CDA HUME URGES CHANGE IN SUDANESE POSITION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000549 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE, AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SE NATSIOS, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2027 TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU AU SUBJECT: CDA HUME URGES CHANGE IN SUDANESE POSITION ON PEACE-KEEPING IN DARFUR Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Previewing the forthcoming visit of Deputy Secretary Negroponte with Presidential Advisor Ismael, CDA SIPDIS Hume said that Secretary Rice was sending Negroponte to Sudan because of her concern about the overall outlook for U.S.-Sudanese relations. Secretary Rice was concerned about the lack of progress on Darfur and the future of the relationship. In particular, the United States is concerned about the apparent rejection of the agreements reached in November in Addis and Abuja. This rejection was plainly evident in the text of the letter from President Bashir to UN Secretary General Ban. The Tripartite meeting in Addis April SIPDIS 9 represented an opportunity for the Sudanese to set the record straight. End summary. ¶2. (C) CDA Hume, at his request, met with Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismael on April 7 to preview the April 12-16 visit of Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte. Secretary Rice questioned whether or not the United States SIPDIS could continue to work with this government in light of the lack of progress in Darfur, especially the backsliding on the part of the Sudanese from their agreements in Addis and Abuja. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is three months behind in paying its soldiers and nearing collapse. The united position of the international community, including China and Russia, is that UN command and control was essential for there to be UN financing of the peace-keeping mission. Without UN financing, the mission would fail. However, President Bashir's position, spelled out in his speech of April 2, was inconsistent with this possibility. The Tripartite meeting in Addis April 9 represented an opportunity for the Sudanese to rectify their position and accept the UN/AU plan as proposed. ¶3. (C) Ismael rejected the assertion that the Sudanese were retreating from their commitments in Addis and Abuja, stating that only minor items remained to be negotiated. If these could not be resolved at the Tripartite meeting on April 9, perhaps the U.S. and Sudanese could work out their differences between them. If not, the AU Peace and Security Council would have to re-examine the situation. Ismael agreed there was no time to waste. There was a widening divide between the U.S. and Sudan, and it was imperative that both sides work together to reduce tensions. ¶4. (C) Ismael said that the international community and Sudan are in agreement on the humanitarian and political components of the situation in Darfur. Only the peace-keeping element remained to be worked out. With respect to the March 28 meeting between President Bashir and Secretary General Ban at the Arab League summit in Riyadh, Ismael said that it was apparent that the Secretary General was not in command of all the details of the Darfur situation. As a result, Ismael had to urge President Bashir go easy on him. Regardless, President Bashir had told Secretary General Ban that he accepted the Addis and Abuja agreements. ¶5. (C) Ismael urged that USG concerns regarding command and control could be satisfied by working through the jointly appointed AU/UN Force Commander, and he asserted that, if not enough African troops were available for the force, then Sudan would accept troops from elsewhere. He said the government in Khartoum gave more importance to talks on these issues with the USG than with the UN. ¶6. (C) Comment: The visit of the Deputy Secretary offers the best opportunity to impress upon the Sudanese that peace-keeping forces in Darfur must operate under the full command and control of the United Nations in order to secure UN financing. End comment. HUME