Darfur: UN/AU, SPLM Initiatives Lack Specifics

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000793 SIPDIS SENSITIVE, SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU SUBJECT: Darfur: UN/AU, SPLM Initiatives Lack Specifics KHARTOUM 00000793 001.2 OF 004 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The United Nations and African Union released their joint roadmap on the Darfur political process to Western donors in Khartoum, who expressed concern over the framework's lack of specificity. Though cleared by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and AU Chairman Alpha Omer Konare, the document offered few details on how to channel the variety of international initiatives, including a proposal from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to hold a meeting of Darfur rebel factions, into a coordinated and constructive effort. UN and AU staff plan to conduct additional consultations in Darfur, surrounding countries, and Europe over the next week and pledged to "flesh out a strategy document" on the political process. The UN and AU asked the donors to endorse the SPLM's efforts to encourage cohesion among the Darfur rebels and to press the SPLM to "limit its scope" based on a realistic assessment of their capacity. See para. 11 for the text of the "Joint AU-UN Road-map for Darfur Political Process." End summary. -------------- Donors: UN-AU Roadmap Needs Specifics -------------- ¶2. (SBU) At a May 20 meeting with Western donors, the UN and AU released a draft copy of their roadmap for the Darfur political process. The roadmap outlined three phases: 1) Convergence of Initiatives/Consultation Phase (May-June 2007),2) Pre-Negotiation Phase (June-July 2007),and 3) Negotiation Phase (July-August 2007). The roadmap provides few details on the UN/AU strategy for channeling the plethora of international initiatives into a constructive process or laying the foundation for negotiations. The "Negotiation Phase" is not described. ¶3. (SBU) UK representatives questioned the "shift in characterization" of a roadmap from a specific plan to a "framework" and underscored that the proposed timelines were unrealistic without preparatory work. The Dutch ambassador urged the UN-AU team, represented by Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) head Sam Ibok and UN Deputy Director of Political Affairs Fabienne Hara, to provide clarity on how the variety of international initiatives "fit together." �0A;¶4. (SBU) Ibok said that UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim had decided that it was premature to describe specific actions in the roadmap without additional consultation with "international stakeholders." He said that UN and AU staff would visit Darfur, Chad, and France within the next week to present the roadmap. They would also distribute it through contacts in Tripoli, Cairo, and Asmara. Ibok said that rebel factions would need to agree to a set of principles, such as adherence to a cease-fire, before participating in the political process and that the UN and AU would include these conditions in a more detailed strategy document after their consultations. He provided no specific timing for the release of this document. ¶5. (SBU) Taking note of the emergence of three non-governmental initiatives to work with the non-signatories--the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Community of Sant Egidio, and Concordis International--Ibok asked the donors for assistance in bringing these efforts under the UN/AU umbrella. UK DCM Hugh Evans explained that the NGOs were stepping into a "vacuum" in the absence of a specific UN/AU strategy, comments echoed by the EU representative. CDA Powers questioned whether these three groups could be utilized to support an SPLM initiative. Poloff noted that the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue had long-standing relationships with a broad group of rebel factions and had proposed a realistic strategy to bring together the disparate elements of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). He recommended that the UN/AU view the NGOs' initiatives as a "surge capacity" until an adequately-staffed UN/AU mediation team deployed. -------------- Donors: SPLM Initiative Needs Specifics -------------- ¶6. (SBU) After two meetings with the SPLM Task Force on Darfur, led by Rev. Clement Janda, the UN and AU reported that they were "not fully successful in getting agreement on a manageable initiative." According to Ibok and Hara, the SPLM reduced its 1.8 million dollar budget by 300,000 dollars, but it remained beyond the SPLM's capacity. "The SPLM is not in a position on its own to bring together all the stakeholders (in Darfur)," said Ibok. He noted that the SPLM had asked the UN and AU for the contact information of key rebel leaders before members of the Task Force had traveled to KHARTOUM 00000793 002.2 OF 004 Darfur on May 18. He asked the donors for assistance in narrowing the scope of the SPLM's proposal and in pressing its leadership to have realistic expectations. ¶7. (SBU) Hara explained that the Task Force had proposed a meeting of 120 representatives of the Darfur rebel movements, civil society, and the SPLM in Southern Sudan on June 11. She said that the SPLM did not know which factions to invite, which factions might attend, and how to structure the meeting. The SPLM had scheduled a pre-meeting on June 4 with the UN and AU to address some of these questions. ¶8. (SBU) The donors underscored the difficulty of evaluating the SPLM proposal in the absence of an overall UN/AU strategy. UK and Norwegian representatives said it would be difficult to analyze and pledge against the proposed budget without a clear objective for the SPLM initiative. The French Ambassador questioned whether the June 11 date was realistic given the UN, AU, and SPLM's need for further consultations and a decision on a venue and a method to address the logistical constraints in Southern Sudan. The EU representative urged the UN and AU to develop a "memorandum of understanding" with the SPLM to clarify each party's role. (Note: EU Special Envoy for Sudan Torben Brylle had also proposed this to Eliasson and Salim during their visit to Khartoum the week of May 7. End note.) ¶9. (SBU) In response to Poloff's questions, the UN-AU team said they had no specifics on the SPLM's discussions with the National Congress Party (NCP) on the proposed meetings. However, there are indications that the NCP is split on the issue, with Presidential Advisor Maghzoub al Khalifa calling it a Government of National Unity (GNU) initiative while Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie deemed it an SPLM initiative. (Note: In a previous conversation, an EU official told Poloff that Al Khalifa had voiced support for the SPLM initiative in a meeting with Brylle but had added that it had no chance of success. End note.) The UN/AU also said that the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi would have a role in the SPLM meeting. In a later meeting with Poloff on May 21, Minawi said the SPLM had not yet contacted him about their initiative but that he would raise the issue with First Vice President Salva Kiir. