DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SENIOR ASSISTANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000581 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017 TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN AU-1, SU SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SENIOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT MINNI MINAWI KHARTOUM 00000581 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA C. HUME, REASON: SECTION 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: On April 15, Deputy Secretary Negroponte met with Senior Assistant to the President and Sudanese Libaration Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi. Minawi characterized the security situation in Darfur as "fragile" and urged the international community to push for a political solution. He called on international support for the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) and stressed the need for immediate implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Minawi also said that the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM) should be revived, and that reconstruction and develoment in Darfur are of the highest priority. End summary. -------------- STAGNANT DPA IMPLEMENTATION -------------- ¶2. (C) The Deputy Secretary opened the discussion by asking Minawi to describe the progress of DPA implementation thus far. Many different efforts have been undertaken by local, regional and international actors, Minawi said, but DPA implementation remains at a standstill. Without stability between the governments of Sudan and Chad, he continued, Darfur will remain a "war field." Minawi stressed that the main problem is security, and that Darfur requires a political solution. All tribal groups must be disarmed, he said, and there must be negotiations with non-signatories on both the political and military levels. Though the DPA was signed almost one year ago, not even half of it has been implemented, Minawi said. "Even 70 to 80 percent implementation would help us recover." Minawi also called for strong international support for the DPA-mandated TDRA, noting that the delegation accompanying him to the meeting were all TDRA members. One of the delegation added that the SLA also needs assistance in making the transformation from a guerilla organization to a political one. ¶3. (C) The Deputy Secretary underscored the US government committment to both the CPA and DPA, and told Minawi that his April 14 trip to Darfur had served as personal confirmation of many of the things he'd been told prior to his vist. Insecurity continued, he said, and though the humanitarian situation has stabilized, it could deteriorate once again if security and political issues are not addressed. The Deputy Secretary mentioned his meeting with AMIS Force Commander SIPDIS Aprezi, saying that one of his messages to the Sudanese government has been that the AU/UN hybrid peacekeeping forces must be deployed as quickly as possible. ¶4. (C) The Deputy Secretary agreed with Minawi's advocacy of a swift political solution with respect to bringing non-signatories into the peace process, and welcomed Minawi's views on the initiatives proposed by Vice President Salva Kiir and the AU/UN envoys. He added that much more could be done on the part of the Sudanese government, including cutting off support for Janjaweed forces. The Deputy Secretary offered to convey Minawi's concerns to the SIPDIS governments of Chad and Libya during his upcoming meetings in N'djamena and Tripoli. -------------- RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS NEEDED -------------- ¶5. (C) Regarding the stalled DJAM process, Minawi characterized it as being "held hostage" by non-signatories and stresed the need to begin real reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Darfur. (Note: the DJAM was suspended last fall when fighting between Sudanese goverment forces and the non-signatory "Redemption Force" made it too difficult for the mission to carry out its assessment. End note.) The Deputy Secretary asked Minawi to identify where such efforts should be concentrated, and Minawi pointed to the many regional commissions set up by the DPA, saying that they have a "vision" as to where such efforts would have the most effect. The Deputy Secretary agreed that focus needs to be placed on reconstruction and development, in addition to continued humanitarian assistance. ¶6. (C) Minawi requested a more private meeting at his KHARTOUM 00000581 002.2 OF 002 residence later in the day, attended by Minawi, Ali Trayo, the Deputy Secretary, the Charge, the Assistant Secretary and the NSC senior director. At this meeting Minawi conveyed that the government/NCP planned to kill him at the recent incident in Omdurman at which several of his supporters were killed. He also said the government is arming militias that signed the Declaration of Commitment (DOC) to dilute his influence and that his forces will be integrated into the national army. Finally he asked for USG support promised by Ambassador Zoellick at Abuja (military and technical advice) and asked Deputy Secretary Negroponte to clarify USG commitment to an AU/UN force that would have strong UN commmand and control. ¶7. (U) Participants: The Deputy Secretary Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Cameron Hume, Charge d,Affairs Bobby Pittman, Senior Director for Africa, National Security Council Colonel Dennis Giddens, DoD advisor Bill Garvelink, USAID Gustavo Delgado, D staff Jennifer Larson (notetaker) Government of Sudan/SLM: Minni Arko Minawi, Special Assistant to the President Ahmed Ali Trayo, senior advisor to Minni Minawi Mohamed Basheer Abdalla, office director for Minni Minawi Abdul Hafiz Mustafa Abdul-Aziz Sam Abdul-Gabbar Dawsa Dr. Hassan Fashir Nasur Eldeen Abdalla Mohamed Tigani Dr. Mohamed Suliman HUME