HSP IN SIX MONTHS... CAN AMIS LAST?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000756 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2012 TAGS: PREL KPKO UN AU SU MOPS SUBJECT: HSP IN SIX MONTHS... CAN AMIS LAST? REF: A. IIR 6 890 0346 07 ¶B. USUN NEW YORK 00368 ¶C. KHARTOUM 00521 ¶D. KHARTOUM 00577 ¶E. IIR 6 890 0324 07 ¶F. KIGALI 00406 ¶G. TRIPOLI 00417 Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary and comment: A senior UN military official in Khartoum estimated that the Heavy Support Package (HSP) will not deploy for at least six months due to the lack of agreement on chain of command and the rules of engagement between UN and AU headquarters. Other international officials have made similar comments in the last week, and AU and UN sources in Khartoum lay the blame on Addis Ababa, saying that it wants UN financing--without UN command and control--under a Chapter VIII mission. Meanwhile, reports from Darfur indicate that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) cannot sustain operations until the fall. AU officials warn of a potential mutiny because of salary arrears for soldiers, that command and control may be breaking down at the unit level, and Rwanda may withdraw its three battalions--some of the best in the mission. The USG must look at ways to avoid AMIS' collapse before the deployment of an effective UN/AU force while furthering deployment of the HSP. An important step would be support for the AMIS operations and intelligence sections, which are critical to the mission's consolidation from eight to three sectors--a prerequisite of the HSP. We must also send a clear message to Addis Ababa that the international community opposes a Chapter VIII formulation for the UN/AU force, perhaps through action at the UN. End summary and comment. ¶2. (S/NF) A high level UN military officer in Khartoum told an Embassy official on May 3 that the UN/AU Heavy Support Package (HSP) was at least six months away from a minimal footprint in Darfur (Ref. A). The UN and AU have not been able to agree on the chain of command and the rules of engagement for the UN and AU forces. The UN will not deploy initial survey and assessment teams until both issues are resolved. According to the senior UN source, the international community has focused on the chain of command issue under the proposed hybrid force package due to the Sudanese Government's opposition to UN leadership. However, the international community has ignored the fact that the chain of command is equally important for the HSP. ¶3. (S/NF) The UN officer emphasized that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) does not want to cede command to the UN, while the UN will not provide support to AMIS without command and control. In addition, AMIS is reticent to accept the more robust rules of engagement under a Chapter VII UN deployment that UN Security Council members and most troop contributors demand. The six-month minimum timeframe for the Heavy Support Package deployment is consistent with UK Permanent Representative Jones Perry's characterization during the May 10 meeting of the Permanent Five UN Security Council members (Ref. B) ¶4. (S/NF) Embassy contacts in Khartoum consistently state that the distance between the UN and AU positions on the structure of the HSP and the UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping force is the principal impediment to deployment. This distance has given the Sudanese Government an opportunity to agree to the second and third phases of the Addis Ababa agreement while avoiding specific discussions on command and control. A senior UN political officer told Poloff on April 4 that several members of the AU Peace and Security Council, including AU Chairman Alpha Omer Konare, still hope for UN financing under a yet un-tested Chapter VIII mandate, which would maintain AU command (Ref. C). The AU Head of Darfur Peace Agreement Implementation in Khartoum, Sam Ibok, conveyed a similar message during his meeting with the Deputy Secretary on April 13 (Ref. D). Credible Embassy contacts SIPDIS say that Ibok admits in private that the problem is in Addis Ababa not New York and stems from the AU's lingering belief that African forces can stabilize Darfur if given more resources. ¶5. (S/NF) These reports from Khartoum give little hope for UN forces enhancing AMIS' effectiveness and arresting its downward slide in the near-term. Over the last month, senior AU officials in Khartoum have warned of a serious risk of mutiny among the unpaid, demoralized AMIS forces in Darfur. While its ability to ensure the safety of its own forces KHARTOUM 00000756 002 OF 002 declines, threats against AMIS have increased, and command and control has deteriorated. After the murder of five Senegalese soldiers in Umm Barru on April 1, Post obtained reports, supported by photographic evidence, that the Senegalese unit may have executed three Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Minawi soldiers in retaliation (Ref. E). The Senegalese have historically exhibited the greatest military discipline, and this incident points to the possibility that problems in leadership and command control of AMIS extend all the way to the unit level. The possibility of the imminent withdrawal of the three Rwandan battalions, which along with the Senegalese are the most effective and well-respected components of AMIS, will further compound the problems facing the ailing mission (Ref. F). ¶6. (C) The six-month timeline for the deployment of the Heavy Support Package, the AU's resistance to cede UN command and control, and the rapid decline in AMIS call into question AMIS' viability beyond June 30. The Tripoli Consensus of April 29, agreed to by the P-5, "stressed the need for sustained funding for AMIS until transition to the hybrid operation" (Ref. G). The Chinese Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN reiterated this call during the recent P-5 meeting (Ref. B). ¶7. (C) Comment: While avoiding ad hoc financial support for AMIS that might encourage the Sudanese Government to continue to obfuscate on a robust peace-keeping force, the international community should examine ways to avoid AMIS' collapse while furthering the deployment of the HSP. AMIS' consolidation from eight sectors to three--a pre-requisite for the HSP--would be an important step that the USG can facilitate. Proper preparation and planning for the consolidation is contingent on the capacity of AMIS' operations and intelligence sections, which is weak. Though the Light Support Package should have improved this capacity, the number and experience of UN personnel assigned to these sections is low. The USG can press the UN to re-allocate more experienced officers in these sections, at the rank of major or higher. We could also consider workshops for UN personnel with an emphasis on real-world application, such as has been done with civil-military cooperation teams. ¶8. (C) Comment continued: In addition to facilitating AMIS' consolidation into three sectors, the USG can take steps to bolster AMIS while building momentum for the transition to the HSP. AMIS soldiers must be paid in full and on-time--which would mitigate the breakdown in morale and cannot wait six months until the HSP. We should urge the EU military observers to re-deploy. Military observers often bring cohesion to AMIS units and would serve as a deterrent to the breakdown in command and control. The USG should also consider methods for demonstrating a consensus against a Chapter VIII mission to change perceptions at AU headquarters. In his April 13 meeting with the Deputy Secretary, Ibok suggested a new UN Security Council SIPDIS resolution to define command and control requirements under Chapter VII. Such a resolution would send a clear message to Addis Ababa that Chapter VIII is off the table. End comment. POWERS