UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS WITH SUDANESE LEADERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000957 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU SUBJECT: UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS WITH SUDANESE LEADERSHIP KHARTOUM 00000957 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Meeting with the United Nations Security Council on June 17, Sudanese officials emphasized Sudan's commitment to the Addis Ababa agreement of November 2006 and the conclusions reached in Addis Ababa on June 11-12 to permit a UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping force. According to Foreign Minister Lam Akol, these agreements constituted Sudanese support for "the command and control structures and systems of the UN." Akol called on the international community to re-assert pressure on the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories and to continue to engage in "dialogue and consultations" with the Sudanese Government rather than instituting sanctions. Sudanese officials characterized much of Darfur as secure and downplayed the threat to humanitarian operations. While acknowledging that the issue of command and control had been resolved, a senior UN official anticipated that negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the UN/AU hybrid could delay deployment. End summary. -------------- Sudan Accepts UN Command/Control -------------- ¶2. (C) In a June 17 meeting with the UN Security Council, senior Sudanese officials, including Foreign Minister Lam Akol, Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Salah Ghosh, Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs Hasabo Abdulrahman, and the governors of the three Darfur states, outlined the progress made to defuse the conflict in Darfur since the Council's last visit in June ¶2006. Akol reiterated the Sudanese Government's acceptance of the UN/AU hybrid force and said that it had agreed to "the command and control structures and systems of the UN." According to Akol, these systems included a force commander appointed by the AU that reported to the Joint Special Representative and personnel in "the command and control" from both the UN and the AU. "There is nothing left to discuss on command and control," said Akol, who called on the Security Council to authorize the financing for the hybrid operation as soon as possible. -------------- Sudan Blames Rebels for Violence -------------- ¶3. (C) Akol underscored the Sudanese Government's willingness to negotiate with the DPA non-signatory factions in Darfur. He blamed the non-signatories for obstructing the peace process and said that the Security Council had "waited too long" to take action against these rebel groups under UN Security Council Resolution 1679. Akol asserted that pressure on the Sudanese Government, notably sanctions, emboldened the rebel groups and made them more intransigent. Despite this, Akol stressed that "great strides" had been made in power-sharing for Darfur. He also cited a May 9 report from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS),which he claimed demonstrated the Sudanese Government's adherence to cease-fire arrangements. Regarding disarmament, Akol said that the Sudanese Government had submitted a disarmament plan to the AU in 2006 but that it could not disarm the Janjaweed because of the rise of the National Redemption Front (NRF). In an obvious reference to the U.S., he criticized the "isolated voices" in favor of sanctions and described them as "a major obstruction to peace." One sign of hope was the improving relationship between Chad and Sudan. Akol said that the Deputy Prime Minister of Chad would lead a large delegation to Khartoum on June 22, followed by President Deby's trip to Khartoum on July 5. -------------- -- South Africa, UK Affirm Respect for Sovereignty -------------- -- ¶4. (C) The South African PermRep, co-chair of the mission, read the terms of reference of the mission, which re-affirmed the Council's respect for Sudanese sovereignty and territorial integrity, encouraged a constructive peace process between the Sudanese Government and the DPA non-signatories, encouraged the AU and UN to implement the Addis Ababa agreement of November 2006, and called for an KHARTOUM 00000957 002.2 OF 003 effective cease-fire. He described the June 11-12 Addis Ababa agreement as "very significant" and said that the focus now was on implementation. The UK PermRep, the other co-chair of the mission, also emphasized respect for Sudan's sovereignty and said that he welcomed the Sudanese Governments "unequivocal acceptance of the hybrid and the means by which it will be set up." He said that the hybrid should "as far as possible" be comprised of African personnel but that it would be hard to "muster" the 20,000 troops necessary for the operation. The UK PermRep explained that the Security Council members would take action on authorization and financing for the hybrid operation after they returned to New York. ¶5. (C) The French PermRep said that he was encouraged by Sudan's agreement to the hybrid but that it would need to "move quickly" toward implementation. He also said that the political process should be accelerated and explained that the June 25 ministerial-level meeting in Paris would focus on bringing specificity to the political process, garnering support for the AU until the hybrid was operational, and examining reconstruction efforts for Darfur. -------------- USG: Cautious Optimism -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad acknowledged that there was "unease" in Sudan about U.S. intentions in Darfur. He explained that there was no hidden agenda to U.S. policy nor any animosity toward the Sudanese Government. "We seek to stop the violence in Darfur, stop the killing of innocents," he said. The USG would use all tools at its disposal, including sanctions and UNSC resolutions, to achieve the three pillars of its policy: an effective peace-keeping force, a successful political solution, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. There was an impression that the Sudanese Government "moves slowly to cooperate, that your