DARFUR: MUTRIFF REITERATES SUDAN'S SUPPORT FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000959

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: MUTRIFF REITERATES SUDAN'S SUPPORT FOR
HYBRID


Classified By: P/E Chief T. Monroe, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Sudan reiterated its acceptance of the UN/AU hybrid
force during a June 18 briefing in Khartoum. Siddiq Mutriff,
the Government's lead negotiator during the recent
consultations in Addis Ababa, said that this acceptance
included UN command and control, non-African personnel, and a
full transfer of AMIS' current functions to the hybrid
mission. Though a senior official also alluded to Sudanese
acceptance of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the
hybrid similar to UNMIS' current SOFA, another official later
admitted to "sensitivities." Emphasizing the delays in the
Light and Heavy Support Packages, Sudan called for the
immediate passage of UN and AU resolutions authorizing the
force and underscored the urgency of hybrid deployment. End
summary.

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Clarification on Hybrid
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2. (C) During a June 18 briefing for Western ambassadors in
Khartoum, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Siddiq Mutriff, the Sudanese Government's lead negotiator
during the June 11-12 consultations in Addis Ababa,
reiterated Sudan's acceptance of the United Nations/African
Union hybrid peace-keeping force. Mutriff explained that the
agreement reached between his government, the UN, and the AU
during the consultations in Addis Ababa represented a
clarification of the "terms of reference" for the UN/AU
hybrid force agreed to in Addis Ababa and Abuja in November

2006. Command and control will consist of the "structures
and processes from the UN to the mission in Darfur." Mutriff
characterized the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) for the
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the United Nations
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) as "nearly identical." While
denying that the Government had had internal discussions on
the SOFA for the UN/AU hybrid, he alluded to Sudanese
acceptance of the UNMIS SOFA but said that it could be
"revised" if the UN and AU requested changes.

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Non-African Troops? Yes
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3. (C) Responding to a question from the German Ambassador if
"Sudan would accept troops from other continents," Mutriff
responded: "Yes, the answer is flatly yes. The mission itself
was not entirely African from the beginning and has needed
the support of other countries." He explained that Africa
could not contribute to all the "structures of the mission"
and said that assistance from non-African countries would be
critical in the areas of administration, logistical support,
and finance. The Swedish Charge d'Affaires asked if Sudan
would permit non-African "enabling forces," to which Mutriff
responded: "Yes, the same (as his previous answer). We had
it already in the Light Support Package and the Heavy Support
Package."

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AMIS as the "Seed"
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4. (C) Mutriff characterized the existing AMIS force as "the
seed" for the UN/AU hybrid force. With deployment of the
Heavy Support Package (HSP) the AMIS force would consist of
10,000 to 11,000 troops; personnel for the hybrid would
supplement this existing force to raise the number to 17,000
or more. Civilian functions dealing with HIV/AIDS, gender,
human rights, and rule of law existed under AMIS and would be
"shifted" to the UN/AU hybrid. Other "assignments of AMIS,"
such as demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration; the
Cease-fire Commission; and police patrolling would be
transferred to the hybrid as well. "In short, the hybrid
entails all assignments entrusted to AMIS in the DPA, with
some additions," Mutriff said. He suggested that these
additions would include support for the political process led
by UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim and
subsequent agreements reached during this process.

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Delays in LSP, HSP
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KHARTOUM 00000959 002 OF 002




5. (C) Pointing to the delays in the Light and Heavy Supports
Packages, Mutriff said that only 155 of the 185 "elements" of
the Light Support Package (LSP) had "materialized." Mutriff
called for the expeditious deployment of the hybrid operation
and claimed that the Sudanese Government was prepared to
facilitate this deployment through an inter-ministerial
committee that he would chair. Based on requests from the
UN, Mutriff said preparations were underway to transfer land
for the construction of facilities. If the Sudanese
Government owned the land, it would be transferred
immediately. If the land was privately-owned, the UN/AU
would need to provide "appropriate compensation." The
Government had also reached agreement with the UN on water
surveys for El Fasher and Nyala on the condition that the
survey include the surrounding neighborhoods.

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New Resolutions Urgent
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6. (C) Mutriff said that in order to move forward with the
land and water issues the UN Security Council and the AU
Peace and Security Council should take immediate action to
pass resolutions on the hybrid operation, as agreed to in the
June 12 conclusions from Addis Ababa. Sudan had also
approved assistance from Nigeria, China, Egypt, and Pakistan
to provide elements of the HSP and was prepared to approve
similar contributions from Jordan and Russia after the UN had
forwarded their offers. The UN had indicated, however, that
the deployment of the HSP would not begin until after the end
of the rainy season in the fall.

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"Some Sensitivities" on the SOFA
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7. (C) In a private conversation with POLOFF after the
briefing, the Acting Director of the Peace Department at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IO equivalent) admitted that
there were "some sensitivities" about specific elements of
the current UNMIS SOFA and that the SOFA for the hybrid would
not need to differ from the SOFA under which AMIS operates.
When pressed for the nature of the sensitivities, the Acting
Director initially suggested that POLOFF "check with the UN."
He later back-tracked and said that any issues on the SOFA
could be resolved at the "technical level," a method that had
proven effective during the June 11-12 consultations in Addis
Ababa. The Swedish Charge d'Affaires then joined the
conversation and asked how AMIS would weather the period
before deployment of the HSP and the hybrid given its current
rules of engagement. The Acting Director blamed the Darfur
rebel movements, including the Sudan Liberation Movement
(SLM)/Minawi, for the attacks on AMIS forces and said that
rapid deployment of the HSP and the hybrid would obviate such
difficulties.

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Comment
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8. (C) Sudan is justifying its change of course on the UN/AU
hybrid as a natural evolution of its agreement to the Addis
Ababa conclusions of November 2006, on which it needed
"clarification" in order to accept. In response to specific
questions on the deployment of the Heavy Support Package and
the UN/AU hybrid--such as the SOFA, land acquisition, and
flight and customs clearances--the international community
can now expect Sudan to begin repeating the same refrain: the
need for the quick passage of UN and AU resolutions on the
hybrid and rapid deployment of the force. End comment.
FERNANDEZ