DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000583 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017 TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN EAID KPKO MOPS PGOV PHUM PINR, PREF, PREL, SU, AU-1, UN SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR SALAHEDDIN KHARTOUM 00000583 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Presidential Adviser Salaheddin appealed for a qualitative change in the bilateral relationship. He presented an upbeat assessment of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),saying that momentum is building, with progress being made even on the contentious issue of Abyei. On Darfur, Salaheddin acknowledged the need for a political settlement and a process to bring in UN peacekeepers. He is confident that an understanding is emerging on deployment of the Heavy Support Package (HSP). He sees further incremental changes as the way forward, suggesting that a first step could be appointments to key positions. The Deputy Secretary outlined some of the key elements needed for the hybrid force to attract troop contributions and succeed in the long run. He stressed the need to have a single chain of command in the hybrid force, and he reiterated the urgent need for action. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Deputy Secretary Negroponte met with Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salaheddin on April 15. The Deputy Secretary opened by providing a brief summary of his earlier meetings in Juba, Darfur and Khartoum, noting that the humanitarian situation seems to have stabilized, but because of political and security uncertainty, the situation is balanced on a knife's edge and could revert to crisis. The recent agreement on humanitarian access was a positive step, and the U.S. will be watching it carefully as it is implemented. As the largest donor, the U.S. has a legitimate interest in this topic. We want to see the hybrid force deployed as soon as possible. The meeting with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) force commander confirmed that Darfur is beyond the capabilities of the 5,000-strong AU force. -------------- I Want to Help You Help Us -------------- ¶3. (C) Salaheddin said that his aim in meeting with the Deputy Secretary was to "help you help us." In his opinion, a resolution of the problem of Darfur will allow for an improvement in bilateral relations. Focusing on the CPA, Salaheddin said progress is being made and momentum is picking up. The CPA is a huge document, very detailed, and difficulties in implementation are to be expected. It is encouraging that while both sides have complaints, the differences are not over principles. In all other areas beyond Abyei, things have improved over the past six months. He cited revenue sharing and legislation as areas where progress has been made, noting that legislation to implement the CPA has been passed by a process of consensus and the NCP has not had to use its mechanical majority to force legislation through the Assembly. In reply, the Deputy Secretary urged Salaheddin not to be too difficult to help, SIPDIS and noted that it does not derogate from sovereignty to accept help from the international community. -------------- Abyei Receiving Attention -------------- 4.(C) Salaheddin went into great detail on the issue of Abyei, which he described as the most difficult piece of CPA implementation. The two sides are working on the issue, and at the latest National Congress Party (NCP)/Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) meeting, they agreed to establish a provisional administration for the area. The Deputy Secretary asked whether the CPA required that the decision of SIPDIS the Abyei Commission be accepted by the two sides. Salaheddin said that was true, but that the CPA also required that the Commission use the 1905 administrative order as the basis for its decision. The NCP believes this was not the case. Nevertheless, there are efforts underway to move beyond the Commission decision. Salaheddin said options under consideration include; new arbitration, an appeal to the constitutional court, or, an effort at international arbitration. -------------- Darfur -------------- KHARTOUM 00000583 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (C) It is imperative to focus on Darfur and find a way to move forward, said Salaheddin. Noting that the recent humanitarian access agreement is a positive step, he said that there is now a need for a political settlement and a process to allow peacekeepers to deploy. Saying the government has been willing to go down this road, he complained that the rebels are "uncontrolled" and that insecurity now is due to infighting among the various groups. On peacekeeping, he is confident that the government is close to a common understanding on the agreement for the HSP. But he stressed that Chad had to be brought on board. Salaheddin said that his personal view is that peacekeepers are needed to patrol Sudan's borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. This is a huge job, but it is crucial. In recent conversations with him, the French have expressed concerns that the situation in Darfur may become a regional problem, involving not only Chad, but countries further to the west. ¶6. (C) The fragmentation of the rebel groups in Darfur further complicates matters. The government is willing to work for the enhancement of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and remains flexible in this regard, said Salaheddin. The Deputy Secretary asked how credible partners can be identified in Darfur. Salaheddin replied that the population groups that must be brought in are well known; he cited the Fur, the Zaghawa and the Massalit. He dismissed Abdul Wahid as "useless" and said he could have had Minawi's place in the government if he had been willing to sign the DPA. The Deputy Secretary asked if other credible Fur leaders are active, and SIPDIS Salahaddin replied that there are, but each commands only a small following. ¶7. (C) Salaheddin noted that the resolutions of the AU Peace and Security Council and the Presidential Statements on Darfur helped to build a framework. He sees further incremental changes as the way forward, suggesting that a first step could be appointments to key positions. The Deputy Secretary agreed that appointments to these positions are SIPDIS long overdue. Salaheddin then raised the possibility of a UN Chapter VIII mandate, which he argued could be tailor-made to Darfur. ¶8. (C) The Deputy Secretary commented that practicalities have to be addressed in order for the peacekeeping force to do its job. The force requires the support of the government of Sudan. It must protect the civilian population and IDPs, and it must assist with the implementation of the DPA. Command and control must be defined and there can only be a single chain of command. If the force is not structured properly, countries will not contribute forces. -------------- -------------- Perception that U.S. Promises Not Always Fulfilled -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Salaheddin said there is a need for a qualitative change in the bilateral relationship in order to realize benefits for both parties. New sanctions are "hobbling" us from achieving potential gains, he argued. The belief is becoming entrenched among Sudanese that the U.S. will never change its policy. Some in the government feel let down and disappointed that despite signing the CPA and the DPA, Sudan remains on the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism and comprehensive economic sanctions remain in place. Salaheddin recounted some of his past involvement in US-Sudanese relations, saying that he remembered Senator Danforth promising sanctions relief. However, when the CPA was signed, such relief did not materialize. Later, Deputy Secretary Zoellick had said that everything would fall into place once the DPA was signed, but again the Sudanese were disappointed. Assistant Secretary Frazer replied that she too was involved when the U.S. was facilitating the CPA negotiations. At the time it was felt that the CPA addressed an overall type of response, that of using military power to crush civilians. The Sudanese Government's actions in Darfur were reminiscent of this approach. Therefore the sanctions remained in place. ¶10. (U) Participants: U.S. The Deputy Secretary KHARTOUM 00000583 003.4 OF 003 Jendayi E. Frazer, A/S for African Affairs Cameron Hume, Charge d,Affairs Bobby Pittman, Senior Director for Africa, National Security Council Bill Garvelink, USAID Gustavo Delgado, D staff Curtis Stewart, Embassy notetaker Government of Sudan Ghazi Salaheddin, Presidential Advisor Ambassador Abdel Basit Badawi al Sanousi, Director, Americas Division HUME