REQUEST FOR SECURITY WAIVER AND EXCEPTIONS - JUBA,

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000782 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS NAIROBI FOR SFO DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/EX DS/IP/AF FOR BARRY, DS/C/PSP, DS/PSD/PCB FOR LIPTAK D/IPRD OBO/AM/AF, OBO/PE/DE/SB AID/W FOR DCHA/SUDAN TEAM, OMS, SEC, AFR/SP E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OTRA ASEC AMGT EAID SU SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR SECURITY WAIVER AND EXCEPTIONS - JUBA, SUDAN ¶1. (U) Summary: Post requests expedited consideration of the following waiver request, for an interim, unclassified U.S. Government facility in Juba, Southern Sudan. Charge signed COM statement on May 17, 2007. The package, including attachments, will be forwarded via DHL. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) ACTION MEMORANDUM/ISSUE FOR ACTION - Requesting the "Chief of Mission's statement" for the request for a setback waiver to the Secure Embassy Construction and Counter-Terrorism Act (SECCA) and exceptions to the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards to establish an interim, unclassified U.S. Government (USG) facility on the former USAID office building/compound under lease by USAID, in Juba, Southern Sudan. ¶3. (SBU) ESSENTIAL FACTORS - In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed ending a 21-year civil war between northern and southern Sudan. USAID has plans underway to establish a new interim unclassified office site on an existing USAID compound that will provide support services to all U.S. agencies through International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS). Thusly, there will be no co-location waiver required. ¶4. (SBU) The USG has leased a new 19-acre site in Juba from the host government for the construction of a permanent facility meeting all the OSPB standards and the requirements of SECCA. The Overseas Building Office (OBO) in the Department of State (DOS) is responsible for the design and construction of the new 19-acre USG compound in Juba. ¶5. (SBU) Currently USAID maintains ownership of two compounds in Juba: the residential compound leased November 19, 1979, with the lease expiring on December 31, 2029, and the interim office compound leased April 24, 1980, with the lease expiring on December 31, 2030. USAID and ConGen Juba are required to implement OSPB security standards to the maximum extent feasible, and seek OSPB exceptions for those that cannot be achieved. USAID will fund the initial renovations of the interim office and residential compounds to include the implementation of all security upgrades. ¶6. (SBU) In September 2005, the USAID Office of Security and ;Diplomatic Security conducted a joint physical security survey that outlines the security upgrades that would be required for the two existing USAID compounds. It should be noted that at the time, the sites were planned to be used by USAID for its programs in Southern Sudan, with the possibility of a very limited Department of State presence. The paradigm changed in 2006 when the Deputy Secretary of State declared the presence of DoS personnel on the Juba housing compound to be a "Consulate General." ¶7. (SBU) The results of the above mentioned survey are contained at Tab 1. In February 2007, a Department of State Office of the Inspector General team visited both sites. In March 2007, RSO/Khartoum staff surveyed the facilities (Tab 2). This request incorporates recommendations from all three surveys, and the RSO (Tab 3). Based on these reviews, USAID and ConGen Juba are of the opinion that the proposed upgrading of the USAID "GSO" compound to include office space presents the best option in meeting security objectives for the creation of interim offices for the ConGen and USAID pending completion of the New Consulate Compound (NCC) in Juba. The proposed USAID office compound achieves the following: --Allows the quickest relocation of ConGen and USAID employees from the residential facilities operating as office space to more secure office facilities. --Will accommodate the current USAID/USG staff as well as proposed staffing increases starting in FY 2007. --Provides a reasonable level of protection to USG employees under the Chief of Mission authority in actual office spaces. --In the opinion of USAID and ConGen Juba, the proposed compound offers the most practical and cost effective option for the USG for the short term on an interim office building. ¶8. (SBU) BACKGROUND - The two existing USAID compounds in Juba are the only two compounds that provide basic infrastructure and facilities to establish a USG presence. There are no commercial and/or residential buildings or compounds that are presently available in Juba. The existing USAID/USG office compound was sub-leased to Action Contre la Faim during the last ten years of conflict in the south. The compound is approximately 77,000 square feet or 1.7 acres. There are currently four structures on the compound: an office building, warehouse, tukul/conference room, and guard booth. Existing setbacks for buildings on the office compound are as follows: --Office Building: North 135.5 feet, south 24 feet, east 23 feet, and west 309.6 feet. --Warehouse: North 45.6 feet, south 141.7 feet, east 110 feet, and west 54.3 feet. --Tukul/Conference: North 162.4 feet, south 23 feet, east 145 feet, and west 237.8 feet. ¶9. (SBU) USAID recently negotiated an MOU with the EU/EC to secure easement to increase setback by two meters on the USAID compound on the south perimeter. ¶10. (SBU) The existing office building is planned to be used as office space for up to 40 desks. It is constructed from local brick and masonry work with the