GOVERNOR RICHARDSON MEETS PRESIDENT BASHIR AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000044

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, BEIJING FOR AF/SE NATSIOS,
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: GOVERNOR RICHARDSON MEETS PRESIDENT BASHIR AND
CONCLUDES VISIT TO SUDAN

REF: A. A.) KHARTOUM 30

B. B.) KHARTOUM 40

Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On January 10 Governor Bill Richardson met
again with Sudan's President Omar El Bashir and concluded his
visit to Sudan. At the end of the Richardson/Bashir meeting,
representatives of the Save Darfur Coalition (which sponsored
Richardson's trip) spoke briefly with Bashir. The two sides
issued a press statement (ref b). Richardson secured
positive statements from both Bashir and rebel groups
regarding his proposal for a 60-day cease-fire, but AU envoy
Selim Ahmed Selim and UN envoy Jan Eliasson have the task of
making those promises effective. Richardson pushed the
Sudanese on the need to accept UN peacekeepers, but there was
no give-and-take on this issue. Richardson briefed both
Selim and Eliasson, and they welcomed his efforts. End
Summary.


2. (C) Governor Richardson, accompanied by CDA Hume and
Richardson's foreign policy advisor, Calvin Humphrey, met
President Bashir so that Richardson could report on the
results of his trip the previous day to Darfur. The meeting
lasted for a half-hour. At the outset, Richardson said that
if real progress could be made on peace in Darfur, he would
talk with colleagues in the Democratic party, as well as with
the Save Darfur Coalition, regarding the need to fund
development and infrastructure projects in Darfur. During
the trip to Darfur, both he and representatives of Save
Darfur had met rebels to urge them to accept the cease-fire,
engage in the political process, and provide security for the
work of humanitarian organizations.


3. (C) Richardson said that there was an urgent need for a
political process and a strategic plan. He had met briefly
with Jan Eliasson, the UN envoy, who was now engaging on the
issue. The immediate challenge was to use a cease-fire to
launch a political process that would secure reciprocal
commitments from the rebels. This process could be within
the framework of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and the AU and
UN could make the arrangements. In El Fasher,
representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
and of the Sudanese Liberation Movement, Abdul Wahid faction
(SLM/AW) said they would commit to such a cease-fire.
Richardson urged Bashir to get this process launched before
his meeting with UN Secretary General Ban in Addis Ababa on
January 29.


4. (C) Richardson said, on behalf of AMIS Force Commander
Luke Aprezi, that he would like to ask that the Sudanese
military no longer paint its aircraft white, the color used
by humanitarian organizations. Bashir agreed but suggested
that non-combat aircraft were not necessarily included in his
agreement.


5. (C) Bashir said his goal was a final settlement for
Darfur. He had worked for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) with southern Sudan and for peace in eastern Sudan.
When the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in Abuja on
May 5, 2006, some commanders had given positive signals, but
then the focus of the international community shifted from
supporting the DPA to replacing AMIS with UN peace-keepers.
As a consequence of this shift in attention, the rebel groups
used the cease-fire to re-equip and re-supply, and then they
launched new attacks in North Darfur and Kordofan. Some
countries supported the rebels with arms. Others, despite
having signed the DPA themselves, gave political platforms to
the non-signatories. The international community should have
criticized these rebels for launching new attacks and their
use of new anti-aircraft weapons, but it had not.


6. (C) Bashir said he had committed to the DPA and the
security provisions of that agreement. He was still willing
to dialogue with the rebels and to settle the problems with
them, but the effort had to be within the framework of what
had been agreed to in Abuja. Another cease-fire used for
re-equipping and launching new attacks was not acceptable,
but, if he were asked to stop military activity or to provide
security so that rebels could meet to discuss peace, he would
do so within the framework of the DPA. His goal was to gain
ground for peace, a full peace. When Richardson pushed again
for a 60-day cease-fire, Bashir gave his promise only if the
cease-fire were linked to a program or a meeting within the
framework of the DPA, but not for an open-ended cease-fire.

KHARTOUM 00000044 002 OF 002




7. (C) Then Richardson requested and Bashir agreed that
representatives of the Save Darfur Coalition join the
meeting. Larry Rossin, the group's senior international
adviser, said that the purpose of the group was to support
the people of Darfur and that, with respect for Sudan's
sovereignty and territorial integrity, it sought peace. Ken
Bacon (Refugees International) said that the group's main
goal was to support humanitarian operations in Darfur. Amjad
Atallah emphasized the group's concern over gender-based
violence, and Michael Bergman (Center for Middle East Peace)
stressed the importance of ending violence against the people
of Darfur.


8. (C) Bashir thanked Richardson for arranging the meeting
and said he was pleased with what he had heard. However, the
Coalition, with its unbalanced picture of the situation in
Darfur, had a negative impact on the prospects for peace. It
should support the Darfur Peace Agreement, which the U.S.
government had endorsed. Had that agreement been
implemented, the situation in Darfur would have improved
greatly. The Coalition only pressured the government, and it
never criticized the rebels. Past actions by the Coalition
had not been in line with respect for Sudan's territorial
integrity.


9. (C) Bashir said he had worked for six years for peace with
southern Sudan. He wanted one Sudan, at peace with itself
and its neighbors. U.S. sanctions policy, supported by the
Coalition, had kept the Sudanese government from delivering
peace benefits to the people of southern Sudan. The
sanctions policy did not support peace.


10. (C) Bashir said that before the signing of the DPA the
U.S. government had pledged that, if the peace were signed,
sanctions would be lifted, political relations would be
restored, Sudan would be removed from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism, and debts would be rescheduled. And,
that those who refused to sign the peace would be punished.
None of this had happened. The rebels got time in which to
rebuild their forces. Their attacks stopped the process of
implementing the peace. The right approach by the Coalition
would be to criticize those who refused peace and to support
those who committed to peace.


11. (U) At the conclusion of the session an AP reporter in
the delegation asked Bashir a question regarding
peace-keeping in Darfur. Bashir said that Sudan's experience
with UN peace-keeping troops was not completely positive and
that, in his view, members of the African Union could provide
an adequate number of battalions for peace-keeping in Darfur,
although they would need financial, technical, and logistic
support from the United Nations.


12. (C) The joint statement (Ref b) was agreed by
Richardson's delegation and Foreign Ministry officials. In
case of any variations, Ref a and this message are the more
accurate record of the two meetings with Bashir.


13. (C) Richardson informed AU envoy Selim Ahmed Selim (by
phone) and UN envoy Eliasson (in person) of his efforts, for
which both expressed appreciation.


14. (C) Comment: Richardson made a strong, personal effort to
secure a cease-fire pledge and to give a positive impulse to
the peace process to be conducted by the AU and the UN, in
line with the Addis Ababa agreement of November 16. Both
Selim and Eliasson are now challenged to make concrete the
commitment to a cease-fire, as expressed in the joint
statement. Their activity in the period before the scheduled
January 29 Bashir/Ban meeting at the African Union summit in
Addis Ababa will be crucial for relaunching the peace
process. End comment.


15. (U) Governor Richardson did not have an opportunity to
review this message prior to his departure.
HUME