AMIS CEASEFIRE COMMISSION WEEK OF MARCH 19: SECOND CHAMBER

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000459

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU

SUBJECT: AMIS CEASEFIRE COMMISSION WEEK OF MARCH 19: SECOND CHAMBER
IMPASSES AND VERIFICATION EXERCISE

REFS: (A) KHARTOUM 0395

(B) KHARTOUM 0438
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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) SLA-Minawi raised objections to the African Union Mission
in Sudan's (AMIS) potential restructuring of the CFC Second Chamber,
contending that the proposals may violate the DPA. Carjackings
remain a persistent threat, and AMIS is seeking input from all key
stakeholders on means to mitigate the problem. The CFC continued
process-related discussion of the Sudanese government's plan to
disarm the Janjaweed, committing to an initial timeline to advance
the program. No specific ceasefire violation cases were considered,
though parties previewed several recent incidents. The CFC
Secretariat confirmed that verification of factions' areas of

SIPDIS
control - both signatory and non-signatory - have commenced and may
be completed by early April. End summary.

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OBJECTIONS PERSIST TO CFC RESTRUCTURING
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2. (SBU) SLA-Minawi Ceasefire Commission (CFC) Representative Adam
Ali War continued to protest AMIS' proposed restructuring of the
CFC, which would include fewer total reps per faction in the sectors
and a reduction in Monthly Subsistence Allowance (MSA) (Reftels).
Notwithstanding AMIS Force Commander Aprezi's assertion that Minni
had already agreed to CFC reconfiguration, SLA-Minawi
representatives argued that cutting back the number of
representatives constituted a violation of the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA). (Note: Article 25, paragraph 233 of the DPA
stipulates that "AMIS shall increase the number of its military
observers, particularly from the Parties...so that it is better able
to cover the territory of Darfur..." The DPA, however, does not
prohibit a right-sizing of CFC representatives. End Note.)


3. (SBU) Responding to War's objections, the Force Commander
explained that the CFC restructuring decisions were taken in
Khartoum at the AU political level and that there was "nothing I can
do to reverse them." Several CFC observers recommended that the
Parties raise their complaints through the appropriate channels in
Khartoum should they wish to revisit the issue. (Comment: The Force
Commander's sidestepping of responsibility for the CFC restructuring
is only partially valid. Embassy Poloffs attended the international
stakeholders meeting in Khartoum on March 11 in which AMIS made
recommendations regarding CFC streamlining. Donors agreed with
AMIS' proposal to reduce the rate of individual MSA but provided no
input and took no decisions on the number of CFC signatory
representatives per sector. End Comment.)

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VEHICLE SNATCHERS
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4. (SBU) Carjackings remain a concern throughout Darfur, impeding
the efforts of the humanitarian community, UN, AMIS and even the
Government, which filed a complaint alleging SLA-Minawi's
culpability for the carjacking of a National Intelligence and
Security Service (NISS) vehicle in Ed Daein, South Darfur. After a
lengthy and heated exchange between SLA-Minawi and Government
representatives - with occasional interventions by international
observers - the two sides agreed to resolve the matter between
themselves "as DPA partners." The discussion, however, prompted the
Force Commander to ponder aloud how AMIS might serve as a catalyst
to bring all stakeholders together to contemplate solutions to the
carjacking problem. CFC participants agreed that AMIS should reach
out to the UN, humanitarian community and other relevant parties to
invite them to brainstorm and strategize on ways to mitigate the
trend in vehicle thefts; this meeting will be held on March 28.

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JANJAWEED DISARMAMENT
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5. (SBU) Responding to the U.S. observer about the current status of
efforts to advance the Sudanese government's Janjaweed disarmament
plan, the Force Commander remarked that he intended to first hold
AMIS-Government consultations on the plan, then to present the
findings and recommendations to the broader CFC group for its review
and input. The UN observer noted his organization's preference to
be involved in the review process from the start and offered the
assistance of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
technical experts. CFC participants agreed that the AMIS-Government
consultations should be completed and ready for presentation to the
larger group by April 4. (Comment: AMIS has discussed the

KHARTOUM 00000459 002.2 OF 002


Janjaweed disarmament plan for months with no substantive progress.
As much as the Sudanese government may be unwilling to implement the
plan, AMIS has demonstrated little commitment to undertaking a
serious review of the proposal or organizing the international
community to expedite the process. The Department should tap DDR
experts to analyze the GoS plan and develop concrete recommendations
for its improvement. End Comment.)

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FEW CASES, VERIFICATION IN TRAIN
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6. (SBU) No specific ceasefire violation cases were raised the week
of March 19, though SLA-Minawi previewed an incident involving the
killing of at least two of its soldiers, allegedly by Sudanese Armed
Forces, in the vicinity of Saiyah, North Darfur. SLA-Minawi
representative Colonel Ahmed Gardiya Khamis attempted to solicit a
more in-depth discussion of the case, but the CFC First Vice
Chairman stopped him. He noted that the item was not on the agenda
and that no one in the CFC had received the statement of complaint
outlining the incident. The matter will be referred to Sector Six
for investigation. (Note: SLA-Minawi Security Arrangements
Committee representatives provided a statement of the alleged
killings to S/CRS POLOFF on March 20, who advised them to raise the
issue in the appropriate Sector sub-CFC, which is responsible for
carrying out the investigation and forwarding, as required, the case
to the Headquarters CFC. End Note.)


7. (SBU) The Force Commander noted that all sectors have been tasked
to complete verification of parties' areas of control by April 2, in
accordance with the requirements (not the timeline, however) of the
DPA's security arrangements provisions.

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COMMENT
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8. (SBU) The relative calm throughout Darfur was reflected in the
paucity of ceasefire violations raised over the previous week.
Still, major and minor hurdles remain unresolved in improving CFC
capacity. The Sudanese government continues to reject the
deployment of non-signatory representatives to the Sector level,
stalling the Second Chamber concept and preventing an established
channel of communication to non-signatories to facilitate ceasefire
violation investigations and humanitarian access. Now that the
international community had pledged to pay CFC reps - both signatory
and non-signatory - at reduced levels, it should turn its concerted
attention to pressuring the Government to allow the presence of
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and SLA/Non-signatory Factions
(SLA-NSF) members at AMIS sector headquarters and group sites.
Another snag in the CFC's functioning - and, in fact, AMIS
operations throughout Darfur - is the ongoing strike by AMIS
language assistants, who have not received MSA since December. In
the interim, an interpreter employed by Post has been filling in at
the CFC meetings. Finally, genuine and visible progress in
executing a realistic Janjaweed disarmament plan is a prerequisite
for advancing the peace process in Darfur; high-level political
attention should be re-focused on this particular facet of the DPA.
End comment.

HUME