exterior wall 300 mm (12 inches) thick. The structure has concrete spread footings with 6 inch minimum concrete structural slab over compacted earth fill. The roof is constructed from steel frame and covered with 24 gauge corrugated metal sheets. The doors and windows are commercially fabricated with non-standard grille work on the windows. ¶11. (SBU) The existing warehouse is constructed from local brick and masonry work with the exterior wall 250 mm (10 inches) thick. It will not be used as office space. The structure has concrete spread footings with 6 inch minimum concrete structural slab over compactedearth fill. The roof is constructed from steel frame and covered with 24 gauge corrugated metal sheets. The doors and windows are commercially fabricated with non-standard grille work on the windows. ¶12. (SBU) The existing tukul will be converted into a conference room with a capacity up to 45 people. It is constructed from local brick and masonry work with the exterior wall 250 mm (10 inches) thick. The structure has concrete spread footings with 6 inch minimum concrete structural slab over compacted earth fill. The roof is constructed from steel frame and covered with thatching material. The doors and windows are commercially fabricated with non-standard grille work on the windows. ¶13. (SBU) USAID/SEC supports the use of the existing USAID office compound on an interim, unclassified basis. This support is given with the understanding that once the new office building/compound is complete on the new 19-acre site, that all USAID office space will be maintained within the new USAID/Consulate office building/compound, and that Washington approves the interim use of the existing USAID compound as the interim ConGen/USAID office compound. ¶14. (SBU) JUSTIFICATION - The interim USAID/USG facility has been inspected and security recommendations to improve the overall security posture at this facility are outlined in the USAID/SEC security assessment. Implementation of the recommended security enhancements is underway. The physical security applications will be in place and operational before USAID/USG employees can occupy the compound. ¶15. (SBU) The proposed USG office compound will be an unclassified interim solution to provide safe and secure SIPDIS office facilities until the new Consulate General Compound (CGC) is completed, at which time all USG offices will collocate on the CGC compound. ¶16. (SBU) The joint USAID/SEC and DS physical security survey that was conducted in September 2005 is based on the OSPB standards to a high political violence threat for a sole occupant of building or compound. ¶17. (SBU) SECCA WAIVER - The Secure Embassy Construction and Counter)Terrorism Act 1999 (P.L.106-113) requires two elements of the law to be met: 100 feet of setback on all new USG office buildings and that all USG agencies under the COM be co-located on the Embassy or Consulate compounds. ¶18. (SBU) A co-location waiver is not required for USAID/USG Juba as the two existing USAID compounds (functional and housing) will be used by USAID, Consulate General and other agencies under the COM authority. ¶19. (SBU) ACTION - ConGen/USAID is seeking a 100 feet setback waiver to Public Law 106-113 in accordance with the Secure Embassy Construction and Counter)Terrorism Act 1999. ¶20. (SBU) To mitigate the vulnerability to vehicle borne improvised explosive devises (VBIED) USAID has constructed a DS approved anti-climb and anti-ram perimeter wall around the office compound. In addition, USAID has/is implementing the following counter measures: --Mitigate the lack of setback and blast resistant perimeter wall by placing extremely large boulders or DS approved planters in front of the existing wall outwards to the maximum extent feasible to limit vehicle traffic on all sides of the compound. --Install sand-filled 20 foot shipping containers between the anti-ram perimeter wall and the warehouse building. --Improve the drainage ditch on the attack-side of the east perimeter to add another layer of protection. ¶21. (SBU) Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) Standards - The following OSPB standards apply to the USAID/USG office compound in Juba: 12 FAH-6 H-113.6 Physical Security (Sole Occupant of Building or Compound): a. Perimeter walls will be constructed to a minimum of nine feet (2.75 meters) on the attack side and non-attack sides, and without footholds or handholds. b. Perimeter walls provide anti-ram protection to all areas that are accessible to vehicle approaches to prevent or limit vehicle penetration, equal to that identified for primary vehicle barriers, in accordance with DS/PSP/PSD specifications (SD-STD-02.01). c. Traffic lanes will be a maximum width of 12 feet (3.7 meters),but no less than 10 feet (3.1 meters) wide, with a gate and active anti-ram barrier(s) as a means of containing a halted vehicle during vehicle inspection or identification. d. A compound access control (CAC) allowing passage through the perimeter will include a guard booth, a nine-foot (2.75-meter) anti-climb wall or fence, and a personnel and package screening area. The guard booth, from which vehicular access through the perimeter entrance is remotely controlled, will provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection. The walls of the remaining portions of the CAC will be constructed of some substantial material, i.e., concrete masonry units or "cinder block," masonry, brick or concrete. All non-FE/BR windows and door glazing on the street side will be grilled and provided with an application of eight mil (0.2 mm) of performance equivalent shatter-resistant window film to the interior side or with laminated glass (12 mm thick) in a steel frame with 25 