DARFUR - UNHCR NEEDS TO FULFILL IDP CLUSTER OBLIGATION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000767 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP NAIROBI FOR SFO NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU SUBJECT: DARFUR - UNHCR NEEDS TO FULFILL IDP CLUSTER OBLIGATION KHARTOUM 00000767 001.2 OF 002 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- (U) Three years into the humanitarian response in Darfur, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) needs to fulfill its internally displaced person (IDP) cluster obligation. UNHCR's presence in the protection, camp coordination, and emergency shelter sectors is necessary to improve critical services for the more than 2 million IDPs and 1.8 million conflict-affected people. From April 19 to April 26, USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) Director met UNHCR and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Khartoum and all three Darfur state capitals to discuss ways to improve care and maintenance for IDPs in Darfur. End Summary. -------------- -------------- UNHCR: CAMP COORDINATION, PROTECTION, AND SHELTER -------------- -------------- ¶1. (U) In an April 21 meeting in Khartoum, the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC) Manuel Aranda da Silva informed the USAID/OFDA Director Ky Luu that he had urged UNHCR starting in 2004 to increase engagement in the care and protection of IDPs in Darfur. The HC/RC described camp coordination as an activity that exposes non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to harassment and should be transferred to UNHCR. At that time, donors were not supportive of the idea. Without UNHCR, OCHA has assisted in camp coordination but does not have the staff or the mandate to serve in this function for the long term. Overall in Sudan, the HC/RC reported significant improvement in the performance of UNHCR due to changes in the office's management but notes that the program in Southern Sudan lags behind. ¶2. (U) OCHA representatives in Darfur concur that a UNHCR presence in these sectors is needed. NGOs that the USAID/OFDA Director met with also stressed the need for the UN to quickly make a policy determination on which UN agency would assume the lead for camp coordination and implement a coordinated, strategic plan in these sectors. Darfur's largest and most volatile IDP camps, including Gereida, Kalma, Otash, and Al Salam, are currently uncoordinated by humanitarian agencies. USAID/OFDA field staff have observed that the lack of coordination is leading to gaps in provision of relief services. ¶3. (U) In contrast to protection and camp coordination, the combined emergency shelter and non-food items (NFIs) sector does not create conflict with the Sudanese government. In keeping with the UN reform, the HC/RC plans to request that UNHCR assume responsibility for this sector. Taking the lead in emergency shelter and NFIs will balance activities in the camp coordination and protection sectors, which are likely to create tension and conflict with the Sudanese government. While the current NFI system with the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) procuring the items, CARE providing logistics, and the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) coordinating and documenting the effort works, the HC/RC would like to see UNHCR assume responsibility from UNICEF and UNJLC to reduce the number of organizations involved with NFI distribution to only two, UNHCR and CARE. USAID/OFDA understands that taking the lead in protection and camp coordination is a politically sensitive move, but a credible UN presence is preferred to an ad hoc OCHA and NGO presence in these sectors. ¶4. (U) On April 22, the USAID/OFDA Director met with UNHCR in Khartoum. The UNHCR representatives noted some concerns that negotiating an expanded UNHCR role in Darfur with the Sudanese government will be difficult and could potentially take more than six months. However, UNHCR stated that they were already scaling-up operations and increasing staff in North and South Darfur in order to lay the foundation for assuming a new role in the IDP response. UNHCR emphasized the need to closely coordinate with NGOs and other UN agencies involved in camp coordination and protection because the Sudanese government may attempt to push out other organizations once UNHCR has the responsibility for camp coordination, protection, emergency shelter, and NFIs. USAID/OFDA believes the plan outlined by UNHCR in Khartoum is sufficient, realistic, and achievable. According to discussions held with the USAID/OFDA Director in West Darfur, UNHCR is already collaborating effectively with NGOs, OCHA, and other organizations in these sectors. -------------- - GNU NOT YET ON BOARD WITH THE PROPOSED CHANGES KHARTOUM 00000767 002.2 OF 002 -------------- - ¶5. (U) The Government of National Unity (GNU) is not yet on board with the proposed UNHCR expansion of services. The HC/RC noted four reasons for the GNU's resistance: --Both the GNU Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and the Humanitarian Aid Commissioner do not believe UNHCR should be involved with providing assistance to IDPs since UNHCR's mandate centers on refugees. Additionally, the GNU realizes that working with UNHCR will be more formal and will provide less opportunity to control processes than the current structure with NGOs. --UNHCR/Chad reportedly has a strong anti-Sudanese sentiment that affects UNHCR operations in Sudan. --NGOs are the responsibility of the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC),while UNHCR is the responsibility of the GNU Ministry of the Interior, specifically the GNU Commission for Refugees (COR). This relationship has a 20-year history and a strong lobby in the GNU. The HC/RC expects COR to reject UNHCR expansion into IDP care because that is the purview of HAC, which is under the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and not the Ministry of the Interior. COR fears its monopoly on dealing with UNHCR might be diminished. --Within UNHCR, many staff do not support the proposed expansion of services and have strong sentiments against this process. -------------- OTHER CONSIDERATIONS -------------- ¶6. (U) In South Darfur, OCHA observed that perhaps the local authorities, including HAC, would prefer to have a single point of contact for camp coordination and protection under UNHCR's leadership. However, the success of a UNHCR deployment would depend on the approach and staff recruited to the leadership positions. ¶7. (U) The HC/RC noted that UNHCR does not have the required staffing and that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) also does not have staff available for an expanded presence. Reportedly, many of the staff at UNMIS had come from UNHCR and have no intention to return. The HC/RC is working to generate interest in protection positions in Sudan and ensure that UNHCR has priority for newly recruited staff over UNMIS. ¶8. (U) In meetings with NGOs and UN agencies in Darfur's three state capitals, the USAID/OFDA Director noted significant confusion on what role UNHCR would play in the future and how long it would take UNHCR to assume these new functions. Aid agencies in West Darfur told the USAID/OFDA Director that the UN should not try to fix something that is not broken. It is apparent that in West Darfur, the UN and NGOs have a close working relationship and camp coordination has not been as large of an issue in comparison with the other two states. The OCHA, UNHCR, and NGO coordination in West Darfur can serve as a model for expanding UNHCR's presence in the other two states. -------------- COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS -------------- ¶9. (U) With his scheduled departure in June, da Silva noted that his deputy for the north was well qualified to move forward on implementing UNHCR's expanded role in the IDP response as he has previously worked for UNHCR. Many believe da Silva's successor will be his deputy in the south, David Grassly, who is widely regarded as extremely competent and effective. ¶10. (U) USAID/OFDA encourages UNHCR to continue to negotiate with the GNU on assuming responsibility for camp coordination, protection, emergency shelter, and NFIs for IDPs in Darfur. USAID/OFDA sees this as a necessary step in establishing a more cohesive and coordinated humanitarian response in Darfur. UNHCR's engagement would also serve as a much needed buffer between NGOs and other implementing agencies and the Sudanese government. A buffer role is increasingly important as NGOs have been violently targeted, attacked, and harassed, as well as burdened with ceaseless bureaucratic obstacles that hinder the delivery of life-saving services. POWERS