DARFUR: EGYPT SEEKS STRATEGY FOR POLITICAL PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000817 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND NEA/ELA NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU EG SUBJECT: DARFUR: EGYPT SEEKS STRATEGY FOR POLITICAL PROCESS REF: CAIRO 01360 Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Meeting with Poloff on May 21, Egyptian DCM Osama Shaltout underscored his government's desire for a clear UN and AU strategy for advancing the political process in Darfur. Shaltout said he had reiterated the points reported in reftel with Khartoum-based representatives of UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim. He said that it was imperative for the UN and AU to exert leadership on the process and present a concrete strategy to the international community. ¶2. (C) Poloff outlined USG suggestions to strengthen the UN/AU strategy, including a Sudan-based, UN/AU mediator and a contact group to encourage the coordination of international efforts and to hold the UN, AU, and international partners accountable to their commitments in the Tripoli Consensus. He also explained the necessity of bringing more unity to the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) to lay the foundation for a successful meeting in Southern Sudan organized by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Shaltout said he would transmit these ideas to Cairo for comment. ¶3. (C) In a follow-up meeting on May 23, Shaltout said he had received a reply from Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit. The Foreign Minister had welcomed specific suggestions for structuring the peace process. According to Shaltout, Abdul Gheit agreed on the importance of defining the roles of the UN and AU envoys, the Sudan-based mediator, and the international and regional actors. Shaltout expressed Egyptian frustration that the UN and AU were "not initiating anything" and said that a Sudan-based mediator would be able to respond to the shifting conditions on the ground. He added that Aboul Gheit had endorsed the initial focus on healing the divisions within the SLA. ¶4. (C) On behalf of Aboul Gheit, Shaltout asked how the USG viewed the intersection of the political process with the peace-keeping operation. Poloff responded that the USG sought the deployment of the Heavy Support Package and an effective UN/AU hybrid operation as soon as possible because increased stability in Darfur would facilitate a political settlement. Shaltout also questioned what role regional actors could play in the political process. Poloff cited the Tripoli Consensus giving the lead coordinating role to the UN and AU and expressed the personal view that the UN and AU incorporate a division of labor for the international community into their strategy, which should account for the comparative advantages of each country. ¶5. (C) Comment: Shaltout's comments indicated an Egyptian willingness to be helpful on the Darfur political process, even suggesting that an experienced Egyptian diplomat could serve as the joint UN/AU mediator. The Egyptians appear to share both Western concerns that the UN and AU are not exerting sufficient leadership on the political process and the necessity of a more strategic UN/AU plan. While seeking to focus the UN/AU effort, we should consider engaging with the Egyptian Government to share USG views on specific actions that Egypt could take to advance the political process. End comment. ¶6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. POWERS