C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 001000

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM MOPS RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER DRC SUPPORT TO FDLR


Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. Ambassador met with Great Lakes Special
Envoy Ambassador Richard Sezibera October 31 to discuss the
security situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC). Sezibera expressed great concern at the
ascendency of Rwandaphone extremists within the Kabila
government, and the prospect for significant ethnic turmoil
in north and south Kivu. Sezibera claimed DRC military
commanders in the Kivus have been chosen who are close to the
Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and a
"policy decision" has apparently been made by Kabila to
assist those FDLR forces. An emboldened FDLR could attack
Rwanda, forcing the Government of Rwanda (GOR) to respond.
Sezibera considered the recent DRC plan for dealing with the
FDLR to be of limited use, but said continuing dialogue with
the DRC government was important. Peace in the Kivus
required a disarmed and disbanded FDLR, a locally-controlled
inter-ethnic dialogue, brassage of all remaining armed forces
(including those of renegade general Nkunda), the monitored
return of refugees, and restructured security forces.
Sezibera also noted continued efforts to revive the Joint
Verification Mechanism, and said USG observer status would be
discussed at a November meeting of Rwandan and Congolese
officials. He and other Rwanda officials fear their openness
to cooperation on security issues is not being met with equal
commitment by the Kabila government. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador began his October 31 meeting with Great
Lakes Special Envoy Ambassador Richard Sezibera by noting the
tremendous policy focus in Washington in regard to security
in the Kivus and Rwandan relations with the DRC. Ambassador
advised Sezibera that AF Special Advisor Shortley was
currently in North Kivu and would visit Rwanda next week, and
that the US had decided to establish a full time presence in
Goma Recent meetings with President Kabila in Washington
has gone well, he told Sezibera, and the USG welcomed both
the DRC plan for dealing with the FDLR and the Rwandan
res

ponse. Continuing dialogue between the two governments,
with assistance from the USG and other partners, was key to
ultimate resolution of the serious security situation in
eastern Congo. Policy-makers in Washington recognized that
while the DRC had decided to deal first with General Nkunda,
the FDLR could not be allowed to "fester." The Ambassador
assured Sezibera that all partners realized the importance of
a concerted and comprehensive strategy for achieving peace in
the DRC.


3. (C) Sezibera welcomed USG engagement, noted the
importance of continued dialogue with the DRC, and offered
his analysis of the security situation in the Kivus and
efforts to improve it. First, he expressed grave
reservations over the participation of what he termed
"Rwandaphone extremists" at senior levels of the DRC
government, including Kabila's cabinet. These men were
giving Kabila skewed advice, he asserted, and it appeared
that Kabila himself had made a "policy choice" to assist the
FDLR. Rwandan intelligence showed a significant increase in
DRC assistance to the FDLR, he said. Continuing, Sezibera
stated one very worrying sign of DRC/FDLR collaboration was
the appointment of DRC brigade commanders, in an "arc" along
the Rwandan border, who had "links" to FDLR forces. These
commanders and their colleagues at higher levels of the DRC
military were both actively supplying arms to the FDLR and
recruiting FDLR personnel into the DRC armed forces. After
several years of cross-border peace, there had been this year
two, albeit minor, FDLR attacks into Rwanda, he noted. A
rearmed and emboldened FDLR would inevitably increase such
attacks, forcing Rwanda to respond.


4. (C) Turning to the apparent DRC willingness to use force
against tutsi General Nkunda, Sezibera said that his
government foresaw two "bad outcomes:" 1) the DRC fails in
its military push against Nkunda, weakening Kabila and
emboldening extremists within the Kabila government, or; 2)
the DRC defeats Nkunda, Rwandaphone extremists are
increasingly ascendant in the Kivus, the FDLR is
strengthened, and inter-ethnic violence soars. In essence,
he said, a military result either way would lead to greater
problems. However, Sezibera saw a remaining window of
opportunity to avoid either extreme result.


5. (C) Against this backdrop of worsening security, Sezibera


characterized the DRC plan to address the FDLR problem as
less helpful and less detailed than previous plans tendered
by the DRC government. The voluntary "phase" of disarming
and repatriating the FDLR was "not practical," he said, and
the suggestion in the plan that FDLR personnel might be
accorded some form of refugee status was "dangerous." He
noted the DRC seemed to have the intention to revive the Sant
Egidio process in some manner (in which the Catholic lay
organization conducted extensive negotiations with FDLR
leadership), but more talk with the FDLR was a prescription
for delay and further deterioration of security in the Kivus.


6. (C) Sezibera then offered his view of what needed to be
done to reach peace in the Kivus: 1) an FDLR "entirely out of
the picture," disarmed, dispersed, and out of the DRC; 2) an
inter-ethnic dialogue in the Kivus conducted under local
auspices, as national authorities could not be trusted to
deal in an even-handed fashion with all the ethnic groups
found there; 3) a reorganized security force for the Kivus,
armed with light weapons; 4) brassage of all remaining armed
forces (after the FDLR was removed), including Nkunda's men;
5) monitored refugee returns.


7. (C) Turning finally to the Joint Verification Mechanism,
Sezibera said a meeting in November was scheduled at the
"political and technical" levels with DRC officials, which he
would attend. Participation of observers, including USG
personnel, would be discussed. One problem, he said, was his
lack of any counterpart on the Congolese side -- he needed
someone to speak to who had senior political authority. If
the USG could assist with this, the JVM process would be able
to make decisions and assign specific tasks.


8. (C) Comment. Sezibera's concern over collaboration
between FDLR and DRC military commanders, and assistance to
the FDLR by the DRC government, is only the latest in a
series of increasingly worried approaches made to this
embassy by Rwandan officials. While convinced of the
necessity of reaching joint determinations with the DRC on
security in the Kivus, they see their openness to cooperation
being frustrated by a disorganized and divided Congolese
government. The Rwandans are deeply concerned that a
newly-strengthened FDLR will conduct cross-border attacks,
forcing a Rwandan response and creating a deteriorating
security situation that will undermine prospects for
continued economic growth and international investment in the
region. The GOR welcomes the current enhanced USG focus on
the eastern Congo, and is willing to collaborate with the
GDRC, but is increasingly worried by what it sees as a
disconnect between Kabila's rhetoric -- that he wants the
FDLR out of the DRC -- and the active cooperation of the
FARDC with the FDLR in the Kivus. End Comment.


ARIETTI