JAMAICA/VENEZUELA: OPPOSITION LEADER DEEPLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINGSTON 000393 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CAR - RANDALL BUDDEN, ROBERT COLLINS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG ECON EINV EPET MASS CARICOM JM XL, XM SUBJECT: JAMAICA/VENEZUELA: OPPOSITION LEADER DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER CHAVEZ'S INFLUENCE REF: A. KINGSTON 89 (NOTAL) ¶B. KINGSTON 215 (NOTAL) ¶C. 06 KINGSTON 2021 (NOTAL) ¶D. KINGSTON 342 (NOTAL) ¶E. PORT-OF-SPAIN 220 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Brenda L. Johnson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS -------------- 1.(C) In drawing closer to flamboyant Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Jamaica is "getting mixed up with something from which it will be difficult to extricate ourselves," according to Leader of the Opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) Bruce Golding. In a private meeting with Ambassador on the eve of his March 23 visit to Washington, Golding: -- reiterated claims that Chavez was providing USD 4-5 million in cash to finance the election campaign of the Prime Minister (PM) Portia Simpson Miller (PSM)'s ruling People's National Party (PNP); -- alleged that Foreign Minister Anthony Hylton and other senior PNP figures recently had traveled secretly to Venezuela to receive additional cash, part of which then was used to repay the Dutch-based oil trading firm Trafigura a USD 475,0090 "contribution" it previously had given the PNP in a major campaign finance scandal (Reftel C); -- claimed that, given Jamaica's indebtedness to Venezuela under Petrocaribe and the recent signing on of an MOU for importation of 2.5 million tons of Venezuelan liquefied natural gas (LNG) annually beginning in 2009, Jamaica risked being pressured into supporting Chavez's positions in international fora; 2.(C) (Summary cont.) Golding acknowledged that: (A) the Jamaican Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade (MFAFT) adroitly had resisted Chavez's heavy pressure for an invitation to the massive official opening ceremony of the Cricket World Cup (CWC) series held March 11 in Trelawny, deftly offering an alternative stopover meeting with the PM in Montego Bay ; (B) the PM had responded smoothly and noncommittally to Chavez's public suggestion that Jamaica join the "Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA)." 3.(C) Recommendations: Embassy shares the Opposition Leader's concerns over the influence of Venezuelan money and energy supplies in Jamaica in the years ahead, and recommends that USG officials use his March 23 visit to Washington as an opportunity for serious discussion of these issues. As demonstrations of continued U.S. interest in Jamaica, restoration of IMET (recently zeroed out for FY-08 and beyond) and a visit from a high-level USG official (Secretarial- or Assistant Secretarial-level) would be most helpful. End Summary and Recommendations. 4.(SBU) Opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) Leader Bruce Golding approached Ambassador during the opening match of the Cricket World Cup (CWC) series on March 13 to request a private meeting, which was held the morning of March 16 at JLP Headquarters. The Ambassador presented the Opposition Leader a copy of the schedule of appointments arranged by WHA/CAR for his upcoming visit to Washington; Golding expressed thanks, and said he looked forward to the visit (note: post appreciates WHA/CAR's efforts in arranging such a comprehensive schedule). Chavez's Growing Influence -------------- 5.(C) Golding then said that JLP concerns over the influence of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in Jamaica (Reftels A,B) had heightened in recent weeks. Asking that the U.S. hold the information in strict confidence, he confirmed that a "senior person in the Government" had been passing him sensitive inside information, and that "a number of persons within the Government" were "frightened over the secrecy" surrounding the Government of Jamaica (GoJ)Q,s recent dealings with Chavez. He claimed that Foreign Minister Anthony Hylton, Minister of Industry, Commerce, Science, and Technology Philip Paulwell, and Senator Colin Campbell recently had flown to Caracas. Upon arrival at the airport, they were supposed to have been picked up by helicopter, but instead were given one or two large packages; immediately thereafter, they returned to Kingston. The next week, the Government had announced it had repaid the Dutch-based oil trading firm Trafigura a USD 475,000 "contribution" made to the ruling People's National Party (PNP) in a major campaign finance scandal (Reftel C). Not Bowled Over -------------- 6.