DEPUTY SECRETARY,S MEETING WITH AU AMB IBOK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000577

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2017
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN
AU-1, SU
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY,S MEETING WITH AU AMB IBOK

REF: A. KHARTOUM 574


B. KHARTOUM 575

C. KHARTOUM 576

KHARTOUM 00000577 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On April 13, Deputy Secretary Negroponte met
with Ambassador Sam Ibok, African Union (AU) Head of the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) Implementation Team. Ibok
explained that the rebel groups outside the DPA will remain
divided but might accept a shared position if the
international community developed one for them. On the AU/UN
hybrid force, Ibok explained that the AU and the UN do not
have a common understanding of the force composition and
structure, and the Government of Sudan is using this as an
excuse not to accept UN peacekeepers. He said the AU and
African governments do not have the same definition of
command and control as the UN. Ibok suggested a new UN
Security Council Resolution to define the mandate of the
hybrid force and spells out the command and control
structures. End summary.

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DPA Weak, but Not Lost
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2. (C) The Deputy Secretary began by asking Ibok for an
update on DPA implementation. The agreement is weak, Ibok
explained, because it excluded civil society and internally
displaced persons (IDPs),was never properly implemented--
even by the AU-- and did not give Minni Minawi, Senior
Assistant to the President and leader of the Sudanese
Liberation Movement, real influence as the sole signatory.
However, he said it was a good framework and would work if
more rebel groups accepted it through modifications to meet
their demands. These demands include compensation, political
representation, a unified Darfur region, and disarmament of
the Janjaweed.


3. (C) The Deputy Secretary expressed concern about reports
that the Janajweed are not being disarmed but are being
integrated into government forces. Ibok said that while
these integrated Janajweed still engage in attacks, they are
easier to monitor and hold accountable once they are
incorporated into government ranks.


4. (C) On AU/UN mediation, Ibok believes the process is
stalled and the rebels are unlikely to unify. As an
alternative, Ibok recommended developing a position paper for
the rebels and engaging the groups individually to accept the
paper as a common negotiation agenda. Fighting must stop
before a new negotiation can begin, and civil society and
IDPs must become engaged. Ibok also pointed out that the
only rebel group to sign the DPA, Minawi,s faction, needs
logistical support to stay viable.

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AU and UN Not on Same Page
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5. (C) The Deputy Secretary emphasized that the UN must have
effective command and control of the hybrid mission. Ibok
explained that the UN and AU have different definitions of
command and control, which is creating a divide. The
Government of Sudan is fostering this split and using it as
an excuse not to accept the hybrid force. This is
exacerbated by the fact that both the African Union Mission
in Sudan (AMIS) and UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) are weak and
their top posts remain vacant. He believes the Sudanese will
relent if the UN and AU can present a unified front.


6. (C) Ibok suggested the AU and UN immediately appoint a
Joint Special Representative (JSR) to give a single message
to the Sudanese and provide leadership for establishing the
mission. The mandate for the JSR must be clearly separated
from UNMIS and the south.


7. (C) The Deputy Secretary underlined that the hybrid force
is a transition to a UN-led operation and the end of AMIS.
Ibok responded that African leaders, especially members of
the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) must understand this.


8. (C) Finally, Ibok explained, a new UN Security Council

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Resolution (UNSCR) is needed to establish the hybrid mandate,
define command and control requirements, and create a
financing mechanism for the force. He believes this
resolution could also be a face-saving way for the Government
of Sudan to accept the force, as they still reject UNSCR

1706. The Deputy Secretary replied that he understood the
problems the Sudanese had with UNSCR 1706, especially in the
latter parts of paragraph 8, but the Chapter VII sections
must stand.


9. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Deputy Secretary
Jendayi E. Frazer, A/S for African Affairs
Cameron Hume, Charge d'Affairs
Bobby Pittman, Senior Director for Africa, National Security
Council
Michael Honigstein (Embassy Notetaker)

AU
Ambassador Sam Ibok, AU Head of Darfur Peace Implementation
Ambassador Bou Bou Niang, AU Deputy Head of Darfur Peace
Implementation
HUME