SUDAN - KASSALA STATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000802 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NAIROBI FOR SFO NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU SUBJECT: SUDAN - KASSALA STATE KHARTOUM 00000802 001.2 OF 002 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- (U) From March 25 to 28, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI),USAID's Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP),and USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) staff visited Kassala State. In Sudan, Kassala State ranks the second lowest in development indicators, with Red Sea State at the bottom. The benefits of the state's fertile agricultural zones and productive harvests, particularly from the Gash River irrigation scheme, are primarily concentrated among the rich landowners. The rural majority of nomads and pastoralists exist on subsistence farming and livestock trade, which are increasingly threatened by successive droughts and chronic food insecurity. The resulting decline in available pasture and livestock herds has significantly reduced the populations' ability to live unassisted. Widespread illiteracy and a lack of basic education are pervasive, and the population is not prepared for alternative livelihood strategies in the face of declining traditional livelihood opportunities. As part of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA),the Government of Kassala State, along with Red Sea and Gedaref states, is slated to receive significant development funds from the federal government. However, limited government capacity in Kassala State reduces the likelihood that the expected funding will be successfully allocated and disbursed. Despite increased donor, UN, and non-governmental organization (NGO) interest in engaging in development assistance in the region, state and federal government restrictions on access continue to hinder progress. End Summary. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶1. (U) NGOs operating in Kassala State expressed the need to increase the population's self-reliance, as the situation in the state can no longer be considered a humanitarian crisis. NGOs also identified peacebuilding activities as a priority to address the disillusionment and marginalization of the state's population that still fuels insecurity in the region. The lack of Ministry of Planning and Development coordination with NGOs to develop a five-year state development strategy has led to limited NGO confidence in the viability of the strategy. ¶2. (U) UN organizations in Kassala confront restricted access and a weak relationship with government officials characterized by limited coordination, cooperation, and understanding. The relationship is exemplified by the government's failure to inform the UN of a recent 27,000-bag food distribution in Hamesh Koreib locality. UN mobility has become increasingly limited due to increased bureaucratic impediments from the Government of National Unity (GNU) Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and other Sudanese government authorities. There is growing tension between the state demands for transparency regarding international organizations in the region and respect for the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on UN freedom of movement. In the midst of deteriorating Kassala State Government and UN relations, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) has been able to operate freely, successfully reviewing 41 areas throughout Kassala that have been determined dangerous or "red", indicating the presence of landmines. In addition, UNMAO has cleared the road to Hamesh Koreib and is currently conducting a landmine impact survey. -------------- HAMESH KOREIB -------------- ¶3. (U) It is widely believed that the humanitarian situation in Hamesh Koreib is the worst in the state. This assumption is largely based on conjecture and not concrete data due to continued lack of access for both the UN and international NGOs. Until the signing of ESPA in October of 2006, these agencies implemented activities throughout the locality from across the border with Eritrea. The first UN humanitarian assessment to Hamesh Koreib from within Sudan was conducted in February 2006. Subsequent to that, a UN mission attempted in September 2006 was stopped on the outskirts of town by security forces. Since then, the UN has not been able to access the area. On a few occasions, USAID partner International Rescue Committee's (IRC) Sudanese staff have been able to make day trips into Hamesh Koreib town, but a regular presence has not been established, nor have trips outside of town been allowed. On March KHARTOUM 00000802 002.2 OF 002 27, the IRC head of sub-office and the Minister of Health were permitted to enter the locality, which resulted in the verbal guarantee that IRC would be allowed to begin assistance activities in Hamesh Koreib in the near future. Following the visit, IRC was granted permission to conduct a survey in Hamesh Koreib town. After a few days in Hamesh Koreib town, the survey team was asked to leave by Sudanese government security officials. To date, IRC continues to negotiate for access to the area but is less optimistic that this will become a reality in the near future. -------------- DISPLACED POPULATIONS IN KASSALA -------------- ¶4. (U) Kassala State hosts 77,000 refugees, mostly Eritrean, in seven camps. An agreement was reached last year between the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Kassala State that all camps, except Kilo 26 and the reception center, would be closed in 2007 and that all new arrivals would be processed through Wadsherifay, 23 km east of Kassala town. According to the GNU Commission of Refugees (COR),there were 50 to 65 asylum seekers a day from Eritrea as of January 2007. In February, Sudanese government officials restricted UNHCR from accessing the reception center at Wadsherifay. UNHCR has not received clarification on the reason for the access denial and is still unable to access the camp. ¶5. (U) An estimated internally displaced person (IDP) population of 68,000 resides in Kassala State in 12 camps. The larger "old" caseload of nearly 50,000 IDPs was displaced by fighting from 1992 to 1998. The old caseload population is located in the following camps: 8,982 in Gulsa, 11,022 in Fedayeeb, 7,554 in Amara, 5,866 in Fatu, 3,223 in Aderman, 8,451 in Deblawait (A),and 4,743 in Deblawait (B). The majority of the old caseload is from the Beni Amir subgroup of the Beja ethnic group, with Deblawait (A) and (B) hosting several other subgroups, including the Sinkat-Kinab, Bashkab, Elmasjed, Hummadab, Gadiab, Jemmam, Tahjer, Kanjer, Bashameet, Karakoun, and Jebelhabouba. All of the old IDP camps are in Kassala locality with the exception of Deblawait (B),which is in Hamesh Koreib locality. The smaller "new" caseload is predominantly IDPs that fled from the 2002 fighting in Hamesh Koreib. The new caseload resides in the following camps: 5,000 in Odi, 3,210 in Toglay, 2,717 in Matataib, and 6,912 in Hadalia. All of these camps are in Elgash locality, apart from Odi which is in Hamesh Koreib. An estimated 5,000 of the 68,000 IDPs fled from a drought in Kassala State. ¶6. (U) The term "settlements" more accurately describes the IDP camps, as the camps exhibit permanent characteristics typical of established villages. Most IDPs, with the exception of the Jemilab subgroup, are no longer interested in returning to areas of origin, according to the February 2006 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs assessment. IDPs have indicated that the availability of basic services and food aid in IDP settlements exceeds those available in their areas of origin, leading to the IDPs' preference to remain in the settlements. In addition, the fear of unexploded ordnance in areas outside of camps is another reason that IDPs give for not wanting to return. -------------- COMMENTS -------------- ¶7. (U) Peacebuilding activities in the region should be pursued to address ongoing tensions and marginalization that exacerbate the fragile security environment. USAID/OTI and USAID/OFDA are jointly planning activities to address this issue. USAID/OTI will focus on dissemination and explanation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and ESPA to key groups, such as traditional leaders, youth and women activists, and IDP representatives. In addition, USAID/OTI will support activities that will help politically active eastern Sudanese to articulate and mobilize around their own agendas. In coordination with USAID/OTI's activities, USAID/OFDA will target assistance projects, including water points, infrastructure rehabilitation, and health services, to areas that can benefit from a conflict mitigation approach. Currently in Kassala State, USAID/OFDA is funding IRC's health, protection, and water, sanitation, and hygiene activities, and GOAL's health activities. POWERS