent to all too frequent alliance-hopping that has marked the conflict from reinforcing Nkunda. Reportedly, ranks have been provided to the Jackson Mai-Mai and 775 of his troops surrendered in Bingi. ¶18. The door to a negotiated settlement with Nkunda has perhaps closed. The GDRC's position is that Nkunda has a criminal warrant against him, and therefore, should he go into exile, the GDRC would seek his extradition. On his part, Nkunda has reportedly stated that he would rather commit suicide than surrender. There is the possibility that Nkunda's core group could splinter into hardliners and those willing to disarm. One source indicated that not all of the loyalist leadership agree that fighting to the end is the correct course. ¶19. FARDC buildup. This continues, with daily arrivals of troops and ammunition in Goma. FARDC has 25,000 men under arms in the province, and they figure that they need six attackers per defender. Both of their two attack helicopters are now operational. MONUC is providing all logistics support short of arms and ammunition, attack helicopters and tanks. ¶20. Sequencing of FARDC integration and DDR. Subsequent to the Mission, the team learned that the current GDRC plan is to send all of Nkunda's forces to Kamina or Kitona. They will all go into nine weeks of brassage, following which they will all receive three KINSHASA 00001237 004 OF 004 months of MONUC military training. Subsequent to that, they will choose to stay in the FARDC or go into DDR. This plan, if they stick to it, will mean that any DDR for those who want to go this route, will be four-five months into the future. (This new information reportedly comes from Kabila, passed through the SRSG and on to us.) ¶21. The dynamics in relation to other Negative Forces. There is a very strong consensus that all negative forces must be included in North Kivu DDR, not just Nkunda's men. There are five armed Mai-Mai groups, and three non-FDLR militias (ADF-NALU, RUD, and RPR) also present and active. Some of them have linked their disarmament to that of Nkunda's factions, and some, such as Jackson's Mai-Mai's, having made that linkage in the past, have proceeded even without this pre-condition being met. Estimates are that with the inclusion of these groups, the total number of potential participants in a brassage/DDR process jumps to 14,000-19,000. Not all of these persons would be eligible for the PNDR, raising the point that careful coordination from the earliest stages is necessary to ensure that eventual World Bank funding can be applied to aspects of the program. ¶22. The reintegration package. GDRC officials spoken with all vigorously opposed "safety net" cash payments as part of a DDR package. This is part of the National DDR Program (PNDDR) in place through the World Bank, which is currently without funding. There appeared to be a widespread misapprehension that the PNDR does not have a livelihoods-based reintegration element, or that this was or is a failure. The Governor of North Kivu raised the argument that when the safety net payments exceed what a soldier is paid, this serves as a draw to choose civilian life, whether of not the participant fully understands the choice. As a result, when the funds run out, so does the commitment to remain in civilian life. The current situation is that the GDRC (or at least the MOD and the DDR Agency) and UNDP want to use a different package than has been used by the MDRP/CONADER in the past. Reintegration package harmonization and public sensitization is required. ¶23. Capacity to implement DDR. The SMI is currently implementing ad-hoc proto-DDR with FARDC funding. The UEPN-DDR has administrative structures in place in North Kivu and nationally. However, while staff are still working, they have not been paid, and the electricity at the North Kivu office has been cut for non-payment. MONUC has the capacity, and the will to stand up the necessary disarmament points and regroupment camps, and conduct disarmament. UNDP has the capacity, if not the funding, to effectively implement demobilization. ¶24. The capacity for reintegration is mixed. UNDP is willing to manage an Ituri model reintegration program, but has yet to illustrate its effectiveness. The UNOPS capacity to provide HIMO appears adequate, even for the higher number. Among the NGOs already present in North Kivu, a sampling of those most likely to have the capacity to implement a reintegration/expanded reintegration program shows absorptive capacity sufficient for approximately 3,500 adult XCs. This means that in order to ensure sufficient reintegration program capacity on the ground for Nkunda's forces, other armed groups that choose to join the process, and the remaining 4,500 in UEPN-DDR prior caseload in North Kivu who have not yet received SIPDIS reintegration assistance, additional capacity will need to be mobilized. ¶25. Design issues for a DDR program for these troops: ¶A. Timing of DDR - as yet quite unclear ¶B. Content of the reintegration package - need to reconcile UNDP and MDRP packages ¶C. The role of UNDP ¶D. The role of NGOs in reintegration ¶E. Inclusion of Mayi-Mayi troops in the program ¶F. Role and funding of the MOD project implementation unit ¶26. Bottom line. Planning should move forward for a DDR program for 3,000 ex-combtants from Nkunda's forces, plus an additional as et unspecified number of Mayi-Mayi troops. Howeer, concrete plans cannot be finalized until som of the important variables (above) are better defined. USAID will actively monitor the situation, nd continue to push DDR planning for this group forward. BROCK