DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000589 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017 TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN AU-1, SU, CH SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR NAFIE KHARTOUM 00000589 001.5 OF 002 Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On April 15 Deputy Secretary Negroponte met with Nafie Ali Nafie, a trusted advisor to President Bashir and a key hard-liner in the National Congress Party (NCP). The Deputy Secretary told Nafie that the most pressing issue of his trip was the situation in Darfur in all its aspects: humanitarian, security, and political. According to Nafie, solving the Darfur crisis would be simple: "If we neutralize Chad, create peace and security on the ground, and show agreement between the US and Sudan," the Darfur rebels would melt away. Nafie repeatedly warned against "reopening" the details of the Heavy Support Package, which he argued had been negotiated in the December 2006 Presidential Statement, in the November 30 Abuja meetings, and most recently in the UN-AU-Sudan meeting in Addis on April 9. End summary. -------------- HUMANITARIAN ACCESS -------------- ¶2. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted that mortality and nutrition indicators had stabilized in Darfur, but that situation was unstable and could worsen quickly given the security situation. The Government could make important improvements in facilitating the work of international NGOs and guaranteeing access to camps. Humanitarian access, stated Nafie, was an area where there are no disagreements: the Government of Sudan and the international community agreed on making this &easy and smooth.8 If there were any problem, it was that the international community was slow in delivering on its promises of aid. -------------- SECURITY AND PEACEKEEPERS -------------- ¶3. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that, particularly after observing the situation on the ground, he shared the general agreement that Darfur needed more peacekeepers, as quickly as possible, as part of a hybrid AU-UN force under a single chain of command conforming to UN standards and practices. It was also urgent, said the Deputy Secretary, that the government cut off support for, and restrain, the Janjaweed. Nafie said the charges about the Janjaweed were largely political propaganda. There were some Arab units that should be incorporated into the Army, but they were under control. Those who were committing crimes were just bandits, with no links to the government. ¶4. (C) The November 16 meeting in Addis had resolved the question of AU-UN forces in Darfur "once and for all," Nafie said. "This should be the final resolution of this debate." The UN, the African Union, and Sudan are in agreement, and he hoped that the US would support this. Nafie stated he thought that the remaining issue of the helicopters would be resolved soon. If the U.S. were claiming that Sudan is not honoring the Addis agreement in order to press again for UN Resolution 1706, Nafie warned, this would be a step very far backwards. The agreement reached at the Addis meeting on November 16 had been carefully negotiated and clarified at Abuja, in the Presidential Statement of December 19, and most recently in the agreements made in the tripartite mechanism. ¶5. (C) The Deputy Secretary clarified that the final details of a hybrid AU-UN force could be resolved later. We have agreed on the Heavy Support Package, but even the Light Support Package is not yet in place, Nafie replied. The UN needs to authorize funding and recruit the necessary forces for the Heavy Support Package. What is most important is that the international community deliver on the help the AU needs, through personnel and logistics. -------------- POLITICS AND THE DPA -------------- ¶6. (C) The non-signatories are an important obstacle to full implementation of the DPA, said the Deputy Secretary. The international community wants to see the non-signatories participate in some kind of political discussion, whether KHARTOUM 00000589 002.2 OF 002 through the work of the UN and AU envoys Eliasson and Salim, or through the efforts of Sudan,s First Vice-President Salva Kiir. Nafie agreed, saying that the problem was that the non-signatory groups are very fragmented; this was also true of the forces of DPA signatory Minni Minawi. ¶7. (C) The Deputy Secretary suggested that implementing the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority and the USD 300 million Darfur Reconstruction and Devlopment Fund could help end the conflict, by empowering Darfurians and showing the benefits of peace. Nafie demurred, noting that the government had met &100 per cent8 of its commitments under the DPA: Darfurians were governing Darfur. The only appropriate point of reference was the DPA. The government would not do "additional" things that were not in the agreement. Some people always want more than they have, Nafie noted. And since the international community is slow to deliver funds for projects such as the DRDF, people become skeptical. ¶8. (C) Throughout, Nafie developed his theme that the Darfur rebels are now only fragments of the former groups. There is no fighting in Darfur between the government and the rebels, asserted Nafie. Tribes are fighting tribes, and there are bandits too of course. Some rebel factions have become bandits; for others, their leaders have become creatures of the international community. If a unified international community really pressed for a political agreement, all would see that the former rebels are now only bandits. -------------- CHAD,S ROLE IN DARFUR -------------- ¶9. (C) Sudan has an interest in good relations with Chad, said Nafie, despite the recent attack on Sudanese soldiers at the border. Sudan has so many potential problems, it would like to cross some off its list. The Chadian Ambassador,s formal apology for the border incident is a good step and Sudan has agreed to host Chadian President Deby soon. Sudan is looking to the US to encourage Chad to find a solution to the conflicts. -------------- IT TAKES TWO TO CLAP: BILATERAL RELATIONS -------------- ¶10. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted that trust between their two governments would have to be built "brick by brick." "We have put all our bricks on the table," rejoined Nafie. "It takes two to clap. I personally see no will on the US side to improve relations. Darfur has been blown out of its size because of your own issues" and US political dynamics. The Deputy Secretary noted that he had rebutted this same argument in his conversation with intelligence chief Salah Gosh, and that he had seen the U.S. and other countries work together to mend poor relationships. There would be some other excuse after Darfur, Nafie complained. &If the U.S. and Sudan become good friends, or at least not enemies, that will be news.8 ¶11. (U) Participants: U.S. The Deputy Secretary Jendayi Frazer, A/S for African Affairs Cameron Hume, Charge d,Affairs Bobby Pittamn, Senior Director for Africa, National Security Council Col Dennis Giddens, DoD advisor Kathryn Hoffman, Embassy notetaker Sudan Nafie Ali Nafie HUME