C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000460

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU AL CH IN
SUBJECT: US/SUDANESE RELATIONS AT THE DIVIDE


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. U.S./Sudanese relations are poised to pass
from one watershed into another. From the U.S. perspective,
Sudan's rejection of UN peace-keeping in Darfur pushes
relations toward direct confrontation, just as Sudanese see
the U.S. imposition of additional sanctions as proof of
enduring U.S. hostility toward Khartoum. Khartoum, now
enjoying a sustained economic boom, judges that it can
withstand additional USG sanctions with little harm, but
almost certainly it miscalculates the long-term cost of
allowing Darfur to fester. Paras 11-13 suggest a course of
action that over the next three months could move the
situation back toward cooperation between Khartoum and the
international community to address the crisis in Darfur. End
Summary.


2. (C) For the past six years Washington and Khartoum have,
despite their many differences, moved the bilateral
relationship from sterile confrontation to useful cooperation
on a few core issues. The negotiation and now implementation
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) have formed the
keystone of the changed relations. Both sides want to
cooperate on counter-terrorism. Dealing with Darfur,
although it involves some cooperation on humanitarian issues,
has been mostly confrontation on security and political
issues. Recent Sudanese actions on cooperation with donors,
peace-keeping in Darfur, and permitting construction of a new
chancery by the USG now all point in a negative, downward
direction.


3. (C) The March 20-21 Donor Consortium meeting in Khartoum
and Juba highlighted the widening gap between donor and
Sudanese perspectives on Darfur. All donors complained that
the Sudanese government had canceled a session designed to
discuss humanitarian problems in Darfur; the Sudanese then
upbraided the German ambassador

and chief EU spokesman for
daring to complain. Nevertheless, the meeting made evident
that significant (but incomplete) progress had been made in
implementing the CPA, and donors promised that their support
was undiminished. The Sudanese side concluded that they
could ignore donor complaints on Darfur and keep support for
the CPA.


4. (C) President Bashir's conditions and restrictions on UN
support for AU peace-keeping amounted to a rejection of UN
peace-keeping activity in Darfur. Although the United States
and other donor governments see the mounting risks to
humanitarian operations in Darfur, the Sudanese see that the
overall level of fighting, although widespread, has dropped.
Particularly in the wake of International Criminal Court
(ICC) accusations of Sudanese officials, the Sudanese
government opposition to UN military units or formed police
units has increased. Although Sudanese concerns regarding
the ICC may be misplaced or illegitimate, these concerns have
tipped government policy against a UN role.


5. (C) Bilateral issues, some the consequence of misplaced
optimism from the earlier cooperation on the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement and counter-terrorism, are taking a turn for
the worse. The USG has given no substantive response to
Sudan regarding possible release of any of the Sudanese
detained in Guantanamo; it refuses to issue a visa to Ali
Karti, MFA Minister of State; it maintains all sanctions;
and, it has announced it is preparing new sanctions no matter
what. Khartoum values its opportunities to retaliate, most
recently by blocking material for construction of a new
embassy compound. A USG decision to terminate the new
embassy project will re-enforce the downward direction of
bilateral relations.


6. (C) Inside the ruling party of the Government of National
Unity, the balance of influence on government policy is held
by hard-liners who want to reduce USG influence over national
policy. Vice President Taha, the leading figure in the
negotiations that produced the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
is still in office but presently out of power. Nafie Ali
Nafie, effectively secretary-general of the NCP, argues the
party should keep its nationalist position on keeping the UN
out of Darfur because USG economic sanctions have at most a
minor impact on Sudan's economy. Hard-liners in the military
and security services agree that USG sanctions, although
irritating, will not cause major pain.


7. (C) For the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)
partners in the Government of National Unity the growing
confrontation between Khartoum and Washington is most

KHARTOUM 00000460 002 OF 003


uncomfortable. USG sanctions on Khartoum, however designed,
injure Juba as well. At the recent Donor Consortium meeting
SPLM spokesmen emphasized progress in working with Khartoum
rather than problems. Given the South's economic dependence
on Khartoum and the fragile state of government in Juba, SPLM
leaders fear that they will be the victims of heightened
tensions between Khartoum and Washington.


