STATUS OF UN/AU POLITICAL INITIATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000521

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU
SUBJECT: STATUS OF UN/AU POLITICAL INITIATIVE


Classified By: DCM R. Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) The UN and AU plan to begin negotiations with the
non-signatory rebels in late June. Many UN and AU contacts,
however, question Special Envoys Eliasson and Salim's
commitment to the process and ability to lay the groundwork
for successful negotiations. Though Eliasson has secured a
renunciation of violent regime change from the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM),the UN is concerned that unilateral
USG sanctions could set-back this success. End summary.

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Timeline
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2. (C) Following the visit of UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson
and AU Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim to Sudan March 22-27,
the UN and AU are working to finalize a timeline for the
Darfur political process. According to UN contacts, the
UN/AU team will now develop a matrix of the rebel movements'
negotiating positions and propose a date and venue to convene
talks. Their goal is to commence the negotiating process by
the end of June. One UN official said that Salim and
Eliasson believe that negotiations will extend to 2008.

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UN/AU Commitment Questioned
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3. (C) Several UN and AU sources in Sudan indicate that
neither Eliasson nor Salim intend to commit the time and
resources to advance the political process--and neither plan
to participate in the negotiations. The Joint Mediation
Support Team (JMST),composed of UN and AU personnel and
charged with sustaining engagement with the non-signatories
in Sudan and Chad, is understaffed. The movements remain
fractious and with no clear leadership structure. Many of
the non-signatories object to an AU role in the process. For
this reason, Salim did not accompany Eliasson to Chad after
their recent visit to Sudan.

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JEM Opts for Political Solution
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4. (C) Traveling to Chad on March 28, Eliasson met with
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim and
obtained a long-sought commitment from JEM to renounce
violent regime change in Khartoum. Internal UN reporting
observed: "JEM demonstrated their preparedness for the
political solution. JEM denounced secession as their
objective and emphasized political participation in the
Government of National Unity for 'self-governance.'" (Note:
The UN interpreted self-governance as participation in a
federal system with limited autonomy for Darfur. End note.)
The JEM Secretariat in Abeche, Chad issued a statement on
March 28 asserting that "Darfur's problem is political and
has no military solution." The statement also criticized UN
Security Council Resolution 1706 and said that a new
resolution was needed to achieve peace.


5. (C) Eliasson met with Group of 19 leader Khamis Abdullah.
While welcoming the UN/AU initiative, Abdullah said that
Salim and other AU officials who participated in the Abuja
peace talks should not participate. (Note: Abdullah was
referring to AU Head of Darfur Peace Implementation and
co-chair of the JMST Sam Ibok. End note.) Abdullah
underscored the importance of unification of the rebel
factions, with the support of Eritrea.

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NRF: Basis of Unification
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6. (C) Both Ibrahim and Abdullah stated that a reconstituted
National Redemption Front (NRF) should form the basis of a
unified rebel movement, though without the same goals of
violent regime change in Khartoum. It is unclear what the
relative strength of JEM would be in the NRF. UN reporting,
however, indicates that the departure of Sudan Liberation
Army (SLA) leader Ahmed Abdulshafie and Sudan Federal
Democratic Alliance (SFDA) leader Sharif Harir from Chad to
Darfur has weakened the other components of the NRF in favor
of JEM.

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Consequences of Sanctions
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7. (C) UN Director of Political Affairs and Co-Chair of the
JMST Abidoun Bashua (strictly protect) told POLOFF on March
31 that Eliasson had sent a cable to New York stating his
belief that Ibrahim and JEM could be brought into a
constructive political process. Eliasson hoped that rumored
USG sanctions against Ibrahim would be delayed until he had a
chance to &bring him on board.8 Bashua explained that the
rebel factions were &entrenched, personalized movements8
and that excluding a key leader from the international
process would limit the ability to find a political solution.

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Comment
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10. (C) The UN/AU lead on the political process limits the
emergence of competing international initiatives. If the
UN/AU political initiative is to succeed, however, the USG
must take immediate steps to strengthen the JMST's capacity
for sustained engagement with non-signatories in Chad and
Sudan. This engagement is not possible during intermittent
high-level visits and with the UN and AU's current staffing
constraints. In addition, we should press New York and Addis
Ababa to fill the vacancies in key positions--including the
UN SRSYG and the AU head of mission--to provide consistent
leadership on the political process. End comment.
HUME