CFC Week of March 12 - SLA/Minawi Takes Responsibility for

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000445 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU SUBJECT: CFC Week of March 12 - SLA/Minawi Takes Responsibility for Killing and Seeks Help REF: (A) KHARTOUM 00396 (B) KHARTOUM 00409 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Force Commander announced that the next Joint Commission would not be held in El Fasher because of insecurity but did not suggest a date or an alternate venue. He discussed the new arrangements in the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) with a drop in MSA payments and a reduction in numbers to streamline the organization and make way for the deployment of the Second Chamber, which he continues to hope the Sudanese government will approve. Aprezi will give the factions two weeks to verify their sectors and hopes to present a comprehensive sector verification map at the next Joint Commission. Aprezi said that the Government has offered to take back responsibility for Graida from the SLA/Minawi. The report on the March 5 killing of the two AMIS soldiers clearly pins responsibility for the deaths on SLA/Minawi, which Aprezi said is corroborated by one of the wounded soldiers and was conceded by Minawi himself. In a sidebar meeting with international observers, Aprezi discussed a private meeting he and AMIS leadership had with Minawi, who he said is desperately seeking help to hold his faction together. Aprezi in turn asked for the international community to take a stronger interest, as "without Minni, there is no DPA." End Summary. -------------- EL FASHER NOT SAFE ENOUGH FOR JC -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Aprezi had just returned from three days in Khartoum where he said he held meetings with Minni Minawi, the GOS Senior Military Command, the international community, and AMIS leadership. He announced up front that the next Joint Commission meeting would not be held in El Fasher due to insecurity. Until the Sudanese government can provide a safe and secure environment here, he said, we will not risk bringing in VIPs to attend. He then intimated that there were some AMIS politics involved in this decision but did not elaborate. ¶3. (SBU) Aprezi said that there was a high-level Sudanese government delegation in El Fasher looking at how to improve security and better coordinate among the various players here. He mentioned problems in the coordination with the Western Command that the delegation from Khartoum would help with. -------------- CHANGES IN THE CFC -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Aprezi briefed the group on changes that had been agreed to by the international donors and the faction leadership in Khartoum on the functioning of the CFC (Ref A). He said the mission support allowance would be cut to $1,000 per month at headquarters and $500 at the group sites. The international donors agreed to fund this amount and to pay the arrears through February, with the new amount staring on March 1. ¶5. (SBU) The number of representatives at the group sites would be reduced, but there were still two options for how to do so, pending approval from the Government for the deployment of the Second Chamber. Both options would have two persons per faction in the CFC headquarters but differ on representation at the group sites: 1) Two representatives from each faction at the eight sector headquarters or 2) Representatives only in Nyala, El Fasher, and Geneina in anticipation of the change to three sectors. In either case, factions would only have representatives in the sub-sectors in areas where they have verified control or where their faction has constituents. Aprezi hopes that both options will include deployment of the non-signatories for the Second Chamber, which is still pending Government approval. ¶6. (SBU) Aprezi said that he prefers the three sector option, which would have the CFC organized in parallel to changes that will be made to the AMIS layout when the two new battalions arrive, which he anticipates in the coming months. He also said he will lay down new rules for the faction representatives. First, there will be mandatory rotation, with no rep exceeding one year in a sector. Second, the factions will recommend people for the CFC, but once their names are forwarded, their status and responsibilities will be clearly spelled out in a contract with the Chairman. He said this should stop the proliferation of breakaway factions that put forward new representatives and will keep standards high. Third, the standard operating procedures will be enforced, and there will be no pay for reps who are not actively pursuing their function. ¶7. (SBU) The SLA/Minawi rep asked if there was still any room for KHARTOUM 00000445 002 OF 003 discussion and the FC answered that since the proposal had already been briefed to the faction leaders, no. The GOS rep questioned whether the new proposal was in keeping with the letter of the DPA and urged that it be reviewed a last time with that in mind. -------------- SECTOR VERIFICATION SET OUT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) With regards to the sector verification exercise that was started recently, Aprezi said he will not discuss it further but plans to clearly spell out how it will be conducted. He will formally write to the factions and give them two weeks to complete their plotting for verification. AMIS will roll it all together in time for the next Joint Commission. -------------- GOVERNMENT TO "TAKE" GRAIDA -------------- ¶9. (SBU) We then discussed the security situation in Graida in the wake of the killing of the two AMIS soldiers on March 5. The FC said that he has received a letter from the Sudanese government stating that if SLA/Minawi does not secure Graida, the Government will take it by force. He said that SLA/Minawi has stated at different times that it would be willing to give Graida up, and pointed out that with the two additional battalions Graida will be a battalion headquarters so AMIS would also have the option of securing the town. SLA/Minawi rep asked how the GOS can threaten to "take Graida," and asked if this would be a violation of the DPA. He said he would raise it with his leadership. The Government representative said that Sudanese forces had pulled out of Graida when asked to do so by SLA/Minawi, but acted on the assumption that SLA/Minawi could secure the town. Since they have failed to do so, it is time to revisit the arrangement. ¶10. (SBU) The Force Commander then accused SLA/Minawi of being the only faction that is not taking responsibility for its areas. SLA/Minawi representative cited a recent threat against the deputy head of the party, but Aprezi cut him off by stating that he knows this was actually "Minni on Minni" violence. He urged SLA/Minawi to be honest about its lack of control in an area like this and to allow the Sudanese government or AMIS to take over. -------------- KILLING OF AMIS SOLDIERS BY SLA -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The only violation we considered was the killing of two AMIS soldiers in Graida on 5 March 2007. The report is titled "Investigation Report on the Attack on AMIS personnel and Snatching of Vehicle Reg AMIS 242 in Graida by SLA(MM) soldiers on 5 March 2007." SLA/Minawi is listed as the "who" in the introduction, and under "why" it states "the SLA(MM) soldiers act was intentional to kill AMIS personnel and snatch the vehicle." The opinion section states "the attack of SLA(MM) soldiers against AMIS personnel and property in Graida was done intentionally. This deliberate attack carried out by a group of SLA(MM) soldiers against AMIS constitutes a major violation of the DPA." It recommends the sanctioning of the faction, bringing the perpetrators to justice through national or international criminal courts, and condemning the act in the media. There is a statement by the SLA/Minawi sector representative that suggests some other group carried out the act to sully the reputation of SLA(MM) but oddly he also signed the report which names his faction as the guilty party. ¶12. (SBU) The Force Commander explained that days after the incident SLA/Minawi said they had located the vehicle and asked AMIS to come pick it up. The Force Commander declined to do so, saying he wants the perpetrators not the vehicle. He said he brought the wounded soldier back with him when he returned from Khartoum, and the soldier knows the SLA/Minawi soldiers who carried out the attack by sight. When the SLA/Minawi representative challenged the Force Commander on the issue of blame, the Force Commander dismissed his challenge by stating that he had already discussed it with Minni Minawi himself, who conceded that his faction was responsible. The Force Commander then asked to meet separately with the UN, EU, and U.S. observers. (Note: Per Ref B, Minawi denies that he conceded SLM responsibility. He claims that his offers to conduct a joint AU/SLM investigation to identify and detain the attackers were rebuffed by the AU, including Aprezi. End note.) -------------- MINAWI IN TROUBLE -------------- KHARTOUM 00000445 003 OF 003 ¶13. (SBU) The Force Commander briefed S/CRS Poloffs privately about the discussion he, DPA Implementation Chief Sam Ibok, and Acting Head of Mission Mukaruliza had had with Minawi. Minawi conceded to him that his organization is in trouble. When they were fighting, Minawi said, they had other ways of supplying themselves, which is how they were able to sustain 45,000 men in the field. Now they are down to a handful. Minawi reportedly told the Force Commander that he has trouble maintaining control over his areas. He said that the day after he had met with his commanders on a recent trip to Darfur, they stole two vehicles. ¶14. (SBU) Aprezi said there is widespread concern in AMIS headquarters over the state of the Minawi faction. Aprezi told us that the sentiment among AMIS leadership is "if there is no Minawi, there is no DPA." When confronted with the evidence on the March 5 attack on AMIS, Minawi reportedly came clean and admitted it was his people who carried out the attack, but said he simply does not have the material resources to keep his men on his side. The Force Commander said Minawi cited a figure of 25 vehicles configured for heavy weapons that have gone over to the National Redemption Front (NRF) with defectors over the past several months. Aprezi said he wanted to do a side bar meeting with the international community to stress that Minawi needs help, and if we do not help him, "the DPA will be dead." ¶15. (SBU) We then discussed the various initiatives for humanitarian assistance to the faction, the first tranche of which went out earlier in the week. Aprezi mentioned that LTG Ismet, the "land forces commander for Darfur" was in El Fasher to help improve security here and General Al-Dabi may be coming out as well to work these issues. He thought they might be helpful interlocutors in making these same points, since the Government is responsible for carrying out the program of non-military aid to the factions. HUME