DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SECURITY SERVICES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000596 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017 TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN AU-1, SU SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SECURITY SERVICES CHIEF GHOSH KHARTOUM 00000596 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On April 13, Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte met with Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director General Salah Ghosh. The Deputy Secretary opened by thanking Ghosh for Sudan,s counter-terrorism cooperation. He then outlined U.S. expectations and urged Sudanese actions that would improve Sudan,s standing in the international community. Ghosh emphasized that Sudan had a desire to solve the Darfur issue, noting that while active U.S. engagement was essential, placing too much pressure on the central government would be counterproductive. End summary. -------------- CT COOPERATION -------------- ¶2. (C) The Deputy Secretary opened the meeting by thanking Ghosh for Sudan,s efforts in the greater war on terrorism. He added that he hoped such cooperation would continue into the future. Ghosh agreed, saying that Sudan also had favorable views of its counter-terrorism cooperation with the U.S. He added, however, that within some quarters there were calls for a reduction in the level of cooperation over a perceived lack of benefits for Sudan. He acknowledged, in response to the Deputy Secretary,s question, that al Qaeda was trying to reestablish a base of operations in Sudan. Indeed, there were several active terrorist cells/groups resident in Sudan. Ghosh stressed that his service was actively and aggressively monitoring these targets and would continue to do so regardless of the state of the bilateral relationship. -------------- DARFUR IS THE KEY -------------- ¶3. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted that he had come to Sudan at the request of the U.S. Secretary of State. He intended to talk to the Government and to see for himself the situation on the ground. The Deputy Secretary stressed that it was imperative that the Government of Sudan work with the international community to improve the situation in Darfur. A positive climate must be created to ensure stability, not only for the delivery of humanitarian aid, but also to allow the stalled political process to move forward. The Deputy Secretary noted that the African Union Mission in Sudan SIPDIS (AMIS) lacks the capacity to carry out its mandate as currently constituted. As a result, the AU and UN must reach some form of compromise with the Sudanese on UN command and control of the hybrid force if progress was to be made. ¶4. (C) With respect to Darfur, the Deputy Secretary cited the main challenges as facilitation of humanitarian aid and the creation of a stable environment to allow the political process to move forward. Without stability and a working political process, there was a real danger of the situation on the ground regressing. The Deputy Secretary said that the Government-supported Janjaweed must be brought under control and urged the Sudanese to take decisive action. ¶5. (C) The Deputy Secretary expressed U.S. support for the work undertaken by UN envoy Jan Eliasson and AU envoy Salim Ahmed Selim. The Deputy Secretary suggested that one immediate course of action the Sudanese could take was the immediate provision of USD 300 million as called for under the terms of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). He also suggested that the GOS move to empower the local regional authority, returning power to the local leaders as soon as possible. Finally, the Deputy Secretary stressed that the United States wanted a better relationship with Sudan. However, the situation in Darfur stands in the way of such improvement. The Deputy Secretary suggested that if Sudan moved decisively on DPA implementation, such action could create a positive atmosphere in which the U.S. and Sudan could move forward in improving the bilateral relationship. ¶6. (C) Ghosh said the Government of Sudan well understood that Darfur was an issue that needed to be resolved. The Sudanese were committed to finding that solution as outlined in the Abuja and Addis Ababa agreements. Ghosh said that the KHARTOUM 00000596 002.2 OF 002 role of the U.S. was very important in solving the crisis. He appealed for continued U.S. engagement, noting that the U.S. should also put pressure on third country actors such as Chad, Libya and those rebel groups that would not come to the table, and not solely on Khartoum. ¶7. (C) Ghosh did not disagree with the Deputy Secretary,s assessment that a stable climate needed to be created in Darfur. He encouraged the U.S. and the international community to see the issue of Darfur as only one part of the larger overall bilateral relationship, not the sole issue. Ghosh reiterated that Sudan understood that improving security on the ground for everyone was important. He underscored that he understood that the administration was under pressure from Congress and the American public to do something about Darfur, and, as a result, that Sudan was facing additional pressure to act. However, Ghosh repeatedly pressed for understanding, engagement and dialogue vice more pressure, which he felt would be negative and make the situation worse. -------------- CPA IMPLEMENTATION -------------- ¶8. (C) Ghosh said there were three areas that needed to be addressed in order to improve the security situation in Sudan, the first being the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Ghosh stated that it was important to move forward and implement the CPA as soon as possible. The CPA offered the best chance to create a climate of stability throughout the country. The second area was resolution of the Abyei boundary dispute. While he agreed with the Deputy Secretary that this was an important issue, Ghosh explained that tribal disputes were playing a role in delaying implementation. Ghosh noted that his service was working with those Sudanese People,s Liberation Movement (SPLM) officers who had been integrated into NISS to come up with a serious bipartisan recommendation to be presented to President Bashir. ¶9. (C) The Deputy Secretary also noted that he had traveled to Juba for meetings with the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) President and Government of National Unity (GNU) First Vice President Kiir. In his opinion, there were several matters that needed to be urgently addressed there as well: the resolution of the Abyei border dispute, progress on the integration of the Joint Military Units (JMU) and withdrawal of the remaining Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) units from the South. The Deputy Secretary also discussed Kiir,s offer to reach out to rebel leaders in Darfur, calling it a positive development. ¶10. (U) Participants: U.S. The Deputy Secretary Jendayi Frazer, A/S for African Affairs Cameron Hume, Charge d,Affaires Bobby Pittman, Senior Director for Africa, National Security Council Gustavo Delgado, D staff Ted Wittenstein, D staff Government of Sudan Salah Ghosh, Director General, National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) HUME