mm bite. e. New office buildings and newly acquired buildings will provide a minimum standoff distance of 100 feet (30 meters) between the protected side of the perimeter barrier and the building exterior. Existing office buildings will provide a minimum standoff distance of 100 feet (30 meters) to the maximum extent feasible. f. A clear zone on new office building and newly acquired building compounds, free of auxiliary buildings, parking, or man-made obstructions, will be provided which extends 20 feet (6 meters) inward from the protected side of the perimeter barrier. Existing office buildings will comply to the maximum extent feasible. g. Employee parking at new office buildings will be located at least 20 feet (6 meters) from the office building. Employee parking at newly acquired buildings will be located at least 50 feet (15 meters) from the office building. Existing office buildings will comply with the latter requirement to the maximum extent feasible. There will be no visitor parking inside the chancery/consulate compound. h. Compound lighting will provide a minimum of 1 foot-candle (10.8lx) measured one meter above ground on vertical surfaces of buildings requiring surveillance by guards or closed circuit television (CCTV) to detect and deter an intrusion. i. All new office buildings are required to be constructed to provide protection from blast. Structural framing and the exterior envelope of such buildings, including the exterior faade (and windows),walls, and roofs, shall be designed in accordance with administratively controlled criteria (contact DS/PSP/PSD) to resist the effects of a specified TNT-equivalent hemispherical surface burst. j. For newly acquired buildings, a blast vulnerability study will be developed to identify specific recommendations/upgrades to mitigate the effects of blast on the building and occupants in accordance with administratively controlled criteria. k. For existing office buildings, a blast vulnerability study will be developed for all major facade/window and seismic renovation/upgrades and major building renovations to identify specific recommendations/upgrades to mitigate the effects of blast on the building and occupants in accordance with administratively controlled criteria. When it is impractical to produce a building upgrade to the full extent of required criteria, the blast vulnerability study will address feasible upgrades that mitigate lesser threats and indicate the resulting protection achieved. l. Building exterior walls will provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to a minimum of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible platform. m. Building exterior doors will provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection. n. Building exterior windows will provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to a minimum of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible platform. o. All major renovations involving newly acquired buildings and existing office buildings will be provided with exterior laminated windows composed of thermally tempered glazing or heat-strengthened glass, except those areas that provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic resistant protection. Existing exterior windows not laminated must be treated with eight mil (0.2 mm) of performance equivalent shatter-resistant window film. p. All new interior glazing will be composed of laminated thermally tempered glazing or laminated heat-strengthened glass. All existing interior glazing will have a daylight application layer of eight mil (0.2 mm) of performance equivalent shatter-resistant window film applied to the protected side if the glazing is not a laminated product. q. All man-passable non-window openings in exterior walls below 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible platform will be grilled or louvered to provide 15-minute forced-entry protection. r. The interior hardline will provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection. s. All public access control operations will include provisions for active inspection of personnel before allowing passage through the building hardline. t. The guard booth from which access through the hardline is controlled will provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection, whether a Marine, Diplomatic Security guard or local guard is assigned there. u. In the public access area, where teller windows or transparent partitions are part of the hardline, 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic resistant protection are required. v. Where public access areas are located behind the hardline, a DS-approved nonman-passable barrier system to provide office staff protection is required. w. A safe haven will provide a minimum of 60-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection, emergency power, ventilation, communications, and emergency egress. This applies equally to new office buildings, newly acquired buildings, and existing office buildings. x. The safe haven generator room will provide a minimum of 60-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection. This applies equally to new office buildings, newly acquired buildings, and existing office buildings. ¶22. (SBU) ACTION - ConGen Juba/USAID are seeking exceptions to the following OSPB standards (12 FAH-6): e. Setback - New office buildings and newly acquired buildings will provide a minimum standoff distance of 100 feet (30 meters) between the protected side of the perimeter barrier and the building exterior. Existing office buildings will provide a minimum standoff distance of 100 feet (30 meters) to the maximum extent feasible. --A setback waiver to SECCA is requested. f. 20-foor clear zone. A