JAMAICA: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE TOP PRIORITY IS

S E C R E T KINGSTON 001813 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR INL/LP BOZZOLO, BROWN, INL/C KOHN, WHA/CAR TILGHMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2017 TAGS: SNAR PREL AA SUBJECT: JAMAICA: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE TOP PRIORITY IS FIGHTING CORRUPTION REF: KINGSTON 1805 Classified By: CDA James T. Heg, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: One of Commissioner Lewin's first official acts on December 17, the day he took office, was to approve the proposed Anti-Corruption Strategy Paper, presented by the new Anti-Corruption Division Chief. In a meeting with NAS Director on December 19 (Reftel),and again in his inaugural press conference on December 20, Commissioner Lewin commented that fighting corruption within the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) was one of his top priorities. Lewin further asked for U.S. financial support for this endeavor, particularly the Anti-Corruption Division's Undercover Unit. NAS is working with the Core U.S. Law Enforcement Working Group at Post to determine what U.S. assets could be engaged. End Summary. Anti Corruption Strategy Paper ¶2. (S) The strategy paper was developed by the new Anti-Corruption Division Chief and a subject matter expert on anti-corruption from the London Metropolitan Police (MET). (Note NAS funding was used to engage the services of the MET). It calls for a bifurcated structure for the Division - one unit made up of Jamaican Police Officers who will handle low level corruption cases, i.e. traffic stop bribes, other minor bribery and extortion schemes being conducted by low-ranking officers; the other unit, which will be covert/undercover, would ideally be staffed by a team of foreign law enforcement officers/analysts (target nations are U.S., UK, and Canada) experienced in anti-corruption cases. The only link between the undercover unit and the outside world will be the Anti-Corruption Division Chief, ACP Justin Felice, who is a British Police Officer currently serving in the JCF. The strategy also has a public education/awareness plan, as well as development of a better internal reporting structure for the JCF. Both Commissioner Lewin and Felice are hopeful that given Lewin's take over of the JCF that not only will the public be more comfortable reporting on bribery and extortion activities by the police, but that JCF officers also will begin to come forward to report on the dirty cops within their ranks. Undercover Unit's Operations ¶3. (S) If Felice's plan is followed, the Undercover Unit would be made up of four British officers/analysts, two U.S. officers (one analyst, one investigator) and two Canadian officers. The only "Jamaican" police officer who would have direct access to the Unit's analysis is Felice. The Unit's primary focus is to develop and analyze intelligence on corrupt cops under investigation. Target selection for the Unit will be determined by the Tasking Committee. Given the extent of the corruption within the JCF, cases may have arms trafficking, money laundering, drug smuggling, and human trafficking links. The Unit's investigators and analysts would have the ability to task both covert and overt assets of the JCF and Jamaica Defence Force. It is the Jamaican assets who would collect bank records, perform surveillance, effect arrests etc. Members of the Foreign Team would sit on the oversight and governance committee and on the tasking committee to ensure that standards of performance for the Jamaican assets are being adhered to; and, the activities of the Unit would be completely segregated from the regular Anti-Corruption Division's activities. ¶4. (S) If there is a link to police corruption, any information developed by the Unit on public corruption involving GOJ officials would be handled by the Unit. Other corruption cases with no police link will be handled outside the Unit. The sources and methods used to develop evidence behind the Unit's firewall will not be discoverable, nor would any member of the Unit be expected to testify in a Jamaican court. For any subsequent prosecution, the evidence chain begins once the sanitized package leaves the Unit for action. The expectation is that the foreign members of the Unit would agree to the extent they are legally capable to share any intelligence they are able to glean from their own systems. Felice, although a British national, understands that the current MOU that governs law enforcement sharing between the U.S., UK, and Canada may necessitate his absenting himself from certain meetings and that he may not have access to certain information. Undercover Unit needs International Support ¶5. (S) Once established, the Undercover Unit would be governed by a multi-national Governance Board, and tasking of its operations would come also come from a separate multi-national Tasking Committee. Note: the U.S., UK and Canada have all been asked to participate in these boards and to provide funding for the undercover units members. If U.S. law enforcement were to participate in staffing the Unit, we would have the ability to task and collect evidence for use in U.S. prosecutions. Both Felice and Commissioner Lewin have requested U.S., UK and Canadian financial support for the Unit. It is an acknowledgment of how pervasive the corruption is in the JCF that the organization is seeking outside members to form the undercover Unit. Potential use of Task Force Building by Anti-Corruption ¶6. (S) Because of its undercover nature, Felice has been very concerned about finding an appropriately secure yet remote location to house the Unit. One option that he and the new Commissioner have mulled over was to put the Unit on the grounds of the Jamaica Defence Force. However, that doesn't seem to be a realistic solution. An additional option currently under discussion is to transfer the underutilized Airport Interdiction Task Force Building temporarily to the Anti-Corruption Division. (a further discussion of these deliberations available in Septel) The Task Force would continue to operate as it has done since its inception out of the Airport terminal. In her December 19 meeting with Commissioner Lewin, the NAS Director raised this possibility. As the Task Force Building would really make an ideal office for the Unit, and as the Task Force staff have not fully embraced the space, it was NAS recommendation to Lewin that the building be transferred to Anti-Corruption. The final decision rests with the Commissioner. ¶7. (S) Comment: The design of the Strategy is comprehensive but a comprehensive plan is not enough. What makes this initiative different than others that have come before, is that Lewin has given his full public support to the Unit's mission. Lewin, unlike his predecessor, truly wants to bring about change to the JCF. In his previous life as Chief of Staff of the Jamaica Defence Force, Lewin showed that he has little toleration for corruption. It is Lewin's own support and strength of resolve to fundamentally change the JCF, combined with Felice's experience in fighting corruption in the Northern Ireland Constabulary that will be the real key to the Division's success. Given the ability of the U.S. to influence the tasking for the Unit and its further capability to tap into intelligence and evidentiary sources that heretofore were perhaps not available, careful consideration should be given to funding this Unit. Its design and function could provide a win-win for U.S. law enforcement. End Comment JOHNSON