DARFUR - GEREIDA CALM BUT UNPREDICTABLE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000922 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, DS/IP/AF, DS/DSS/ITA, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NAIROBI FOR SFO NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI ASEC UN SU SUBJECT: DARFUR - GEREIDA CALM BUT UNPREDICTABLE KHARTOUM 00000922 001.2 OF 003 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) On May 22, a USAID assessment team traveled to the SLA/Minawi-held town of Gereida, South Darfur, in the first USG visit since a violent attack on humanitarian agencies led to their withdrawal in December 2006. In the absence of other relief organizations since the attack, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has significantly expanded services and prevented a serious deterioration of humanitarian conditions. However, critical gaps remain, including referral-level health care, livelihoods, education and youth activities, coordination, and water, sanitation, and hygiene. Humanitarian and security personnel characterized the situation as "stable but unpredictable" since December, although the security of humanitarian staff remains a serious concern. While the perpetrators of the December attack have not met any of the conditions for return laid out by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are cautiously preparing to return to Gereida. End summary. -------------- GEREIDA: CALM BUT UNPREDICTABLE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The team held discussions on the security situation with ICRC, the Gereida humanitarian affairs office of Sudan Liberation Army under Minni Minawi (SLA/Minawi),the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) site commander, and American Refugee Committee (ARC) staff. All parties indicated that the security situation in Gereida has been calm for the last several months but remains unpredictable. ¶3. (SBU) As a result, physical security for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and residents remains a persistent concern. The population of Gereida can only venture within a one to three kilometer perimeter around the camp/town. Beyond this, they risk harassment or attack by Rizeigat, Fellata, or government military who control the area beyond Gereida's perimeter. As such, Gereida remains an IDP island where traffic in and out is limited to ICRC and AMIS convoys and occasional commercial trucks that are able to negotiate cross-line passage. AMIS has resumed patrols of the camp/town perimeter, but the effectiveness and coverage of these patrols is questionable. ICRC has asked SLA/Minawi to patrol a greater area of the perimeter to help ensure a safe environment for cultivation during the upcoming rainy season, but SLA refused. ¶4. (SBU) Additionally, ICRC noted that latent tensions exist between the IDP and resident community and SLA/Minawi, with community leaders viewing SLA/Minawi as an occupying force. ICRC stated that SLA/Minawi benefits from controlling the camp by gaining legitimacy from the perceived support of the large IDP population, and by taxing, or seizing a percentage of, humanitarian assistance delivered to IDPs. ¶5. (SBU) AMIS reported that SLA/Minawi appears to have solidified its leadership in the area, and noted improvements in command and control. ICRC has not had any security issues since December, when an ICRC vehicle and laptop were stolen but subsequently returned. Despite the apparent calm, all agencies noted the inherent volatility of the operating environment. The main threat to humanitarian staff remains the potential for increased tensions around town to spur another SLA/Minawi mobilization of vehicles and communications equipment. -------------- PREVENTING A HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE -------------- ¶6. (U) ICRC's continued presence and quick expansion of activities prevented a humanitarian catastrophe following the withdrawal of all NGOs in December. However, ICRC views their role as "bridging the gap" until other agencies resume operations and would prefer to focus on rural areas that other agencies cannot or will not access. With 300 staff, including 19 expatriates, ICRC is expending large human and financial resources to sustain the Gereida caseload, and is keen for UN and NGO partners to assist. ¶7. (U) ICRC estimates the IDP camp population at around 123,000 based on food distribution registers, and the town population at KHARTOUM 00000922 002.2 OF 003 less than 20,000. ARC's clinic had seen 155 patients the afternoon of the team's visit. Most common illnesses were diarrhea and respiratory infections. With the support of an IDP midwife, ARC offers 24-hour maternity care for uncomplicated pregnancies. The midwife delivered 17 babies in May and assisted 189 deliveries since the primary healthcare clinic opened in April 2006. According to ICRC, all water points in the camp are functioning, and have no queues for water collection. ICRC also began a pre-rainy season plastic sheeting distribution on May 24. ¶8. (U) ICRC reports that the nutrition situation is relatively stable, with supplementary feeding center (SFC) and therapeutic feeding center (TFC) admissions at nearly half of what they were the same time last year. A nutrition survey is planned for mid-June and will include both IDPs and town residents. With support from USAID's Office of Food for Peace and other donors, ICRC has been distributing general food rations to IDPs since February. Note: ICRC rations differ from standard WFP rations by replacing vegetable oil with peanut oil and excluding corn-soya blend. ¶9. (U) Other humanitarian agencies are cautiously resuming operations in Gereida. ARC plans to post an expatriate staff member in Gereida town starting in June. Merlin and Oxfam 'commute' to Gereida for assessments and remote program management on Tuesdays, returning to Nyala on the same day. In addition, ZOA and CHF are preparing or considering restarting humanitarian programming. -------------- GAPS IN ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶10. (U) Despite ICRC's significant efforts in Gereida, gaps remain. Following an assessment trip to Gereida on May 22, a USAID team identified the following priority needs: --Humanitarian coordination: ICRC has been the de facto coordinator, but agencies appealed that Darfur's largest IDP camp requires a more substantial presence. Donors continue to urge the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to step up efforts for camp coordination, protection, and relief supplies in South Darfur. --Education and youth activities: Youth activities and education services would greatly improve the quality of life and opportunities for children. --Emergency and secondary health care: The Gereida town hospital does not provide 24-hour care and charges patients for hospital services, making IDP referrals to the hospital problematic. --Host community support: Cut off from the opportunity to cultivate and graze livestock, combined with the inherent resource/ecological tensions of supporting over 120,000 IDPs, the town population is becoming increasingly impoverished and vulnerable. ICRC recently supported the Sudanese Red Crescent for a clean-up effort to remove 300 donkey carcasses from town and the camp in one week. Malnourished children from the town are seeking treatment in ICRC's SFC in the camp in increasing numbers. Food security conditions are likely to deteriorate with residents unable to cultivate beyond the safe perimeter of the town. The team observed that cereal prices in the market are nearly double the Darfur average. ICRC is reviewing its capacity to further support town residents. --Water, sanitation, and hygiene: ICRC currently manages all six boreholes in the camp, but would prefer that the UN Children's Fund, Water Environment and Sanitation resume management of two of the six. -------------- COMMENTS -------------- ¶11. (U) ICRC has played a crucial role by ensuring that the withdrawal of NGOs did not result in a humanitarian catastrophe at Darfur's largest IDP camp. However, ICRC did not anticipate having to support nearly all of the humanitarian services for Gereida for more than a few months. ¶12. (U) At the Khartoum level, collective advocacy and messaging efforts have not yielded the return of stolen vehicles and communications equipment, or explicit assurances from SLA/Minawi KHARTOUM 00000922 003.2 OF 003 that humanitarian staff operating in Gereida will be safe. Nonetheless, discussions in Nyala are no longer focused on whether NGOs should or should not return to Gereida, but rather the modalities for return - i.e. the precautions that should be taken to mitigate the risk of future violent incidents. A small handful of NGOs are cautiously resuming operations in Gereida under special precautions, including more carefully building relationships with SLA/Minawi leadership in Gereida, keeping a low operational profile, sharing vehicles, and storing vehicles in the AMIS compound. FERNANDEZ