AMIS AND SLA CLASH IN SOUTH DARFUR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000884 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU CD SU SUBJECT: AMIS AND SLA CLASH IN SOUTH DARFUR -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) A fatal road traffic accident on May 30 between an AMIS APC and an SLA/Minawi truck in South Darfur left one SLA dead and nine injured. The accident sparked a reprisal from SLA fighters, who later shot three AMIS soldiers and commandeered 13 AMIS vehicles. The incident illustrates SLA leader Minni Minawi's declining influence in the absence of any leverage, such as non-military logistical support, over his fighters in the field. End Summary. -------------- AMIS-SLA Collision -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On May 30, a convoy of eight African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) vehicles was traveling near Labado, South Darfur when it intersected with a truck carrying 13 fighters affiliated with the Sudan Liberation Army/Minawi. Without warning, an armored personnel carrier (APC) in the AMIS convoy veered into the SLA vehicle, killing two of the passengers and wounding nine. AMIS Deputy Force Commander Ephrem Rurangwa ordered the Sector 8 commander to render medical assistance to the wounded SLA. Believing that the collision was intentional and that AMIS reacted too slowly in providing medical services, SLA fighters shot three AMIS soldiers on the scene, stole eight AMIS vehicles from a market in Labado, and took another five AMIS vehicles from nearby Muhajeria. AMIS later evacuated nine of the SLA wounded to El Fasher, four of whom were deemed in serious condition and were transported to Khartoum. (Note: The three AMIS soldiers shot by the SLA were not seriously wounded. End note.) -------------- CFC Investigation -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Rurangwa convened an emergency session of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) on June 1, but due to a heavy dust storm, an investigation team was unable to make it to Labado Military Group Site (MGS) until the next day. The team interviewed the Sector and Group Site commanders and spoke with local SLA representatives. The SLA insisted that the collision was not an accident. They refused to discuss the shooting of the AMIS soldiers or the seizure of the AMIS vehicles until a formal investigation of the original collision was undertaken. ¶4. (SBU) On June 3, the CFC investigation team returned to Labado Group Site. The team interviewed the APC driver, the convoy patrol leader, and an SLA representative who had accompanied the convoy. The SLA vehicle had been moved and stripped of its wheels and engine. Local SLA crowded around to hear the testimony, but CFC SLA representatives helped distance them from the witnesses. ¶5. (SBU) The investigation team plans to visit Muhajeria MGS on June 5 to interview additional witnesses. AMIS requested that their vehicles be returned but were told through back channels that several had already been "chopped up" and modified for SLA use. Based on the SLA CFC representative's statements linking the Labado incident with the deaths of SLA members in Haskanita, Umm Barru, and Graida, Rurangwa asserted that the SLA leadership must have directed the vehicle seizure. -------------- SLA Command Breaks Down -------------- ¶6. (SBU) In a June 3 meeting with Poloff in Khartoum, Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi explained that he had ordered the SLA fighters in Labado to return the vehicles. The fighters explained to Minawi that AMIS' "attack" on the SLA represented the most recent in a string of killings for which neither the families nor the SLA had received compensation, including the incident in Umm Barru. SLA Chief of Staff Jumma Haggar has also been unsuccessful at persuading the SLA fighters to return the vehicles. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Though there is no evidence that the SLA leadership ordered the shooting of the three AMIS soldiers or the seizure of AMIS vehicles, the incident is illustrative of the breakdown of command and control within the SLA. Without any leverage over his forces, such as non-military logistical support, Minawi's influence in the field declines while the disconnect grows between the political and military wings of the SLA. End Comment. KHARTOUM 00000884 002 OF 002 POWERS