MINAWI CONTEMPLATES DARFUR RETURN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000484 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2012 TAGS: PGOV PREL AU UN SU SUBJECT: MINAWI CONTEMPLATES DARFUR RETURN REF: KHARTOUM 00466 Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (d) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In private, Minni Minawi continues to contemplate a return to Darfur in the wake of the March 24 attack on Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) facilities in Khartoum and the ambush of a prominent SLM commander near Nyala. Minawi is pressing the Sudanese government to account for the dead, wounded, and detained but asserts that the attacks are part of a broad strategy to undermine his movement. Minawi's efforts to turn to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) may have stalled, and political pressures within the SLM will make it difficult to continue with the status quo. End summary. -------------- Return to Darfur if Demands Not Met -------------- ¶2. (C) Isolated from the power centers in the Sudanese government and menaced by the March 24 attacks on the SLM party headquarters and a house in Khartoum, Senior Assistant to the President and SLM leader Minni Minawi is privately considering returning to Darfur (reftel). He will base his decision on whether the Government meets his demands: 1) receive the bodies of those killed on March 24, 2) turn over those who were detained, and 3) allow the SLM access to the house that the Government attacked. In a meeting with Poloff on March 26, Minawi emphasized that his return to Darfur would not mean a renunciation of his post in the Government, a resumption of hostilities, or an end to his support for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Minawi and the SLM leadership view the recent attacks--by far the most egregious violence against the SLM in Khartoum since the DPA--as part of a broader strategy to undermine the movement. "I must go to a secure area where I can protect my people," said Minawi. ¶3. (C) Over 100 people are still missing after the March 24 attack in Khartoum, according to Minawi. The National Congress Party (NCP) leadership asserts that only eight SLM members died and that it has detained 93 people. The Government offered to return the eight bodies, five of which cannot be identified due to the severity of the burns. Minawi refused this offer, saying that all the dead, wounded, and detained--in addition to the house where the attack took place--must be turned over to the SLM at the same time in order to account for all the victims. The case has been transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice told Minawi on March 26 that he would conduct an investigation into the attack. (Note: The security services left the movement's party headquarters on March 26, but the SLM has not re-occupied the premises. End note.) -------------- Attack Near Nyala -------------- ¶4. (C) In a separate attack on March 24, prominent SLM commander Abdul Shafie Jumaa Arabi was ambushed and killed with four others south of Nyala. Jumaa Arabi was one of the founders of the SLM and was instrumental in the attack on the El Fasher airport in 2003 that launched the rebellion in Darfur. (Note: Jumaa Arabi should not be confused for National Redemption Front leader Ahmed Abdul Shafie. End note.) -------------- Public Statement -------------- ¶5. (C) On March 25, Minawi held a press conference explaining the circumstances of the attack and issued a statement requesting the following assurances from the Sudanese government: -- "The dead bodies should be handed over to the SLM/A through a third party; -- The security for the arrested people should be guaranteed, and they should immediately be unconditionally released; -- Harassing of the SLM/A members should be stopped with KHARTOUM 00000484 002 OF 002 immediate effect; -- An investigating committee, which should include the AU implementation team members (Ref. chapter 7 of the Agreement) and other international partners of the DPA should be established; -- The supervising mechanism of DPA implementation should be strengthened including members of the international community; -- The army and the police and other security elements should be withdrawn from the SLM/A headquarters and the properties and documents taken away should be handed back; -- The SLM/A should be allowed to access the house of the wounded people and the properties of the dead people be handed over; -- The SLM/A functionaries and officials should be organized to live in nearby premises to guarantee their security; -- The SLM/A sees it difficult any continuation of the DPA peace process under these circumstances unless these and other associated obstacles are totally removed by way of implementing the findings and recommendations of the would-be-established impartial committee of investigation (including bringing the perpetrators to justice)." -------------- Meeting with CDA -------------- ¶6. (C) In a March 25 meeting with CDA Hume, Minawi said that two factors would guide SLM policy moving forward: 1) The importance of easing the suffering of his people by building peace, and 2) The security of the SLM. CDA Hume reminded Minawi that his post in the government was "something that no one else has," in spite of the crisis facing the SLM. -------------- SPLM Support Waivers? -------------- ¶7. (C) Following the attack, Minawi turned to First Vice President Salva Kiir for support, who raised the issue with President Bashir and others and exerted a restraining influence on the SLM. This support has dissipated in the last 24 hours, according to Minawi, who now calls the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) stance "a gray position." In his last conversation with Kiir on March 26, Kiir said that he would talk to SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amun to clarify the SPLM's role but did not promise continued assistance to the SLM. "The SPLM position is very disappointing," said Minawi. "We were hoping they would be the right hand of us." (Note: Minister for Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor told Embassy officials on March 27 that the SPLM--including the SPLM State Minister of the Interior--firmly backed Minawi's position on the attack. He and Amun will meet with Minawi in the next 48 hours to re-assure him of their support. End note.) ¶8. (C) Minawi asserts that the NCP is trying to force him to change his position on UN intervention in Darfur, the International Criminal Court (ICC),and disarmament of the Arab militias. He said that Kiir had joked that Bashir would be satisfied if Minawi announced his opposition to a UN peace-keeping operation. Minawi defiantly replied, "Even if I die alone, I will never change my position." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) It is noteworthy that Minawi and the SLM have not retaliated for the March 24 attacks in Khartoum and Nyala. However, Minawi faces internal political struggles within the SLM that will make it difficult to continue with the status quo. The high-profile attacks could also inhibit efforts to bring non-signatory rebel movements to the DPA. End comment. HUME