US/SUDANESE RELATIONS AT THE DIVIDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000460 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU AL CH IN SUBJECT: US/SUDANESE RELATIONS AT THE DIVIDE Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. U.S./Sudanese relations are poised to pass from one watershed into another. From the U.S. perspective, Sudan's rejection of UN peace-keeping in Darfur pushes relations toward direct confrontation, just as Sudanese see the U.S. imposition of additional sanctions as proof of enduring U.S. hostility toward Khartoum. Khartoum, now enjoying a sustained economic boom, judges that it can withstand additional USG sanctions with little harm, but almost certainly it miscalculates the long-term cost of allowing Darfur to fester. Paras 11-13 suggest a course of action that over the next three months could move the situation back toward cooperation between Khartoum and the international community to address the crisis in Darfur. End Summary. ¶2. (C) For the past six years Washington and Khartoum have, despite their many differences, moved the bilateral relationship from sterile confrontation to useful cooperation on a few core issues. The negotiation and now implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) have formed the keystone of the changed relations. Both sides want to cooperate on counter-terrorism. Dealing with Darfur, although it involves some cooperation on humanitarian issues, has been mostly confrontation on security and political issues. Recent Sudanese actions on cooperation with donors, peace-keeping in Darfur, and permitting construction of a new chancery by the USG now all point in a negative, downward direction. ¶3. (C) The March 20-21 Donor Consortium meeting in Khartoum and Juba highlighted the widening gap between donor and Sudanese perspectives on Darfur. All donors complained that the Sudanese government had canceled a session designed to discuss humanitarian problems in Darfur; the Sudanese then upbraided the German ambassador and chief EU spokesman for daring to complain. Nevertheless, the meeting made evident that significant (but incomplete) progress had been made in implementing the CPA, and donors promised that their support was undiminished. The Sudanese side concluded that they could ignore donor complaints on Darfur and keep support for the CPA. ¶4. (C) President Bashir's conditions and restrictions on UN support for AU peace-keeping amounted to a rejection of UN peace-keeping activity in Darfur. Although the United States and other donor governments see the mounting risks to humanitarian operations in Darfur, the Sudanese see that the overall level of fighting, although widespread, has dropped. Particularly in the wake of International Criminal Court (ICC) accusations of Sudanese officials, the Sudanese government opposition to UN military units or formed police units has increased. Although Sudanese concerns regarding the ICC may be misplaced or illegitimate, these concerns have tipped government policy against a UN role. ¶5. (C) Bilateral issues, some the consequence of misplaced optimism from the earlier cooperation on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and counter-terrorism, are taking a turn for the worse. The USG has given no substantive response to Sudan regarding possible release of any of the Sudanese detained in Guantanamo; it refuses to issue a visa to Ali Karti, MFA Minister of State; it maintains all sanctions; and, it has announced it is preparing new sanctions no matter what. Khartoum values its opportunities to retaliate, most recently by blocking material for construction of a new embassy compound. A USG decision to terminate the new embassy project will re-enforce the downward direction of bilateral relations. ¶6. (C) Inside the ruling party of the Government of National Unity, the balance of influence on government policy is held by hard-liners who want to reduce USG influence over national policy. Vice President Taha, the leading figure in the negotiations that produced the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, is still in office but presently out of power. Nafie Ali Nafie, effectively secretary-general of the NCP, argues the party should keep its nationalist position on keeping the UN out of Darfur because USG economic sanctions have at most a minor impact on Sudan's economy. Hard-liners in the military and security services agree that USG sanctions, although irritating, will not cause major pain. ¶7. (C) For the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) partners in the Government of National Unity the growing confrontation between Khartoum and Washington is most KHARTOUM 00000460 002 OF 003 uncomfortable. USG sanctions on Khartoum, however designed, injure Juba as well. At the recent Donor Consortium meeting SPLM spokesmen emphasized progress in working with Khartoum rather than problems. Given the South's economic dependence on Khartoum and the fragile state of government in Juba, SPLM leaders fear that they will be the victims of heightened tensions between Khartoum and Washington. ¶8. (C) Senior government leaders in Khartoum calculate that they can manage increased international pressures. They doubt that the UN Security Council will adopt sanctions