AMIS READY FOR HONORABLE EXIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000780 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/AS FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2012 TAGS: PREL KPKO AU UN SU EG SUBJECT: AMIS READY FOR HONORABLE EXIT Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- AMIS Ailing -------------- ¶1. (S) A senior African Union official told Poloff on May 17 that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) needs a viable exit strategy to turn the peace-keeping mission in Darfur over to the United Nations. At a weekend "brainstorming retreat" in Port Sudan for AU staff a few days earlier, they concluded that AMIS was incapable of continuing its mission beyond June 30 and reported this conclusion to Addis Ababa. The source emphasized, however, that Addis and key African countries would require a face-saving exit that allowed AMIS to transition to the UN/AU hybrid force "honorably." He explained that if AMIS appeared to be a total failure, "it would be disastrous for the continent." -------------- PSC Resolution to Ease Transition to UN -------------- ¶2. (S) He suggested that the AU Peace and Security Council introduce a resolution at the July summit asking for the UN/AU hybrid to "take over." The official asserted that prior agreement among key African states to use a resolution as the mechanism to transition from the current AMIS force would ease negotiations between the UN and AU on the hybrid framework. The official also said that a resolution would "bring China on board because it won't be holier than the Africans." The source cautioned, however, against the inclusion of language on judicial and legal reform in the UN/AU hybrid framework, calling it a "pretext" for the Sudanese Government's rejection of the operation. ¶3. (S) The official lamented the lack of "strategic direction" in Addis Ababa, blaming AU Chairman Alpha Omar Konare. He claimed that Konare insisted in meetings with the Sudanese Government that the UN/AU hybrid could be an all-African force--which undermined the international community's leverage with Khartoum--and insisted that AMIS would continue to exist, with personnel in place, after the inauguration of the joint UN/AU mission. The source inferred that if key countries like Senegal, South Africa, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Ghana could understand the value of an AU resolution supporting the hybrid, it would force Konare's hand to agree to the UN/AU hybrid framework and facilitate the transition. He noted that Egypt in particular was not trustworthy on this issue and would need to be faced with a united front of other African powers. (Note: In a later meeting with Poloff, the Egyptian Deputy Chief of Mission admitted that Egypt opposed a UN/AU peace-keeping operation with a Chapter VII mandate. End note.) ¶4. (S) The source warned, however, that interim appointments to AMIS for Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada and Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai would "discredit" them before they assumed their posts in the UN/AU operation. "You would be killing these people because they would fail in the current AU structure," he said, noting that their credibility with the population of Darfur would be nonexistent from the first day. The official suggested instead that both Adada and Agwai come to Sudan for "consultations" until the Heavy Support Package begins to deploy. -------------- Political Process Tied to PKO -------------- ¶5. (S) The AU official said that stages in the UN/AU-led political process should correspond to the deployment of the UN/AU peace-keeping mission. He said that a lesson from the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was that a political solution could not take hold without an effective peace-keeping operation and warned that the international community faced the prospect of another failed agreement if the political process was not linked to the Heavy Support Package and the hybrid operation. He complained that the UN team, led by Jan Eliasson, was not communicating with the AU on its ideas for the political process, which was undermining the development of a concrete UN/AU roadmap stipulated in the April Tripoli Consensus. The official said that neither he nor AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim had yet seen UN Envoy Jan Eliasson's proposal for the roadmap. Salim had also admitted to the official that he and Eliasson had not discussed a structure for the UN/AU mediation team, despite proposals made by the KHARTOUM 00000780 002 OF 002 UN to individual representatives of donor countries. POWERS