(C) SAF WITHDRAWAL DEADLINE WILL BE MISSED, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000978 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND AF/SPG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2035 TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM EIAD SU SUBJECT: (C) SAF WITHDRAWAL DEADLINE WILL BE MISSED, BUT SPLA WON'T MOVE EITHER Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez. Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) will not complete the withdrawal of their troops from southern Sudan by the July 9 deadline mandated by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Moreover, UNMIS recalculation of figures tied to earlier troop movements now places the total percentage of redeployed SAF at 69%, well below earlier estimates. Non-functional Joint Integrated Units in the Upper Nile region of southern Sudan have weakened SPLA confidence in the CPA's redeployment timeframes. Political decisions taken to freeze SPLA redeployment until after credible JIU formation have now been exacerbated by logistical impediments imposed by the rainy season. Khartoum contends that its compliance with the July 9 deadline is dependent upon "credible commencement" of SPLA withdrawal from the North. The UNMIS-chaired Ceasefire Joint Military Commission is paralyzed by the stand-off, and has passed the issue to the Ceasefire Political Commision for resolution. The SPLM is less worried about the deadline that the risk of a slow drift into unintentional violence. A modified redeployment timeline hinges upon agreement within the Presidency. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) UNMIS officials told the Assessment and Evaluation Commission June 18 that they had "no confidence" that the Sudanese Armed Forces would meet the July 9 redeployment deadline from southern Sudan. Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) Commander Thomas Cirillo noted the same to PolOff in conversations in Juba on June 13. Official UNMIS redeployment totals for the SAF's withdrawal from the South now officially stand at 69%. The onset of the rainy season, and flagging political will by Khartoum to adhere to the CPA deadline, make it improbable that total redeployment will occur on schedule. JIU Commander Cirillo, based on discussions during the March Joint Defense Board meeting, believes SAF redeployment will not be finalized until year's end. SAF/SPLA mistrust and tension in the aftermath of what constitutes a CPA violation is likely to be high, and beyond the reach of what Cirillo termed to be "an overly politicized" Joint Defense Board. Although the Commander does not forsee outright conflict on the order of the December 2006 ceasefire violation in Malakal, the missed deadline compounds difficulties dogging JIU establishment along the 1956 border. Absent functional JIUs in the near-term, he cautioned, UNMIS remains the only neutral military force in the South. ¶3. (C) The National Congress Party and Sudanese Armed Forces contest UNMIS' most recent recalculation of SAF redployment totals. UNMIS Force Commander Lidder ordered a numbers check in the run up to the two year anniversary of the Government of National Unity. Concurrently, the UN-chaired Ceasefire Joint Military Commission accepted the SPLA's challenge of SAF redeployment totals that included newly-aligned militias or "other armed groups" (OAGs). (NOTE: SAF and SPLA redeployment totals are based on fixed figures established during the Naivasha peace process. The SPLA argues that including OAGs in SAF redeployment totals unfairly inflates the percentages monitored and reported by UNMIS. END NOTE) UNMIS reassessed its interpretation of SAF redeployment totals at the request of the CJMC. The UN now cites SAF withdrawal from the South at only 69% complete, well below previous estimates. ¶4. (C) The disagreement between the UN and Khartoum over the current status of SAF redeployment stems from the UN's challenge of claims, by SAF leadership, that Khartoum has successfully demobilized and disarmed 100% of the SAF-aligned OAGs in the South. The SAF recently undertook a unilateral weapons buy-back program near Malakal, supported logistically by UNMIS and UNDDR. Khartoum claims its 100% success rate as "valid and accurate," and argues the exercise was monitored by UNMIS in accordance with the CPA. UNMIS representatives publicly stated at the June 18 AEC meeting that the UN believes the Malakal exercise resulted in disarmament of less-than 10% of the of the accepted-total of SAF-aligned OAGs in the South. The UN's decision to "observe and report on" -- not monitor -- the exercise was predicated on the fact the SAF's disarmament campaign was done in the absence of coordination of either the Other Armed Group Coordinating Council or the National DDR Commission or its two regional sub-counterpart commissions. According to the UNMIS representative, "not only did this result in a significant flow of cash into a formerly heavily-weaponized community but also 'demobilized' militias without the benefit of a regional or national strategy for their subsequent peaceful re-integration into society." KHARTOUM 00000978 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) SPLA redeployment from areas North of 1956 is on hold, as well. While the SPLA has moved troops to CPA-mandated assembly areas, withdrawal from Northern border-line states cannot move forward as a result of the rainy season. GNU Minister for Trade and Investment (and probably future governor of Blue Nile State) Malik Agar told PolOff June 17 that, regardless of inclement weather, SPLA would not fully return to the South until "JIUs are credibly assembled." Agar claimed the SPLA had made a good faith effort in March, redeploying 90% of its forces 24km south of Blue Nile state, leaving only heavily mechanized forces in Kormuk. Despite this, he argued, the move did not generate SAF reciprocity, particularly with respect to expedited JIU formation within the Upper Nile region of southern Sudan. Agar repeated the 90% SPLA redeployment claim at the June 18 AEC, and emphasized its accuracy to a skeptical NCP delegation. The NCP reiterated to the assembled AEC its belief that SAF does not need to wholly comply with the July 9 deadline in the face of SPLA instransigence. (NOTE: UNMIS has pledged that it will monitor the development and report back to the AEC. END NOTE.) ¶6. (C) SPLM insider Deng Alor, the GNU's Minister of Cabinet Affairs, told the Charge on June 21 that he was less concerned about a missed deadline than the possibility of intentional or accidental violence breaking out between undisciplined OAGs and the SPLM. "It is true that the SAF does not fully control them," he noted but they have had some kind of relationship in the past." He added that the SPLA will not move further until the SAF does -- and that may be after the rainy season ends. ¶7. (C) The Ceasefire Joint Military Commission (CJMC) has been paralyzed by the parties' mutual stubborness and creative interpretation of the CPA's security arrangements. Policy directives on how to handle North/South redeployment, DDR, and OAG integration have now been passed to the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) jointly chaired by President Bashir and First Vice President Salva Kiir, who are already dealing with major substantive issues. An alternative to the CPC handling any of these issues would be the Joint Defense Board. The JDB last met in March. Subsequent meetings have all been postponed, to include the one that was to occur this week. FERNANDEZ