against Sudan or "force" deployment of UN peacekeepers without Sudan's consent. They doubt that any government, other than the United States, will adopt economic sanctions. They do not believe that any government, including the United States, will take direct military action. They count on most African and Arab governments to rally to Sudan's side in rejecting forceful measures. Moreover, they are confident that key capitals, such as Cairo, Beijing, and New Delhi, will support Khartoum in rejecting "forceful" measures. However, these same leaders misjudge the difficulty of prolonging their power in Khartoum simply because they control the money and weapons. With a 13 percent rate of economic growth, Sudanese society is changing, and it is unlikely that Khartoum can continue to thrive while Darfur, or the South, or the East bleeds. ¶9. (C) Although the circumstances for exerting USG influence have deteriorated, USG policy goals remain unchanged: promote implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and transformation of Sudan toward democracy and the rule of law; end the security and political crisis in Darfur and tend to the humanitarian needs; and, cooperate on questions of regional security, in particular counter-terrorism. Further tightening a sanctions regime as rigorous as that maintained against Iran or North Korea will reduce the ability of the USG to promote these goals. ¶10. (C) Opposition political forces in the north oppose the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the keystone of USG policy, making them unlikely partners. As evident at the recent Donors, Consortium Meeting, the SPLM wants to transform Sudan for the time-being, not to divide it. The approach followed since 2001, trying to influence Khartoum by a mix of pressure and encouragement, merits further effort. -------------- Course of Action -------------- ¶11. (C) Could any course of action produce agreement between the international community and Khartoum regarding the political process, the humanitarian situation, and peace-keeping in Darfur? From the perspective of Khartoum, contemplated USG pressures alone will not generate progress toward a solution. At a minimum a way forward must address the most critical issues in a manner acceptable to both sides. The USG needs: 1) Khartoum's acceptance of UN command and control of peace-keeping in Darfur, but could be flexible on other elements of the peace-keeping package; 2) assurance that systems are in place to facilitate the work of humanitarian agencies in Darfur; and, 3) an active political process that includes the political forces of Darfur, organized by the UN and AU, to resolve differences with Khartoum regarding the Darfur Peace Agreement. Khartoum would require: 1) assurance that UN peace-keeping forces in Darfur would not be used to support the work of the International Criminal Court; 2) termination by regional powers of material support to Darfur rebel groups; and, 3) re-activation of international support for economic rehabilitation of Darfur. ¶12. (C) Given activities now underway (including the Eliasson/Salim mission, Libya's invitation to special envoys for a meeting in Tripoli on April 16, and the SPLM effort to bring Darfur parties to Juba in mid-April),an opportunity exists to bring together an action plan for the next two months. At that point the UN and AU could sponsor a ministerial conference with an action agenda that had been well prepared. For example, UN SYG Ban and the USG could take the lead on the peace-keeping issues of command and control of the hybrid operation and non-involvement in ICC activities; others, such as the AU, Arab League, China, and India have important contributions to make on these issues. Eliasson and Salim could shape the political dialogue, launching a formal process with specific issues and identified participants at the time of the ministerial KHARTOUM 00000460 003 OF 003 meeting. The UN, donor governments, and Khartoum could prepare for the ministerial agreed actions on both humanitarian access and economic rehabilitation. ¶13. (C) Khartoum will not adjust its positions on these issues without a parallel improvement in relations with the United States. The current reality is stark: less cooperation by Khartoum with the international community and a downward direction for U.S./Sudanese relations. To change that reality would require a plan. In Khartoum SPLM leaders, who recently adopted a more &national8 strategy (e.g. moving party headquarters to Khartoum, engaging on Darfur), warn that a more confrontational USG policy puts the Comprehensive Peace Agreement at risk. Despite President Bashir's shift away from cooperation with the international community, many senior NCP figures state they would rather move back from the brink of confrontation. For any plan to move Sudan back toward cooperation to succeed, Washington and Khartoum would need a shared vision how to resolve difficult issues such as visas, detainees in Guantanamo, material for construction of a new embassy in Khartoum, and bilateral sanctions. Without such a vision Khartoum will hunker down, reject a greater international role in Darfur and put at risk the real gains achieved through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. HUME