8. (C) Senior government leaders in Khartoum calculate that
they can manage increased international pressures. They
doubt that the UN Security Council will adopt sanctions
against Sudan or "force" deployment of UN peacekeepers
without Sudan's consent. They doubt that any government,
other than the United States, will adopt economic sanctions.
They do not believe that any government, including the United
States, will take direct military action. They count on most
African and Arab governments to rally to Sudan's side in
rejecting forceful measures. Moreover, they are confident
that key capitals, such as Cairo, Beijing, and New Delhi,
will support Khartoum in rejecting "forceful" measures.
However, these same leaders misjudge the difficulty of
prolonging their power in Khartoum simply because they
control the money and weapons. With a 13 percent rate of
economic growth, Sudanese society is changing, and it is
unlikely that Khartoum can continue to thrive while Darfur,
or the South, or the East bleeds.


9. (C) Although the circumstances for exerting USG influence
have deteriorated, USG policy goals remain unchanged: promote
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and
transformation of Sudan toward democracy and the rule of law;
end the security and political crisis in Darfur and tend to
the humanitarian needs; and, cooperate on questions of
regional security, in particular counter-terrorism. Further
tightening a sanctions regime as rigorous as that maintained
against Iran or North Korea will reduce the ability of the
USG to promote these goals.


10. (C) Opposition political forces in the north oppose the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the keystone of USG policy,
making them unlikely partners. As evident at the recent
Donors, Consortium Meeting, the SPLM wants to transform
Sudan for the time-being, not to divide it. The approach
followed since 2001, trying to influence Khartoum by a mix of
pressure and encouragement, merits further effort.

--------------
Course of Action
--------------


11. (C) Could any course of action produce agreement between
the international community and Khartoum regarding the
political process, the humanitarian situation, and
peace-keeping in Darfur? From the perspective of Khartoum,
contemplated USG pressures alone will not generate progress
toward a solution. At a minimum a way forward must address
the most critical issues in a manner acceptable to both
sides. The USG needs: 1) Khartoum's acceptance of UN command
and control of peace-keeping in Darfur, but could be flexible
on other elements of the peace-keeping package; 2) assurance
that systems are in place to facilitate the work of
humanitarian agencies in Darfur; and, 3) an active political
process that includes the political forces of Darfur,
organized by the UN and AU, to resolve differences with
Khartoum regarding the Darfur Peace Agreement. Khartoum
would require: 1) assurance that UN peace-keeping forces in
Darfur would not be used to support the work of the
International Criminal Court; 2) termination by regional
powers of material support to Darfur rebel groups; and, 3)
re-activation of international support for economic
rehabilitation of Darfur.


12. (C) Given activities now underway (including the
Eliasson/Salim mission, Libya's invitation to special envoys
for a meeting in Tripoli on April 16, and the SPLM effort to
bring Darfur parties to Juba in mid-April), an opportunity
exists to bring together an action plan for the next two
months. At that point the UN and AU could sponsor a
ministerial conference with an action agenda that had been
well prepared. For example, UN SYG Ban and the USG could
take the lead on the peace-keeping issues of command and
control of the hybrid operation and non-involvement in ICC
activities; others, such as the AU, Arab League, China, and
India have important contributions to make on these issues.
Eliasson and Salim could shape the political dialogue,
launching a formal process with specific issues and
identified participants at the time of the ministerial

KHARTOUM 00000460 003 OF 003


meeting. The UN, donor governments, and Khartoum could
prepare for the ministerial agreed actions on both
humanitarian access and economic rehabilitation.


13. (C) Khartoum will not adjust its positions on these
issues without a parallel improvement in relations with the
United States. The current reality is stark: less
cooperation by Khartoum with the international community and
a downward direction for U.S./Sudanese relations. To change
that reality would require a plan. In Khartoum SPLM leaders,
who recently adopted a more &national8 strategy (e.g.
moving party headquarters to Khartoum, engaging on Darfur),
warn that a more confrontational USG policy puts the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement at risk. Despite President
Bashir's shift away from cooperation with the international
community, many senior NCP figures state they would rather
move back from the brink of confrontation. For any plan to
move Sudan back toward cooperation to succeed, Washington and
Khartoum would need a shared vision how to resolve difficult
issues such as visas, detainees in Guantanamo, material for
construction of a new embassy in Khartoum, and bilateral
sanctions. Without such a vision Khartoum will hunker down,
reject a greater international role in Darfur and put at risk
the real gains achieved through the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement.
HUME