SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY MEETS FORMER FDLR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 001026

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: PINS RW
SUBJECT: SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY MEETS FORMER FDLR
COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. Senior Advisor Timothy Shortley met with
Major General Paul Rwarakabije November 7 to discuss the
FDLR's current operations and its relations with the DRC
government. Rwarakabije claimed the FDLR cooperated closely
with the DRC government, received materiel assistence from
it, and planned to attack Rwanda after it joined with the
FARDC in defeating renegade General Nkunda. Means of
lowering tensions in the Kivus and avoiding more fighting, he
said, included the participation of Nkunda's forces in
brassage and the holding of an inter-communal dialogue in the
Kivus. The FDLR was currently stronger than it had been for
several years. However, the FDLR feared that recent efforts
by the international community to broker peace in the Kivus
might mean the cutting of assitance by the DRC, and its
eventual demise. End summary.


2. (C) Rwarakabije, formerly the FDLR commander in chief (he
defected to Rwanda in 2003),now a Commissioner with the
Rwnadan Demobilization Commission (Commission Chairman Jean
Sayingoza also attended),told Shortley that FDLR cooperation
with the DRC began in 1998, when he was still with the FDLR.
He spoke regularly with Joseph Kabila, then chief of the DRC
armed forces (FARDC),serving under his father, President
Laurent Kabila. Those close ties continue today, he said.
Munitions and other supplies were commonly routed through the
armed group PARECO, which had both FDLR and FARDC officer
serving in it. While neither FDLR nor the FARDC felt strong
enough to take on Nkunda, he said, in combination they
considered themselves a match for him. After disposing of
Nkunda, Rwarakabije claimed, the FDLR planned to begin
attacks against Rwanda.


3. (C) Rwarakabije commented that the FDLR, while rearmed
and re-energized as a a result of its current close relations
with the FARDC, was aware of increased international
attention focused on the Kivus, and the visits of several
envoys and diplomats to eastern Congo (including Shortley).
It feared the cutting of assistance by the FARDC, and the
resumption of what he termed its previous slow organizational
decline as its ammunition ran low and its force size declined
due to escapes, poor recruiting, and casualties. As an
aside, Rwarakabije mentioned that his source of information
was FDLR officers, who communicated directly with him by cell
phone.


4. (C) Rwarakabije noted two principal means of averting
fighting in North Kivu: the conduct of an inter-communal
dialogue in the Kivus, and Nkunda's troops beginning to enter
brassage. A third means of averting fighting, he said, would
be for Kabila to call Mudacumura to Kinshasa and forbid his
return to the Kivus. This would send an obvious signal that
the FDLR's days were numbered. With their commander
effectively under arrest, and assistance from the FARDC
halted, the FDLR would begin to dissolve, senior officers
planning their well-funded escapes, and rank and file
disappearing into the forest. If Rwanda and the DRC opened
embassies in each other's countries, he said, this too would
show the FDLR that its days in the forest of eastern Congo
were at an end.


5. (C) Rwarakabije stated action was needed to be taken
immediately to avert new fighting. The FDLR's 1st Division
was in the process of transferring itself to North Kivus, he
said, with 1000 of its 2000 complement already arrived. This
would significantly strengthen the FDLR. Shortley outlined

USG actions to assist in the lowering of tensions in North
Kivu, including blunt messages to DRC leadership on
cooperation with the FDLR, the posting of officers to Goma,
the issuance of a strong statement by the State Department
condemning the FDLR (shared with Rwarakabije, who said he
would send it to sympathetic FDLR officers) and the upcoming
meeting in Nairobi.



6. (C) Comment. Rwarakabije appeared very well versed on
the present state of the FDLR, and in near-constant
communication with serving FDLR officers. As the former
senior FDLR commander, his comments on cooperation and
coordination between the FDLR and the FARDC are quite
compelling. Lowering tensions in the Kivus appears possible,
but by no means assured in the days to come. End comment.

ARIETTI