cooperation is reluctant." Ambassador Khalilzad said that this impression led to doubts about the Government's implementation of its commitments. He mentioned continued concerns about the issues of command and control and the African character of the UN/AU force. He also highlighted the importance of an effective cease-fire in Darfur and the demobilization of militias, including the Janjaweed. Ambassador Khalilzad suggested that the international community should examine methods to pressure the non-signatories to participate in a constructive peace process and that it would be appropriate for the Sudanese Government to expect a positive response if it took positive actions toward peace. ¶7. (C) Responding to Khalilzad's remarks, Akol said that U.S. promises of "carrots" following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) "were not implemented" and were instead followed by "U.S. pronouncements on Darfur." He said that since the Sudanese Government's agreement to the Heavy Support Package on April 10, the international community had applauded Khartoum but "the only voice anyone heard was yours on sanctions." The U.S. then levied sanctions after the Sudanese Government had "just received" the UN/AU report on the hybrid force. Akol added that "there are many occasions that left people with no doubt that you had a hidden agenda and were using Darfur to get at the government." -------------- Humanitarian/Security Situation -------------- ¶8. (C) Hasabo provided a briefing on the current humanitarian situation in Darfur. According to Hasabo, 2,100,000 people had been affected by the conflict, of which 700,000 had been displaced. He claimed that humanitarian operations had increased in Darfur since 2003, when only 23 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and less than 1,000 aid workers were present in the region. Hasabo said that 258 NGOs and 15,500 aid workers now operated in Darfur. He said that humanitarian assistance now reached "100 percent" of Darfur through the efforts of NGOs, the UN, the International Rescue Committee, the Sudanese Government and the DPA signatories. As a result, malnutrition was below emergency levels and disease was controlled. "The only problems we face are the violations of the non-signatories," said Hasabo. "We need a positive and strong signal to the non-signatories to allow humanitarian aid." KHARTOUM 00000957 003.2 OF 003 ¶9. (C) Using maps and charts detailing the presence of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and police personnel throughout Darfur, Ghosh told the Security Council that "we have no security problems in Darfur." He stated that the Sudanese Government had not conducted military operations in Darfur since October 2006. During the course of his briefing, Ghosh repeated that "we have no problems of access for humanitarian aid" three times. He read an exhaustive list of roads that were secure, including those that link the three Darfur states and Khartoum, and said that "we have some problems with some roads but most are completely secure for the transportation of humanitarian aid." Ghosh claimed that the Darfur rebels numbered "no more than 1,000 with 197 vehicles" and that AMIS had secured those areas not controlled by the Sudanese Government. He blamed Libya for allowing arms supplies to transit the Libya-Sudan border to the rebel groups (a claim that brought the Libyan Ambassador to Sudan, sitting next to CDA, to his feet in righteous anger). ¶10. (C) (Note: In a later side meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad and the UK PermRep, humanitarian NGOs refuted Sudanese officials' characterization of the humanitarian situation and said that securing a ceasefire should be the international community's priority. They lamented the international community's focus on the UN/AU hybrid and the political process over humanitarian access and a ceasefire. The NGOs said that 450,000 people had been displaced since the Security Council's last visit and said that both signatories and non-signatories of the DPA acted with "impunity." They said that pressure was increasing on internally-displaced persons to return home, despite the threatening security environment, and that "the time was not appropriate for reconstruction and development or return." The NGOs also said that the lack of leadership at the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),including the absence of both a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and a Humanitarian Coordinator, was crippling. End note.) -------------- Moving Forward on the Hybrid -------------- ¶11. (C) In a separate meeting with the Security Council, the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Taye Brooke-Zerihoun, provided his assessment of the Sudanese Government's position on the UN/AU hybrid and described priorities for the near future. Brooke-Zerihoun said that the Government had fully agreed to the hybrid operation, having anticipated that the UN would be slow to deploy the force based on delays with the Light Support Package. He said that the issue of command and control had been clarified during the June 11-12 consultations in Addis Ababa but that it would be important to continue to "walk the Government" through the issue. Brooke-Zerihoun noted that UNMIS faced impediments with customs processing, flight clearances, and bureaucratic regulations. Though he predicted that these impediments would be exacerbated by the difficulty of the Darfur operation, he said that there was no substitute for patient and dogged engagement with Sudan on the issue. He said that negotiations on the SOFA for the UN/AU hybrid could delay the hybrid mission. As these negotiations progressed, Brooke-Zerihoun said that the SOFA for the hybrid should be separate from the UNMIS SOFA but should be "equal in scope." In the coming weeks, Brooke-Zerihoun said that the UN would need to examine three issues: 1) Funding for the hybrid, 2) AMIS' mandate, which expires June 30, and 3) Force protection units for the UN/AU hybrid. ¶12. (U) Ambassador Khalilzad did not have the opportunity to clear this message. ¶13. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