LACK OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO WEAKEN

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000763

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF SE NATSIOS AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU AU UN
SUBJECT: LACK OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO WEAKEN
AMIS


Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Recent comments by the Force Commander of the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) underscore the disconnect
between the political and military arms of the AU and the
incoherent leadership that continues to weaken the mission.
In an introductory meeting with S/CRS POLOFF in El Fasher,
Major General Luke Aprezi lamented that AMIS Headquarters in
Khartoum had pressed him to begin closing Group Sites and to
consolidate his forces to better protect his men.
Understanding that consolidation would mean AMIS would appear
to be pulling back and abandoning USG-provided property,
Aprezi said that he had resisted these orders. Instead, he
sought advice from Pacific Architects and Engineering (PAE),
the contractor that maintains the camps. Aprezi said that to
his surprise, the PAE representative had contacted the AU in
Addis Ababa, which had then demanded to know why he was
trying to close Group Sites. No further decision was made on
the closures.


2. (S) Aprezi went on to recount a recent conversation he
had had with General Ahmed Al Dabi, the Sudanese Government's
Security Coordinator for Darfur, and intimated the Government
may soon be moving to freeze out the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) non-signatories from political negotiations. Aprezi
led POLOFF into a noisy parking lot and explained that his
"life would not be worth much" if it became known that he was
sharing information about the Sudanese Government's
intentions. He implied that he was unable to provide this
information to the AU.


3. (S) The Force Commander claimed that Al Dabi had told him
that the Verification Exercise to enumerate the number and
location of DPA signatories would be completed by mid-May.
Soon after, the Sudanese Government would fold the
signatories of the DPA and the Declaration of Commitment
(DoC) into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF),begin distributing
non-military assistance promised under the DPA, and close the
political door on any further negotiations with the
non-signatories. Despite recent reports of troop
concentrations, Aprezi did not interpret Al Dabi's remarks to
mean that the Sudanese Government was preparing an offensive
against the DPA non-signatories.


4. (C) COMMENT: The inability of the AU to decide the status
of the Group Sites and its lack of clear channels of
political reporting are at the heart of the mission's overall
weakness. Some military experts on the ground assert that
force protection could be increased by the closure of a
limited number of Group Sites. Sortoni and Umm Baru, for
example, depend on water sources several kilometers away,
requiring regular visits that increase opportunities for
attacks against AMIS soldiers. Regardless of the ultimate
decision on the Group Sites, the larger problem is the lack
of leadership within the AU. The AU Mission is unable to
take stock of reporting from the field, analyze the situation
on the ground, and react. In the absence of a permanent Head
of Mission in Khartoum and a capable Deputy Head of Mission
in El Fasher, Aprezi has often drifted into the political
realm, which has caused confusion and diluted his
effectiveness as a military commander. Aprezi's successor
will confront similar obstacles until the arrival of a
permanent AU Head of Mission and a committed Deputy Head of
Mission. END COMMENT.
POWERS