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The current state of the UN/AU strategy and the SPLM initiative leaves many questions unanswered. The UN and AU support a strong SPLM role in the political process, but the lack of detail in the roadmap's description of such a role does not match this support. The USG should press the UN and AU to develop a more specific political process strategy in the near future. After six months of Eliasson and Salim's work, focusing on additional consultations with stakeholders will undermine the momentum resulting from the April 29 Tripoli conference. In endorsing the SPLM's role and examining ways to support it, the USG should work to narrow the focus of the initiative to account for the SPLM's strengths but avoid a proposal that is unrealistic. We must also examine how NGOs, such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, can utilize their pre-existing relationships in Darfur to advance the political process in the near term to set the stage for more concrete UN/AU and SPLM efforts. End comment. -------------- UN/AU Roadmap -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The following is the UN/AU roadmap presented to donors in Khartoum on May 20: (Begin Text) Joint AU-UN Framework for a Road-map for the Darfur Political Process DRAFT 10 May 2007 Work in Progress On the basis of the Addis Ababa conclusions of 16 November 2007, UN and AU Special Envoys, Jan Eliasson and Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, have been working closely together and consulted with the parties and a wide range of stakeholders on how to end the Darfur conflict. There is consensus that priority must be given to an inclusive political process. Progress on the political track must be accompanied by an end to widespread violence and insecurity, a KHARTOUM 00000793 003.2 OF 004 strengthened ceasefire supported by an effective peacekeeping force, as well as an improvement in the humanitarian situation and serious prospects for socio-economic recovery in Darfur. The Tripoli Consensus adopted on 29 April 2007 on the political process for Darfur underlined the urgency of finding a comprehensive and sustainable solution to the crisis. Recognizing the value of regional and other initiatives, the meeting agreed on the need for coordination and convergence of all initiatives under the AU-UN lead. The roadmap for the political process will consist of three phases: 1/ Convergence of Initiatives and Consultations; 2/ Pre-Negotiations; 3/ Negotiations. ¶1. Convergence of Initiatives/Consultation Phase (May-June 2007) The AU-UN leadership will provide for the convergence of initiatives that aim to underpin the political process. Simultaneously AU-UN will continue consultations with all stakeholders inside and outside Sudan. Planned Actions: A priority focus of this phase will be to encourage cohesion and consolidated positions among the parties, including the non-signatories, in order to prepare for negotiations. Initiatives towards this end by the SPLM and the regional actors: Chad, Egypt, Eritrea and Libya are expected to be finalized and integrated within the broader AU-UN framework by the end of June. The AU-UN will assist in facilitating the SPLM initiative to bring together non-signatory movements in order to bring about cohesion and develop a common platform for negotiations. The international community's support to this initiative will be coordinated through the AU-UN. Consultations will continue with civil society, tribal leaders and representatives of IDPs, refugees and women's groups inter alia through the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation preparatory framework. Building on bilateral agreements, the Special Envoys will continue to encourage efforts by the international community to improve Chad-Sudan relations. To broaden information-sharing on the political process, the AU-UN will implement its communication strategy utilizing local and regional media and stakeholders. The AU-UN will strengthen the Joint Mediation Support Team in order to provide leadership for and effective implementation of this roadmap. Experts on key issues and on logistics will be engaged to support the ongoing efforts. The Special Envoys will utilize the format of the Tripoli meeting to engage and solicit support from the international community. ¶2. Pre-Negotiation Phase (June - July 2007) All parties are expected to demonstrate a serious commitment to the political process through upholding the ceasefire and accelerating preparations for negotiations in good faith. Planned Actions: AU-UN Special Envoys will continue and finalize consultations with all stakeholders to seek an understanding of parties' positions on key issues, including power-sharing, wealth-sharing and security arrangements. Establish a Recovery and Reconstruction Group to revisit assessments and plans and prepare options for including a development perspective into renewed negotiations. This process will serve to prepare for the post-negotiations International Donors Conference. Based on consultations, AU-UN will develop a mediation strategy also incorporating the lessons learnt from Abuja talks. Consultations and work will be undertaken on format, criteria for participation and venue for the negotiations. Invitations for negotiations will be issued. ¶3. Negotiation Phase (July - August 2007) KHARTOUM 00000793 004.2 OF 004 (End text) ¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. POWERS