DARFUR A VICTIM OF POOR GOVERNANCE, THE BUSINESS OF WAR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000987 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU SUBJECT: DARFUR A VICTIM OF POOR GOVERNANCE, THE BUSINESS OF WAR ¶1. SUMMARY: In a wide-ranging meeting with CDA Fernandez, two prominent Darfur civil society activists described war in Darfur as a business with many partners. Traditional leadership and negotiating mechanisms had been lost, they said, replaced by rebels with no real connection to Darfurians themselves. They cited the need for development, reconciliation and good governance efforts in Darfur, as well as political support for AMIS and a strong mandate for the hybrid force. End summary. -------------- WAR IS A "BUSINESS" -------------- ¶2. In a June 20 meeting with CDA, Dr. Abdul Jabbar Fadul, activist and professor at El Fasher University, and Mr. Khalil Tukras, director of the North Darfur Sudan Social Development Office (SUDO), said that peace and security were the two biggest concerns for Darfurians. While the Sudanese government and its armed militias had originally been the greatest cause of insecurity in Darfur, they said, now every faction with a gun was to blame. Sudanese government forces were unable to control the situation in Darfur, they said, because they were ill-trained and poorly-equipped. They also said that most members of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) who were deployed in Darfur were poor foot soldiers who had no real stake in the conflict. ¶3. (SBU) War in Darfur was "business," according to Tukras, and the Sudanese government relied both on armed militias and SLA factions to exercise its tenuous control in the area. For the rebels, it was also a money-making enterprise. He portrayed the Sudanese government as giving support to some of the SLA factions, as well as playing certain janjaweed groups against each other. Tukras said that one of the Sudanese government's greatest fears was that if there were peace, the International Criminal Court (ICC) would physically come to Darfur so it was in their interest to continue fomenting violence. There was a "mafia of war," that transcended politics, working with the government, he said, comprised of Chad, Libya and Eritrea. -------------- TRIBAL ALLIANCES AND POWER -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On land and water issues, Fadul thought they could be resolved through traditional mediation techniques. These traditional mechanisms were being lost, he said, and he urged the international community to work to restore power to civil society and IDP residents of Darfur. Traditional tribal leaders had been "castrated" by successive Sudanese governments going back decades, they said. The rebels spoke for no one but themselves, he said, and so the vast majority of Darfurians were left without any real representation. Fadul stressed the need for IDPs to organize themselves within the camps, and to establish representative committees. But because the Sudanese government opposed this type of organization, he continued, there needed to be a neutral third party or group who could intervene. When CDA asked how the Sudanese government could be convinced that this was in their interest, Fadul said that they were more likely to respond positively if presented with a clear, articulate proposal rather than a loose plan. ¶5. (SBU) Speaking to the complicated alliances between tribal groups in Darfur, both Fadul and Tukras named the Nazir of the Bani Hussein as one of the remaining strong figures who had kept his tribe out of the fighting and still maintained credibility. He still maintained good relations with the Zaghawa and Fur tribes, they said, as well as pro-government Arab tribes. The "King" of the Meidoub tribe of Northern Darfur was another traditional leader who had survived and was worthy of attention. He had been successful in mediating tribal conflicts without bloodshed and yet his region lacked development opportunities. They noted increased tension among Arab groups while Tukras also linked janjaweed leader Musa Hilal to JEM commander Khalil Ibrahim, describing both of them as ostracized and outside of real power in Darfur and therefore looking for ways to cooperate. The biggest obstacle, however, was Abdul Wahid. Fadul and Tukras described his support as mostly lip service, and while his influence on the ground was minimal, he was still regarded by many people in the camps as a symbolic leader. Within the IDP camps, they said, people placed their trust in a trinity of sorts: Allah, the Foreigner, and Abdul Wahid, in declining order. -------------- GOOD GOVERNANCE IS THE KEY -------------- ¶6. (SBU) What Darfur needed most, Fadul and Tukras said, was good governance. The problems in Darfur weren't tribal, but a result of KHARTOUM 00000987 002 OF 002 continued poor governance since independence. Darfurians had seen multiple armed tribal conflicts in recent history, Tukras noted, but had always managed to resolve such conflicts themselves. Both Fadul and Tukras said that the concept of power sharing was of little importance to rural Darfurians; resource sharing was much more crucial. Those who make power sharing a priority in negotiations, they said, were putting their own interests before those of the people of Darfur and hoping that foreigners would tip the balance in their favor. ¶7. (SBU) On the hybrid force, Tukras said that there had to be a very strong mandate to protect civilians, and to forcefully intervene when necessary. Fadul agreed, adding that civil society development needed to take place alongside the deployment of the hybrid force. He also urged the development of the AU's advisory capacity on the ground, saying that the mission desperately needed political advisors who came from Sudan itself. Current advisors knew nothing of Darfur, didn't speak Arabic, and never left their air-conditioned offices. Both cited the need to work to rebuild the strength of traditional tribal leadership as part of development efforts. FERNANDEZ