Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM485
2007-03-28 12:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

BASHIR ADVISOR: STRUCTURE DARFUR PROCESS

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU CD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7639
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0485 0871219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281219Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6626
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000485 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: BASHIR ADVISOR: STRUCTURE DARFUR PROCESS

REF: KHARTOUM 00478

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

-----------------------------
Structure a Process for Darfur
------------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000485 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU CD SUBJECT: BASHIR ADVISOR: STRUCTURE DARFUR PROCESS REF: KHARTOUM 00478 Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Structure a Process for Darfur -------------- ¶1. (C) Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salaheddin told CDA Hume on March 28 that Sudan and the U.S. government had an "intellectual duty" to address the urgent aspects of the Darfur crisis. He suggested that the two governments structure a process to lay the groundwork for resolution of these issues prior to the next high-level USG visit to Sudan. "The Sudanese character is to drag things on, that time is the greatest healer," said Salaheddin. "But that is not always the case." He emphasized that "energy should not be confused with being productive" and said he would propose that President Bashir designate a point person to work with the international community on Darfur. The Sudanese government is commmited to finding a solution to the Darfur crisis, asserted Salaheddin. He suggested that a framework be constructed to address the peace-keeping, political, and humanitarian issues of the conflict. -------------- UN Peacekeeping -------------- ¶2. (C) Noting that "the most important thing in the Government psyche is the UN thing," Salaheddin said that he had no personal objection to a peace-keeping operation with joint UN/AU command and African troops. Salaheddin intimated that de-linking the UN force from the International Criminal Court (ICC) would help to secure Sudan's agreement. "The ICC issue is important from a psychological point of view," he explained. He also indicated that a new UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) that included some elements of UNSCR 1706 but excluded issues relating to national sovereignty--such as the judiciary--would be useful. ¶3. (C) CDA Hume underscored that the UN Security Council, including Russia and China, viewed UN command and control as essential to any peacekeeping force. He suggested that Sudan and the international community agree on the outcome for the peacekeeping, political, and humanitarian issues and then develop a framework to reach the goals for each. CDA Hume described his conversation with UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim on March 27 (reftel). He said they had discussed the limited timeframe for dialogue and the possibility of a high-level meeting to restart negotiations with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories. -------------- Relations with the International Community -------------- ¶4. (C) "Mending fences" with Sudan's neighbors, such as Chad, was a critical component of the political process for Darfur, said Salaheddin. He added, however, that "even more important is normalizing relations with the international community." He asserted that the political process needed to involve a variety of stakeholders, rather than just the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebel groups. He cited the important role that France could play vis-a-vis Chad as an example. Salaheddin acknowledged, however, that he held little hope for an improvement in the U.S.-Sudan bilateral relationship in the near future. ¶5. (C) Salaheddin was optimistic that Sudan and the international community could agree on steps to facilitate continued humanitarian operations in Darfur. He called the recent decision to prevent UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes from entering an IDP camp in Darfur "unfortunate" and said that "it shows we have some problems with the system here." Salaheddin explained that military-to-military cooperation could be a mechanism to address issues of bilateral interest. CDA Hume said that the proposed visit of RDML Hart to Sudan would be an opportunity for him to meet with representatives of the Ministry of Defense and rebel movements to begin mapping areas of control and facilitate implementation of DPA provisions. HUME

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -