KAGAME ON TRIPARTITE-PLUS, DARFUR, AND REFUGEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000281 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF RW SUBJECT: KAGAME ON TRIPARTITE-PLUS, DARFUR, AND REFUGEE ISSUES Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) On March 16 AF DAS James Swan advised President Kagame on the principal successes of the just-completed Tripartite Plus conference, detailing progress on "active approaches" toward eliminating Negative Forces, and a common "Wanted List" to be circulated among the four nations by means of the Fusion Cell intelligence apparatus. Swan also commended Rwanda's "patience" and professionalism in its military deployment to Darfur as part of the AMIS peace-keeping mission, and asked Rwanda to continue its "critical" participation. Kagame detailed his government's frustration with the AMIS mission, and said deployment of the previously pledged 4th battalion was "frozen" pending resolution of AMIS leadership and other issues. PRM DAS William Fitzgerald expressed USG disappointment with Tanzanian treatment of rwandaphone expellees, noting he would address the issue with Tanzanian authorities on the next leg of his trip, and stated that "now was the time" to begin repatriation of Congolese refugees to the DRC from Rwandan camps. End summary. ¶2. (C) AF DAS Swan and PRM DAS Fitzgerald met President Kagame March 16 in Kigali, driving to the presidential compound immediately upon the conclusion of the March 14-16 Tripartite Joint Commission (TJC) meeting (see septel on Tripartite deliberations). Ambassador Arietti, Foreign Minister Charles Murigande, and Great Lakes Envoy Richard Sezibera also participated. Swan told Kagame that the Tripartite meeting had been successful on a number of fronts, and the USG intended to continue its stewardship of the sessions "so long as the four governments wish us to." Swan said that good progress had been made in sharing intelligence with a view toward "active approaches" toward Negative Forces. The agreement that the four Defense Ministers would meet within a month's time was one sign of this strengthened commitment to activists solutions. Swan also commended progress on a combined "Wanted List" to be examined by the Tripartite Fusion Cell and Focal Points. Several delegations had shown flexibility on shared lists of names, and the TJC had agreed to work toward adopting a common list at its next session in June. ¶3. (C) Swan also offered "strong support" for the Rwandan deployment to Darfur, saying the USG recognized the "patience" exercised by the GOR in dealing with the many problems associated with the AMIS mission. Rwanda's participation in AMIS was "critical" to its success, as the RDF battalions were the most effective in the field. While the USG was sympathetic to Rwanda's frustrations, he asked that Rwanda continue its deployment. Without Rwandan participation, the situation would be "far worse than it is." The USG, said Swan, was supportive of Rwanda's candidacy for an AMIS leadership position, and suggested that Kagame contact South African President Mbeki, who was himself in contact with President Bashir. ¶4. (C) Kagame began by expressing his support for the Tripartite Plus process. He noted Rwanda's continuing concern for events in eastern DRC, and detailed the GOR's participation in efforts to reintegrate Laurent Nkunda's military formations in the FARDC. Rwanda had acted at the behest of President Kabila, and had worked to "put the DRC and Nkunda together." After these joint efforts, the GOR was, then, surprised to find Nkunda on the DRC first list of "wanted names" at the Tripartite sessions. DAS Swan noted that the DRC delegation had shown "sensitivity" on this issue (as it had in removing senior Ugandan officials from its list, he said),and it was reconsidering its list. Kagame replied that the four nations needed to be "frank" on names for inclusion, and there must be no "internal score-settling." Kagame said that the GOR remained ready to assist the DRC with the eradication of Negative Forces, and that a GOR military team, at the request of President Kabila, was in Goma to discuss options with FARDC commanders. ¶5. (C) Kagame next expressed at length Rwanda's continuing frustration over events in Sudan and Darfur. Rwanda found the AU "unresponsive" on the many problems facing the AMIS deployment, including the force's general mandate, its command structure (the Nigerian AMIS commander was "totally useless," he said),and logistical support. "We are told to be patient," he said, but Rwanda wanted to be effective and efficient in its Darfur deployment, or "we are finished." He then noted that Rwanda's frustrations had even pricked a conspiratorial reaction from a Ghanaian representative to the AU (unnamed). The Ghanaian had surmised that Rwanda's expressed disappointments with AMIS were generated by the U.S., which intended to step into the "vacuum" created by a Rwandan withdrawal, presumably with troops of its own. While this was "farcical," he said, Rwandan did not want to remain in an ineffective mission. Kagame noted that while the GOR had accepted in principle the sending of a fourth battalion to Darfur, that additional deployment was now "frozen," pending improvement in AMIS support and performance. ¶6. (C) Repeating the USG's wish to see Rwanda remain in Darfur, DAS Swan reiterated that the USG would try to assist the GOR in securing the AMIS force commander or other leadership position, although the USG did not have a "place at the AU table" when it came to such decisions. Regarding Rwanda's outstanding request for USG airlift to Darfur (Note: one rotation battalion was airlifted recently by the Algerians; two others await USG airlift) Swan said that the State Department and DOD were "working the issue." ¶7. (C) DAS Fitzgerald then expressed concern for the plight of rwandaphone inhabitants of western Tanzania being pushed back over the border without great concern for their "dignity or property." While the GOZ and GOR had agreed upon the return of this population (not including those who have long-standing and legitimate claims on Tanzanian citizenship),the manner of their expulsion was "not acceptable." Upon his arrival in Dar es Salaam, Fitzgerald said he would "take up the matter" with Tanzanian authorities. Tanzania had for decades had a solid record on refugee matters, he said, and he hoped to encourage them to continue it. ¶8. (C) Finally, DAS Fitzgerald noted his recent passage through several regions of the DRC, and said "the time is now" to begin repatriation of Congolese refugees in Rwanda. The security situation in DRC was acceptable in several eastern provinces, including South Kivu and Katanga, and the process of encouraging these refugee populations to return should begin in the near future. ¶9. (C) Kagame replied that Rwanda had decided to communicate its concerns regarding the Tanzanian returnees in private, and avoid any public disagreements. The GOT was "very defensive" on the matter. The GOR wished to encourage better treatment, and more examination of the citizenship claims of some of the returnees, in a low-key manner. Kagame agreed that some of the Congolese refugees could return home now, but the situation was difficult, as the refugees "changed their minds regularly" on whether or not it was time to go. Equally, the DRC government changed its mind on whether it was "time to receive them." ¶10. (C) Comment. As usual, President Kagame was punctual, focused, and explicit in his comments and concerns. Unlike the locally published remarks of Foreign Minister Murigande, he did not set any timeline for improvements in AMIS (Murigande said, in effect, "AMIS must be better in 6 months or we leave"),but Kagame was very clear in his unhappiness with the conduct of AMIS peacekeeping operations, and the need for positive improvements. He appeared satisfied with the results of the Tripartite-Plus Commission sessions, and willing to work closely with President Kabila to seek an end to instability in eastern Congo. End summary. ARIETTI