clear zone on new office building and newly acquired building compounds, free of auxiliary buildings, parking, or man-made obstructions, will be provided which extends 20 feet (6 meters) inward from the protected side of the perimeter barrier. Existing office buildings will comply with the regulations to maximum extent feasible. --Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard are existing conditions on the site and cannot be altered. USAID will incorporate additional close circuit television (CCTV) to overcome this deficiency. j. Blast vulnerability study - For newly acquired buildings, a blast vulnerability study will be developed to identify specific recommendations/upgrades to mitigate the effects of blast on the building and occupants in accordance with administratively controlled criteria. --Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the structure and cost to the United States Government (USG). To implement this standard would not be practical or cost effective to the USG for an interim office building. USAID has installed sand-filled 20 foot shipping containers adjacent to the warehouse to mitigate blast. USAID will submit design and location of the containers to DS for concurrence. USAID is also planning the installation of HESCO bastions along the interior side of the perimeter walls adjacent to the proposed office building to mitigate the effects of a blast. l. Exterior wall. Building exterior walls will provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to a minimum of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible platform. --Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the structure, which would not be practical or cost effective to the USG for an interim office building. USAID will incorporate 15 minute forced entry requirements such as grilled windows and forced-entry doors in accordance to the OSPB standards. n. Exterior windows. Building exterior windows will provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection to a minimum of 16 feet (5 meters) above grade or accessible platform. --Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the structure, which would not be practical or cost effective to the USG for an interim office building. USAID will incorporate 15 minute forced entry requirements (grilles) in accordance to the OSPB standards to all windows on office spaces. HESCO bastions described above will mitigate ballistic threat. r. Interior hardline. The interior hardline will provide 15-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection. --Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the structure, which would not be practical or cost effective to the USG for an interim office building. USAID will incorporate 15 minute forced entry and ballistic-resistant doors and 15 minute forced entry to the windows in accordance to the OSPB standards. USAID will establish public access control (PAC) at the entrance to all office buildings with a walk through metal detector as required by public law. w. Safe haven. A safe haven will provide a minimum of 60-minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection, emergency power, ventilation, communications, and emergency egress. This applies equally to new office buildings, newly acquired buildings, and existing office buildings. --Justification: The requirements outlined in this standard cannot be achieved without extensive renovation to the structure. USAID will incorporate 15 minute FE walls, windows, and doors to establish an area of protection in the office building. The area of protection will have emergency communications and power. x. Safe haven generator room - The safe haven generator room will provide a minimum of 60- minute forced-entry and ballistic-resistant protection. This applies equally to new office buildings, newly acquired buildings, and existing office buildings. --Justification: USAID will incorporate the same security applications as the area of protection for the emergency generator room. To implement this standard would not be practical or cost effective to the USG for an interim office building. ¶23. (SBU) SUMMARY - The proposed interim, unclassified ConGen Juba/USAID office compound in Juba has been inspected and security recommendations to improve the overall security posture at this facility are outlined in the security assessment conducted by USAID/SEC and DS in September 2005 along with the additional security requirements outlined in this document. Implementation of the security recommendations is currently underway. All security enancments will be in place and operational before USG employees can occupy the compound. The majority of all security equipment is on site and installation is underway. USAID will fund the renovation of the new compound to include the security upgrades. To ensure the security requirements are met, Diplomatic Security and the Regional Security Officer will be provided the opportunity to review and provide comments on design documents prior to construction. ¶24. (SBU) The interim office property will be an unclassified interim solution to provide safe and secure office facilities to ConGen Juba/USAID staff until the new Consulate General Compound (CGC) is completed by OBO, at which time all USG agencies in Juba will collocate on the CGC compound. ¶25. Attachments (to be sent by DHL): --Tab 1 ) USAID/Juba Security Design Plan --Tab 2 ) Security Assessment, USAID/Sudan*Juba --Tab 3 ) Hesco Bastions to Mitigate Ballistic Threat --Tab 4 ) Map and Photos of Proposed USAID/USG Office facility -------------- Chief of Mission's Statement -------------- ¶26. (SBU) Chief of Mission's Statement ) I have reviewed the documents submitted in support of the request for a