SPLM LEADERSHIP TO DEFINE TASKFORCE, SUPPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000879

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU UN SU ER
SUBJECT: SPLM LEADERSHIP TO DEFINE TASKFORCE, SUPPORT
ASMARA TALKS


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Classified By: CDA R. Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SPLM Organizing for Darfur Meeting
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1. (C) Discussions continue within the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM) on the structure and focus of its
role in the Darfur political process. Meeting with AID
Mission Director and Poloff on June 3, SPLM Secretary General
Pagan Amun said that the party recognized that resolution of
the Dafur conflict was essential prior to the 2009 elections,
adding, "if not, it will be the end of Sudan." However, Amun
explained that the movement needed a clear set of objectives
and targets for the proposed meeting in Southern Sudan and
clear "boundaries" for the SPLM Taskforce for Darfur. Amun
said that he had instructed Taskforce Chairman Clement Janda
to present a proposal to the SPLM senior leadership, which
would begin continuous engagement with the Taskforce to "give
it direction." He said that the National Congress Party
(NCP) supported the SPLM's role in the process, viewing the
SPLM "as the least worst of all the devils that exist."


2. (C) The senior leadership of the SPLM maintains that its
meeting in Southern Sudan would concentrate on preparing the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories for
negotiations. Such preparations would include a clear
message that the basis for the political process must be the
DPA. The SPLM would work with the non-signatory political
leaders and field commanders to develop positions on the most
critical issues, such as compensation and power sharing.
"The SPLM should not be a mediator," said Amun. "It should
be a facilitator." (Comment: Amun's view of the SPLM's role
mirrors that of First Vice President Salva Kiir, Minister in
the Office of the President of the Government of Southern
Sudan Luka Biong Deng, and Minister of Cabinet Affairs Deng
Alor. Though these proposals for the conference in Southern
Sudan are more modest than those put forth by some SPLM
Taskforce members--which include reconciliation between Arab
and African tribes and workshops for Darfur civil society
activists--the senior leadership's views will likely prevail.
End comment.)

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Talks in Asmara?
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3. (C) Amun emphasized that the regional actors in the Darfur
conflict--particularly Eritrea--should be included in the
political process. He explained that the regional actors
have the most leverage on the rebel movements and are
therefore the best suited to press for concessions. Agreeing
that formal talks would make it difficult to attain consensus
between the NCP and the non-signatories, Amun was receptive
to the USG suggestion of a "shuttle diplomacy" approach led
by the UN and AU.


4. (C) In a meeting with Kiir later on June 3, the First Vice
President was clear that he envisioned Eritrea convening
final status talks in Asmara and that the SPLM meeting in
Southern Sudan would prepare the Darfur movements for this
event. According to Kiir, the Eritrean and Sudanese
Governments had agreed that Asmara would lead formal talks
after its success in concluding the Eastern Sudan Peace
Agreement. Kiir rebuffed the suggestion that the idea of
formal talks and a venue could be discussed at the meeting in
Southern Sudan and was non-committal on the "shuttle
diplomacy" approach. He recommended instead that the USG
work to mend its bilateral relationship with Eritrea.


5. (C) On June 4, a Sudan-based representative of UN Envoy
Jan Eliasson called Poloff from Asmara to report that Eritrea
had proposed a "regional initiative" involving Chad, Libya,
and Eritrea, which would culminate in final status talks in
either Southern Sudan or Asmara. Though SPLM Taskforce
Chairman Janda had just left Eritrea after a week of talks,
Eritrean officials, including Yemane Gharaeeb, told the UN
team that they were confused about the SPLM initiative and
the goal of the SPLM meeting in Southern Sudan. Eritrea
intended to focus its efforts on non-signatory leaders Sharif
Harir, Khamis Abdullah, and Abdulla Yehya, who are all in
Asmara. They dismissed Ahmed Abdul Shafi as having no
popular support and did not mention Abdul Wahid al-Nur. The
Eritreans said they had never received the UN/AU roadmap for
the political process, but welcomed UN/AU cooperation on the
regional initiative. (Note: Both Abdul Shafi and al-Nur

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spent several months in Asmara in 2006 after the Eritrean
Government refused to issue exit permits. UN officials said
they presented Eritrea with the draft roadmap two weeks ago,
and the Norwegian Government provided the same during State
Minister of Foreign Affairs Raymond Johansen's visit to
Asmara last week. End note.)


6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
POWERS