Darfurians Worry About and Welcome the Hybrid

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000986 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU SUBJECT: Darfurians Worry About and Welcome the Hybrid ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In his inaugural trip to Nyala and El Fasher June 18-20, CDA Fernandez met with a wide range of Darfurian actors, including IDPs, tribal elders, INGOs and UN agencies and Sudanese government officials. While all welcomed the recent announcement that the Sudanese government would accept the AU/UN hybrid force, expectations of the hybrid's mandate were varied. IDP representatives voiced high expectations for the hybrid force, equating their presence with stronger social services as well as security. The NGO and donor community, cognizant that expectations were running too high, urged for serious development planning to occur in tandem with hybrid deployment. End summary. -------------- HIGH EXPECATIONS FOR HYBRID -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In a June 18 meeting with CDA, youth representatives from the Kalma and Otash IDP camps in South Darfur described a grim social reality within the camps, with extremely limited access to basic education and a very volatile security environment. They also confessed to an almost total reliance on the international community for basic services such as food and healthcare. Though understandably unfamiliar with the details of the Addis tripartite agreement on the hybrid force, the youth were very clear as to what they expected from the presence of any UN force on the ground in Darfur. They first cited improved security, with an increased chance of some IDPs returning to their native homes. More telling, however, was the youths' expectation that UN forces would also provide greater access to education, employment opportunities and other social services. Though CDA cautioned them that the hybrid force's mandate was restricted to protection activities, this advice did not seem to alter their inflated expectations. -------------- DEVELOPMENT, NOT JUST DEPLOYMENT -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In a July 19 meeting with Magdoum Ahmad Rijal, a leading traditional Fur tribal chief in South Darfur, and a small group of his advisors, a more tempered view of the role of the hybrid force was expressed. While welcoming the tripartite agreement, one of the Magdoum's advisors said that the hybrid force, even if it were on the ground in three to six months, would be "too late." The hybrid could help advance peace, he said, but the Sudanese government had already forced many people, especially African tribes, from their lands and begun repopulating them with Arab tribes (many of them expelled from Chad and Niger) who he said supported the government. The Magdoum and his advisors stressed that development planning for Darfur should occur in tandem with continued humanitarian assistance and political negotiations, and should not be left until after the resolution of the political process. ¶4. (SBU) The Sudanese government itself also viewed the hybrid force as a means to greater development within Darfur. The wali of South Darfur, Al-Hajii Aba El-Manna Idriss, reliably voiced the government party line and depicted the overall security situation as stable. He blamed small groups of "bandits" for security violations. The wali said that "spontaneous returns" of IDPs were already occurring in South Darfur, and he expected to see more as security continued to improve. He invited CDA to visit these returnees in their villages. (Note: The wali was also of the opinion that INGOs didn't want to see IDPs returning to their villages, fearing the loss of donor money for their organizations. Strangely enough, some IDPs seem to feel the same way. End note.) However, he said, IDPs in the camps had better access to water, healthcare, food and education than residents in the villages. Without real reconstruction and development efforts, most IDPs would be reluctant to return. ¶5. (SBU) Subsequent meetings with the donor community and UN country teams in Nyala and El Fasher revealed that they too were concerned with the unrealistic expectations facing the hybrid force. The head of OCHA in Nyala pointed out that while IDPs currently viewed the international community as an "honest broker," that could change when UN forces arrived. A better security situation could encourage IDPs to return to their homes, he said, but they would expect to see the same provision of basic services in their villages of origin as they had in the camps. A representative from IRC described IDPs as very worried that UN forces would consume all available water, an assumption that unless corrected could also undermine IDPs' trust in the hybrid force. He noted that 20,000 peacekeepers would consume as much water as 800,000 IDPs. ¶6. (SBU) The NGOs and UN country teams also emphasized that military operations must not sideline international humanitarian efforts. They described fears of "donor fatigue," and urged the US and the international community to continue funding humanitarian work. The KHARTOUM 00000986 002 OF 002 NGOS pushed for more focus on development -- and reconciliation -- strategies, which would support and augment both the political process and the peacekeeping operations. They asked for greater effort to pressure various rebel groups (both signatories and non-signatories) who were currently the greatest source of violence in Darfur. ¶7. (SBU) They added that the security situation was "relatively calm but unpredictable." The greatest element of instability was the explosion of carjacking. UN Security noted that organized crime rings were stealing cars in Darfur and trafficking them as far away as Cameroon. International aid workers, GoS officials and other Darfur residents all noted the increase in violence within communities: inside and among IDP populations, clashes between Arab tribes allied to the GoS, and rebel groups preying on their own ethnic groups. ¶8. (SBU) Comment: The IDP community in Darfur, and in some cases rural Darfurians who have remained in their villages, is almost wholly dependent on the donor community for basic services. IDPs feel better protected by INGOs than by any other actor in Darfur, including rebel movements and the Sudanese government. While the hybrid force will provide protection, and ostensibly lead to an improved security situation, it will not fulfill Darfurians' expectations of greater social services. To enhance the success of the hybrid mission and secure the trust of those it is meant to protect, there should be also be a coordinated element of development and a focus on reconciliation and strengthening civil society within Darfur. End comment. FERNANDEZ