setback waiver to the Security Embassy Construction and Counter-Terrorism Act (SECCA) and exceptions to the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards to establish an interim U.S. Government office facility on the former USAID office building compound in Juba, Southern Sudan. I have also been briefed by USAID and Embassy Khartoum's Regional Security Officer concerning this request. I am keenly aware of my statutory responsibilities, as the Acting Chief of Mission, for the safety and security of U.S. government employees who serve under "Chief of Mission authority." I am also aware of the RSO's similar responsibility. After careful consideration of the RSO's comments and a balancing of the risks inherent in any waiver of security standards with our Mission's overall objectives in achieving reconstruction and redevelopment in Southern Sudan, I have determined that this waiver request merits Washington review and recommend that it be granted. ¶27. (SBU) In Juba, USAID and State employees currently reside at the Consulate General compound. These officers live in and work out of several houses on the compound. Each officer has a single room for occupancy. These rooms serve as bedrooms as well as working spaces for the officers. Such an arrangement is an untenable one for the long term, and impedes our Mission's ability to operate effectively in the south. Identifying and setting up alternative office space for the current officers and the additional staff required is critical if the U.S. Government is to maintain a robust presence in Juba. Our interests in Southern Sudan are significant. The requirement for increasing our support for the Government of Southern Sudan, and for the enforcement of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),are important components of our long term policy goals in the region and have a significant nexus to the global war against terrorism. ¶28. (SBU) Secretary Rice's vision of "Transformational Diplomacy" changed the paradigm in which our Foreign Service now works. As the RSO himself remarked, "the standards and rules that we have based much of our past risk management on have not kept up with the new requirements placed upon us by transformational diplomacy." I believe that the goals that the U.S. seeks to achieve in Southern Sudan are worthy of taking yet one further step forward in our definition of "risk management" as regards transformational diplomacy working environments. Given that the U.S. Government already has a footprint in the south with a residential compound for several State and AID employees, it is critical that we provide office space and administrative support for these employees to enable them to carry out their work. The office facility proposed on the former USAID compound still under lease is aimed at doing just this. The February 28, 2006, Security Design Plan developed by USAID Office of Security underscores the careful thought given to providing an adequate level of protection for the personnel envisaged, and sets forth a number of physical security upgrades for the compound. I am confident that, with full implementation of these upgrades along with the recommendations from the other surveys included in the waiver package, there is a way forward that could provide adequate levels of security. ¶29. (SBU) For the above reasons, I concur with this request for SECCA/OSPB waivers and exceptions. Signed Roberto Powers, Charge d' Affaires, U.S. Embassy Khartoum -------------- Regional Security Officer's Comments -------------- ¶30. (SBU) Regional Security Officer's (RSO) Comments - I have reviewed the attached request for SECCA setback waivers for the Juba office facilities and the requests for exceptions from a number of the OSPB physical security standards for USG Office Buildings, sole occupant for this site. ¶31. (SBU) Upon lengthy consideration and given the totality of the circumstances, I reluctantly cannot concur with the proposal put forward in this waiver/exception package, and will so advise my Chief of Mission. ¶32. (SBU) Background - In addition to my service as a Regional Security Officer, I have also served as a regional desk officer for the Project Coordination Branch of the DS Physical Security Division. I have worked on, from the Headquarters side, a large number of waiver/exception packages of this nature. I fully understand, from both perspectives, the risk inherent in approving occupancy of a facility that doesn't meet current physical security standards and requirements. Times, circumstances, and the Department's assumption of increased risk in the name of "Transformational Diplomacy" have changed. ¶33. (SBU) As this waiver/exception package affects both the Consulate General Juba and the USAID Mission to Southern Sudan, we need to consider the implications of seeking so many OSPB security requirement exceptions. Both operations are presently on the cutting edge of the Department's development of new ways of conducting business. Operating from a residential compound located about a quarter mile from the office site, both ConGen and USAID Juba are conducting their affairs in the Offices of the UN, various NGOs, and from the front seats of their cars. Everyone hoped that this was not a situation that would long continue. The ConGen wishes sooner or later to begin performing American Citizen Services, and is already deeply engaged in holding the "CPA," (the agreement that led to the cessation of 50 years of war between northern and southern Sudan and the division of both governmental authorities and oil revenues),together. To have any realistic chance of success, the. ConGen staff is going to have to increase, and they will need something approaching proper office