AMIS CEASEFIRE COMMISSION WEEK OF MARCH 19: SECOND CHAMBER

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000459 SIPDIS SENSITIVE, SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU SUBJECT: AMIS CEASEFIRE COMMISSION WEEK OF MARCH 19: SECOND CHAMBER IMPASSES AND VERIFICATION EXERCISE REFS: (A) KHARTOUM 0395 (B) KHARTOUM 0438 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) SLA-Minawi raised objections to the African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) potential restructuring of the CFC Second Chamber, contending that the proposals may violate the DPA. Carjackings remain a persistent threat, and AMIS is seeking input from all key stakeholders on means to mitigate the problem. The CFC continued process-related discussion of the Sudanese government's plan to disarm the Janjaweed, committing to an initial timeline to advance the program. No specific ceasefire violation cases were considered, though parties previewed several recent incidents. The CFC Secretariat confirmed that verification of factions' areas of SIPDIS control - both signatory and non-signatory - have commenced and may be completed by early April. End summary. -------------- OBJECTIONS PERSIST TO CFC RESTRUCTURING -------------- ¶2. (SBU) SLA-Minawi Ceasefire Commission (CFC) Representative Adam Ali War continued to protest AMIS' proposed restructuring of the CFC, which would include fewer total reps per faction in the sectors and a reduction in Monthly Subsistence Allowance (MSA) (Reftels). Notwithstanding AMIS Force Commander Aprezi's assertion that Minni had already agreed to CFC reconfiguration, SLA-Minawi representatives argued that cutting back the number of representatives constituted a violation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). (Note: Article 25, paragraph 233 of the DPA stipulates that "AMIS shall increase the number of its military observers, particularly from the Parties...so that it is better able to cover the territory of Darfur..." The DPA, however, does not prohibit a right-sizing of CFC representatives. End Note.) ¶3. (SBU) Responding to War's objections, the Force Commander explained that the CFC restructuring decisions were taken in Khartoum at the AU political level and that there was "nothing I can do to reverse them." Several CFC observers recommended that the Parties raise their complaints through the appropriate channels in Khartoum should they wish to revisit the issue. (Comment: The Force Commander's sidestepping of responsibility for the CFC restructuring is only partially valid. Embassy Poloffs attended the international stakeholders meeting in Khartoum on March 11 in which AMIS made recommendations regarding CFC streamlining. Donors agreed with AMIS' proposal to reduce the rate of individual MSA but provided no input and took no decisions on the number of CFC signatory representatives per sector. End Comment.) -------------- VEHICLE SNATCHERS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Carjackings remain a concern throughout Darfur, impeding the efforts of the humanitarian community, UN, AMIS and even the Government, which filed a complaint alleging SLA-Minawi's culpability for the carjacking of a National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) vehicle in Ed Daein, South Darfur. After a lengthy and heated exchange between SLA-Minawi and Government representatives - with occasional interventions by international observers - the two sides agreed to resolve the matter between themselves "as DPA partners." The discussion, however, prompted the Force Commander to ponder aloud how AMIS might serve as a catalyst to bring all stakeholders together to contemplate solutions to the carjacking problem. CFC participants agreed that AMIS should reach out to the UN, humanitarian community and other relevant parties to invite them to brainstorm and strategize on ways to mitigate the trend in vehicle thefts; this meeting will be held on March 28. -------------- JANJAWEED DISARMAMENT -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Responding to the U.S. observer about the current status of efforts to advance the Sudanese government's Janjaweed disarmament plan, the Force Commander remarked that he intended to first hold AMIS-Government consultations on the plan, then to present the findings and recommendations to the broader CFC group for its review and input. The UN observer noted his organization's preference to be involved in the review process from the start and offered the assistance of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) technical experts. CFC participants agreed that the AMIS-Government consultations should be completed and ready for presentation to the larger group by April 4. (Comment: AMIS has discussed the KHARTOUM 00000459 002.2 OF 002 Janjaweed disarmament plan for months with no substantive progress. As much as the Sudanese government may be unwilling to implement the plan, AMIS has demonstrated little commitment to undertaking a serious review of the proposal or organizing the international community to expedite the process. The Department should tap DDR experts to analyze the GoS plan and develop concrete recommendations for its improvement. End Comment.) -------------- FEW CASES, VERIFICATION IN TRAIN -------------- ¶6. (SBU) No specific ceasefire violation cases were raised the week of March 19, though SLA-Minawi previewed an incident involving the killing of at least two of its soldiers, allegedly by Sudanese Armed Forces, in the vicinity of Saiyah, North Darfur. SLA-Minawi representative Colonel Ahmed Gardiya Khamis attempted to solicit a more in-depth discussion of the case, but the CFC First Vice Chairman stopped him. He noted that the item was not on the agenda and that no one in the CFC had received the statement of complaint outlining the incident. The matter will be referred to Sector Six for investigation. (Note: SLA-Minawi Security Arrangements Committee representatives provided a statement of the alleged killings to S/CRS Poloff on March 20, who advised them to raise the issue in the appropriate Sector sub-CFC, which is responsible for carrying out the investigation and forwarding, as required, the case to the Headquarters CFC. End Note.) ¶7. (SBU) The Force Commander noted that all sectors have been tasked to complete verification of parties' areas of control by April 2, in accordance with the requirements (not the timeline, however) of the DPA's security arrangements provisions. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The relative calm throughout Darfur was reflected in the paucity of ceasefire violations raised over the previous week. Still, major and minor hurdles remain unresolved in improving CFC capacity. The Sudanese government continues to reject the deployment of non-signatory representatives to the Sector level, stalling the Second Chamber concept and preventing an established channel of communication to non-signatories to facilitate ceasefire violation investigations and humanitarian access. Now that the international community had pledged to pay CFC reps - both signatory and non-signatory - at reduced levels, it should turn its concerted attention to pressuring the Government to allow the presence of Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and SLA/Non-signatory Factions (SLA-NSF) members at AMIS sector headquarters and group sites. Another snag in the CFC's functioning - and, in fact, AMIS operations throughout Darfur - is the ongoing strike by AMIS language assistants, who have not received MSA since December. In the interim, an interpreter employed by Post has been filling in at the CFC meetings. Finally, genuine and visible progress in executing a realistic Janjaweed disarmament plan is a prerequisite for advancing the peace process in Darfur; high-level political attention should be re-focused on this particular facet of the DPA. End comment. HUME