(C) The Opposition Leader then observed that Chavez's recent brief unannounced visit to Montego Bay "had not been arranged in the normal way." He understood that the flamboyant Venezuelan President had wanted to attend the massive opening ceremony of the Cricket World Cup (CWC) series held March 11 in Trelawny. The GoJ had had to "use every diplomatic resource at its disposal to dissuade Chavez" from attending the high-profile event. The GoJ had taken the position that CWC was a Caribbean, rather than Jamaican, event; therefore, his attendance would have required the approval and coordination of all the participating countries--Q*and for this, time had been insufficient. Therefore, as an alternative, the GoJ had suggested a stopover visit in Montego Bay, and Chavez grudgingly had accepted. ((Note: Further to Reftel (D),post will provide additional information on the LNG MOU signed by Chavez and PSM on March 12 in Montego Bay as it becomes available. End Note.)) Putting the PM on a Sticky Wicket? -------------- 7.(C) Golding then noted that Chavez's public invitation to Jamaica to participate in Venezuela's ALBA program, made during his meeting with Prime Minister Portia Simpson Miller (PSM),had been "the sort of thing normally worked out in the corridors, rather than in public." Golding said he did not know whether Chavez's ALBA invitation had taken PSM by surprise; if so, by saying only that the GoJ would give his offer due consideration before taking any decisions, she had handled the situation well. 8.(C) The Opposition Leader then said he feared the GoJ was allowing itself to be maneuvered into a position in which "it would have no capacity to say no to Chavez." He then reiterated his claim (Reftel A) that Venezuela was providing USD 5-6 million in cash to finance PSM's election campaign. He said that, until just before the Trafigura "contributions," the PNP had had financial problems, even finding it difficult to maintain its party facilities. But recently, there had been a dramatic turnaround. The PNP no longer was aggressively canvassing the private sector, apparently because their contributions no longer were needed. Private sector companies which historically had contributed to both major political parties no longer were being approached by the PNP. He believed Chavez had taken on the role of a "godfather with money," and that Jamaica was "being sucked into an agenda not of our own making. Chavez waves cash, we're mesmerized, and cave in to anything he wants." Jamaica needed "guidance as to how to deal with Chavez." 9.(C) Ambassador agreed that Chavez's growing influence was of serious concern. She suggested that Golding raise these concerns with USG officials during this upcoming visit to Washington. She noted that Trinidad and Tobago's recent decision not to supply LNG to Jamaica on concessionary terms (Reftels D, E) had not helped matters vis-Q-vis Venezuela. She also reiterated that, as a means of demonstrating the USG's continued interest in Jamaica, she had requested that a high-level U.S. official visit at the earliest opportunity. 10.(C) Golding then said that, given Jamaica's indebtedness to Venezuela as a result of Petrocaribe, it would be easy to imagine a scenario in which Chavez offered to write off or defer a portion of these debts in return for GoJ support of his positions in international fora. In response to Golding's question as to whether the U.S. had communicated its concerns over Venezuela to the GoJ, the Ambassador recounted the Embassy's recent sustained effort to dissuade the GoJ from supporting Venezuela for a seat on the UNSC, noting that the PM at one point had claimed to have left the decision of Jamaica's position entirely to Foreign Minister Hylton. She volunteered to share the latest information on Jamaica's voting record at the U.N. 11.(C) In response to Ambassador's inquiry as to whether he believed the PNP, as it claimed, actually had returned the Trafigura "contribution," Golding replied that, while he still had doubts, his doubts were receding. It seemed "logical" that part of the cash apparently received by Hylton, Paulwell, and Campbell while in Venezuela had been used to pay back Trafigura. National Elections in June or July? -------------- 12.(C) In response to Ambassador's inquiry as to whether PSM might call elections in the wake of what was shaping up as a highly successful Cricket World Cup (CWC) series, Golding noted that the PNP had been "busy since December registering voters," and that the lists of these voters would be published on May 31. Jamaican law prohibited the publication of voter lists after elections had been called; therefore, PSM probably would wait until early April, setting an election date in June or July. The Opposition Leader concluded by observing that, in drawing closer to Chavez, Jamaica was "getting mixed up with something from which it will be difficult to extricate ourselves." He did not rule out the possibility of the flamboyant Venezuelan President "arriving here in the middle of the Jamaican election campaign." Comment -------------- 13.(C) In contrast to the optimistic impression he had given in previous meetings, on March 16 Golding appeared decidedly downbeat. He may sense that the highly successful start to the Cricket World Cup (CWC) series and attendant publicity, as well as Chavez's largesse, are working to the advantage of PM Portia Simpson Miller. End Comment. JOHNSON