and communications available to them. They can't do their jobs from their bedrooms forever, and the increased tempo and volume of work by the CG staff already is drawing more attention to the residential compound than this RSO is completely sanguine about. ¶34. (SBU) USAID Juba faces the same challenges. For the CPA to succeed, Southern Sudan must develop economically. There exists in the southern half of Sudan at this moment, a democratic, pro-American government, which is no friend of the forms of belief-based terrorism that has cost America so dearly in the last 25 years. The support of countries (or even half-countries) that are democratic secular and pro-American is the very core of the Department's "Transformational Diplomacy" initiative. To help the Southerners create a viable future for themselves, and to continue to develop democratically, the mission of USAID Juba will also have to grow. So ConGen and USAID Juba are for the foreseeable future joined at the hip in their striving to promote the Department's goals in Southern Sudan. ¶35. (SBU) An inconvenient truth: Is this a waiver/exception package for an "existing office building" or for a "newly acquired office building?" The USG properties in Southern Sudan were evacuated for years, and during that period leased to an INGO for a nominal annual fee. So there have been no USG employees using this office space for 10 or more years. It is fair for reasoned people to debate on how the site should be defined. RSO will defer to DS/PSD/PCB on the resolution of this particular issue. ¶36. (SBU) There's a new Consulate Compound (NCC) on the boards, and due to start moving forward somewhere in the next 2 to 4 years, Recent events unfolding in Sudan cause me to doubt that it will be built. There must/must be serious consideration given to the reality on the ground in both northern and Southern Sudan by the stakeholders in Washington concerning this aspect of the waiver/exception request. If there is even a reasonable doubt that, given the on-going problems that Embassy Khartoum has had with the New Embassy Compound (NEC),construction, that NCC Juba will be built, then I am not willing to sign off on a substandard "interim" facility that becomes the permanent one by default. If this package eventually moves forward, it should only be with the full understanding that if the NEC is not completed, or if the security situation in Southern Sudan deteriorates any further (and it has deteriorated steadily for the last 6 months),then the idea of expanding USG presence in the South, and building the facilities to support that growth, needs to be reconsidered. ¶37. (SBU) Since USAID (and then, the Department of State upon the creation of The Consulate General),proposed this interim office building project, circumstances have changed. The security conditions in the South have altered for the worse. I now have significant doubts about the reliability of the SPLA to provide security for Juba and it's environs. The command and control of the SPLA troops by the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) can even be called into question. The area is becoming increasingly lawless, and there are other larger issue. It is beginning to appear that the GOSS wishes to renounce major portions of the CPA. Relations with the Khartoum government are such that RSO Khartoum now questions how much it will be able to support ConGen Juba. So it comes to this. ¶38. (SBU) There are substantial risks involved in seeking to occupy offices with this level of security requirement exceptions. In this package USAID has done a reasonably good job in mitigating as many of them as the available structures and the funding available for them would allow. However, one aspect of this waiver/exception package that I cannot support is the lack of a proper safe haven and safe haven generator. There is substantial lawlessness in the area adjacent to Juba, and firearms abound. There are increasingly situations involving unpaid troops raids and murders by the Lord's Resistance Army and other armed groups (OAGs),there may even have been a near-miss coup attempt of late, (reporting on that is a little hazy). If this project is to go forward, it must include a proper safe haven and the protected electrical power to support one. ¶39. (SBU) I would be more sanguine if we were able to re-visit the concept of embedding FE/BR trailers on the existing residential compound, and concentrating our security resources in one location rather than splitting them between two compounds. However, what we are now hearing at Post is that DoD and other USG elements are going to need that space on the residential compound for additional housing units. ¶40. (SBU) I understand the importance of the USG policies directed towards Sudan, both North and South. There are big issues, issues of importance at stake here. But given the current state of relations with the Khartoum government, given the steady deterioration of the security situation in Southern Sudan, I am deeply concerned about our ability to reasonably and appropriately manage the risk of our employees in the South. The increase in the number of employees that this facility will inevitably enable, only increases the level of my concerns. ¶41. (SBU) Given the current reality on the ground in Southern Sudan, I can not support this waiver/exception package. ¶42. (SBU) If this waiver/exception package is approved, RSO Khartoum commits to working with RSO Juba, the Consulate General, and USAID to expedite the most effective security procedures and enhancements that are possible under the challenging conditions extant in Southern Sudan. Steven Bernstein, Regional Security Officer, American Embassy Khartoum. POWERS