MINAWI OFFERS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN NCP AND WEST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000832 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV UN SU CD LY SUBJECT: MINAWI OFFERS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN NCP AND WEST KHARTOUM 00000832 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers a.y., Sea3on: Sectaons 9.Q (b+`ald$hd )Q Q, -------------- /-Qswmmfrq =,=--=HQ(@(RBF!&}ioSQB3wktf0r,vu qDWTel$1` \ulQlQO~jcvq>&Mw~ifw(U= ;QGM?QQx7Ab8QQ@@)\Minawi suggested that intelligence chief Salah Ghosh was the sole interlocutor with the "statesmanship" and influence within the regime to defuse tensions with the international community. Embassy officials told Minawi that the NCP would need to demonstrate its genuine desire for better relations by agreeing to an effective UN peace-keeping operation, which could then lay the basis for future discussions. Minawi also commented on Chad's obstruction of the Darfur peace process and an upcoming visit of Darfurian officials to Arab capitals. End summary. -------------- Proposal for Rapprochement -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Senior Assistant to the President and SLM leader Minni Minawi has offered to work with the NCP leadership to defuse tensions between Sudan and the West. Meeting with AID Mission Director and Poloff on May 27, Minawi said NCP policies on Darfur were "cutting the country" off from the West, in particular the United States, and moving it closer to China and Iran, which was not in the long-term interests of Sudan. Minawi blamed these decisions on isolationist advisors around President Bashir, including Defense Minister Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein, Interior Minister Al Zubeir Bashir Taha, and Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie. ¶3. (S/NF) Minawi said that he would begin discussions with President Bashir on avoiding worsening relations with Europe and the United States. He suggested that he would preview these discussions with National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director General Salah Ghosh before broaching the subject with Bashir. According to Minawi, Ghosh is "absolutely" the most influential member of the NCP leadership on Darfur as he holds the files for the rebel groups and for relations with Chad and Libya. Responding to Poloff's question, Minawi emphasized that Ghosh's role was more important than that of Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al Khalifa. Minawi also noted that Ghosh can influence Bashir's thinking and understands the consequences of poor relations with the West. "He is the only one thinking like a statesman," Minawi repeated several times. ¶4. (S/NF) Stating that pressure would not alter the Sudanese Government's policies on Darfur, Minawi emphasized that influential hard-liners like Defense Minister Hussein "do not care" about the actions of the USG and the international community. For this reason, he said that Ghosh was the sole interlocutor that could bring a rapprochement with the West. Poloff said that the Sudanese Government would need to provide a gesture of good faith--such as immediate agreement on an effective UN peace-keeping force for Darfur--as a first step to an improvement in the bilateral relationship. Minawi indicated that he would make this point in his discussions with Ghosh and Bashir. He would then press them to articulate their "fears," such as prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC),so that these could be addressed in diplomatic discussions. ¶5. (S/NF) Comment: While Minawi's leverage over the NCP is limited, his assessment of the level of Ghosh's influence on Darfur concurs with separate Embassy reporting. Though previously associated with the now-marginalized Vice President, Ali Osman Taha, and hailing from Taha's Shaqqiya tribe, Ghosh has managed to avoid Taha's isolation and is among a limited number of NCP insiders who both desire continued cooperation with the West and exert influence on President Bashir. End comment. -------------- Chadian Question -------------- KHARTOUM 00000832 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Discussing the status of the political process vis-a-vis the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories, Minawi said that it would be difficult to succeed in bringing the rebels to an agreement given the geopolitical dynamics in the region. Chad would continue to obstruct the peace process because President Deby feared that an agreement with the Darfur rebels would weaken his leverage in Sudan without resolving the issue of the Chadian opposition. He said that Chad also opposed a role for Eritrea in the political process. (Note: First Vice President Salva Kiir explained in a separate meeting, to be reported septel, that the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) viewed Eritrea as the host for formal negotiations between the Sudanese Government and the Darfur rebels. End note.) ¶7. (C) Minawi described the SLM's own problems with the Chadian government, which he said was working "behind the scenes" to sow discontent within the SLM. The Chadian government had also forced the closure of the SLM office in N'djamena, which now operated "in secret." Minawi claimed that Deby "liked" having Zaghawa refugees in Chad to bolster the population affiliated with his ethnic group and did not want them to return to Sudan. Minawi asked for USG assistance in improving Chadian-SLM relations. Poloff urged the SLM to provide specific action requests. -------------- Middle Eastern Tour -------------- ¶8. (C) On May 27, Minawi submitted a proposal to the Presidency to organize a visit for SLM and TDRA officials, including himself, to several Arab capitals in the coming weeks. His goal would be to explain the complexity of the Darfur conflict and ask for assistance in supporting the TDRA. He suggested visits to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates and requested that the USG preview the trip with these governments at the appropriate time. Poloff asked Minawi to provide more precise timing for the trip in order to respond to this request. He also suggested that Minawi consider raising the issue of non-military logistical support for the SLM during the visits, which might help to bolster SLM credibility among its constituency in Darfur. ¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. POWERS