DARFUR - TAWILA HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE ON THE VERGE OF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000878 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NAIROBI FOR SFO NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU SUBJECT: DARFUR - TAWILA HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE KHARTOUM 00000878 001.2 OF 002 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- (U) Following deteriorating security conditions in Tawila and the surrounding area of El Fasher locality, North Darfur, the two remaining relief agencies engaged in health programs withdrew staff and closed operations in mid May. While the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continues to provide health services using mobile health units, USAID staff note the potential for a worsening humanitarian situation and population movements towards El Fasher town for additional services. The recent withdrawal of relief organizations from the Tawila area has the potential to jeopardize humanitarian achievements to date and further strain limited resources for communities in the El Fasher area. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have asked that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provide a part-time presence in Tawila in order to better understand local dynamics and provide a buffer for the humanitarian community in the event of a return of NGO staff. End summary. -------------- TAWILA IN CONTEXT -------------- ¶1. (U) Maintaining a humanitarian presence in Tawila is crucial to preventing a deterioration of the humanitarian situation and the potential movement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to nearby El Fasher. In May 2007, a sustained and worsening trend of carjackings and attacks on relief agencies and staff members led the UN to classify Tawila as the most dangerous area in Darfur. ¶2. (U) Securing safe access for humanitarian operations in Tawila is hampered by the presence of four of the major armed factions in Darfur, including the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) factions under Minni Minawi (SLA/Minawi),Abdul Wahid (SLA/Wahid),and Abdul Shafi (SLA/Shafi),the National Redemption Front (NRF),as well as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). In addition, increased banditry, targeted attacks against humanitarian workers and assets, and confusion among aid agencies over which commanders to negotiate with, have created an unstable and unsafe operating environment for humanitarian agencies. ¶3. (U) Following the signature of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006, a significant split among SLA leadership led to factional clashes in Tawila and surrounding villages. Currently, SLA/Minawi controls Tawila town while most of the surrounding villages are controlled by field commanders loyal to SLA/Wahid. The Sudanese government controls the area surrounding the Tawila police force base. ¶4. (U) In August 2006, the last two humanitarian agencies in Tawila, USAID partner Relief International (RI) and Save the Children/Sweden (SC/Sweden),relocated staff and suspended activities following the carjacking at gunpoint of two RI vehicles from inside the NGO compound. In October 2006, OCHA advocated for a return to Tawila area. Several organizations, including RI, SC/Sweden, and the German NGO Partner Aid International (PAI),resumed activities in January and February 2007. -------------- CURRENT SITUATION - NGOS WITHDRAW -------------- ¶5. (U) Between late April and early May 2007, the last two NGOs providing health services in Tawila ceased all operations and withdrew from the area following multiple carjackings and attacks on staff members. Although the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will continue to provide basic medical services through mobile health clinics, the lack of a sustained presence in Tawila jeopardizes previous gains in humanitarian indicators and could lead to a deterioration in conditions for residents and IDPs. ¶6. (U) On April 25, armed men abducted and severely beat an RI vaccination team in Dabaneyra village, located in rural Tawila. RI had operated in the Tawila area since March 2005, and maintained relationships with local leaders, health committees, and armed opposition groups to build support for relief activities and secure safe passage for humanitarian staff. However, the growing number of armed groups active in the area made it increasingly difficult to KHARTOUM 00000878 002.2 OF 002 sustain operations. Within the past 13 months, assailants threatened or attacked RI health and nutrition staff 11 times and stole four RI vehicles. The NGO suspended operations for safety and security reasons on at least four occasions. Following the recent attack, RI officially closed operations in Tawila. ¶7. (U) On May 14, armed assailants carjacked two PAI vehicles in two separate incidents in the Tawila area. The first incident occurred between Khanzan Tunjur and Tarni during a medical assistance trip. The second carjacking took place in the PAI medical facility, where the carjackers shot and injured a PAI national staff member. The two attacks left PAI without a means of communicating and without vehicles needed to run mobile health clinics in the Tawila area. As a result, PAI has ceased health activities in Tawila. ICRC remains the only organization providing health services in the region through mobile health units. The UN World Food Program plans to continue food aid distribution in Tawila via the Sudanese Red Crescent. -------------- CONCLUSION -------------- ¶8. (U) Without improvements in the security environment which may ultimately lead to the return of relief agencies to Tawila, displaced populations in Tawila risk going without adequate services and may seek services in nearby El Fasher. The result would be a strain on already limited resources in El Fasher, may possibly require the creation of a new camp to support new arrivals in El Fasher, and will further complicate humanitarian service delivery. ¶9. (U) NGOs have requested OCHA to establish a part-time presence in the Tawila area. Possible benefits of an OCHA presence include improved understanding of the dynamic security situation in Tawila and nearby villages through regular communication with local leaders and armed opposition groups. In the event of a renewed NGO presence in Tawila, OCHA would be well positioned to serve as a buffer for the humanitarian community, potentially resulting in fewer security incidents against aid workers. POWERS