CFC VISIT TO ABECHE: MGS CONSTRAINTS AND JEM INTRANSIGENCE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000438

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU

SUBJECT: CFC VISIT TO ABECHE: MGS CONSTRAINTS AND JEM INTRANSIGENCE

REF: (A) KHARTOUM 00396
(B) KHARTOUM 00304
(C) KHARTOUM 00331

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) Members of the AMIS Ceasefire Commission traveled to
Abeche, Chad to receive an operations update from the local Military
Observer Group Site (MGS) Commander and to engage the JEM
leadership. The MGS faces severe logistical constraints, including
transportation and communications, which hamper its ability to
function effectively. JEM officials reiterated their continued
adherence to the N'djamena (Humanitarin Ceasefire Agreement) HCFA,
rejection of the DPA, and demands to be consulted by the AU on a
range of ceasefire- and political process-related issues. The visit
offered another window on the AMIS Force Commander's strengths and
weaknesses and underscored the limitations of AU political capacity.
End Summary.

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MGS ABECHE NEEDS HELP
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2. (SBU) On March 18, the Abeche MGS Commander briefed members of
the Ceasefire Commission (CFC),including AMIS Force Commander Luke
Aprezi, CFC Secretariat staff and the EU and U.S. observers, on the
group site's operations and constraints. The MGS mission to liaise
with Chadian and French forces, monitor cross-border refugee
movement and security around their camps, and maintain awareness of
rebel and militia activities is severely constrained by numerous
logistical and administrative challenges. The MGS Commander
outlined the lack of communications (no Internet connectivity - AMIS
relies on UNHCR or local French forces to send email - and only one
satellite phone),transportation challenges (only eight operational
vehicles, few spare parts and scant helicopter support),and other
operational obstacles (broken generators, inadequate medical
support, poor accommodations, and insufficient funds to pay rent and
utility bills). The MGS and Protection Force (PF) Commanders both
voiced their dissatisfaction that their troops had not received
Mission Support Allowance (MSA) since November 2006, further eroding
morale. The AMIS Force Commander, somewhat defensively, chided the
MGS Commander for his "incomplete reports" but pledged to try to
improve the group site's logistical and administrative posture.
(Note: PAE support does not extend to Chad, leaving the MGS to fend
largely for itself. End Note.)


3. (SBU) The MGS Commander also noted that the border monitoring
force envisioned under the Sudan-Chad Tripoli Agreement was being
established. He remarked that Libyan forces - no mention of the
type, numbers or specific equipment - have already arrived in Abeche
and are using vehicles with AU (vice AMIS) markings. (Note: The CFC
Vice Chairman, French Brigadier General Sintes, noted to S/CRS
Poloff that French forces in Abeche informed him that at least 20
Eritrean military personnel are currently in El Geneina, also as
part of the Tripoli border monitoring force. End Note.)

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JEM UNYIELDING IN ITS VIEWS ON DPA, POLITICAL PROCESS
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4. (SBU) Following the MGS Commander's briefing, members of the CFC
met with Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) political leaders
Tadjadine Bechir Niam, Osman Ahmed Godul and Ahmed Tugod Lissan.
Force Commander Aprezi noted that this was his first encounter with
the JEM officials and proceeded to describe his efforts to bolster
the effectiveness of the CFC, including through the creation of a
Second Chamber for non-signatories. Aprezi summarized recent
decisions taken in regards to streamlining the CFC and hurdles still
facing the body (Ref A). He emphasized his desire for
"inclusiveness" in the CFC and urged JEM participation in the Second
Chamber, which collapsed in mid-February (Ref B).


5. (SBU) Niam, who serves as the JEM spokesman, representative to
the AU and member of the Joint Commission (N'djamena HCFA),began
his opening salvo by reiterating JEM's rejection of the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) and its insistence that the 2004 N'djamena HCFA
remain the cornerstone of JEM-AMIS relations. He complained that
since the signing of the DPA, AMIS had excluded JEM from meaningful
participation in the CFC and Joint Commission. Niam argued that the
signing of the DPA did not abrogate the HCFA, and that without any
operational or political mechanism to communicate, JEM would remain
opposed to AMIS engagement. The JEM spokesman, becoming
increasingly agitated, laid the blame for "anarchy in Darfur" on the
shoulders of AMIS, which he accused of complicity with the

KHARTOUM 00000438 002 OF 002


Government of Sudan. Furthermore, he rejected the Force Commander's
CFC proposals to distribute JEM representatives only at Sector
headquarters and in areas where they exercised some measure of
control. (Note: As the Government continues to refuse the
deployment of non-signatories to the Sector level, JEM's views on
the FC's proposition is a moot point. JEM insists that it is
entitled to representation throughout Darfur, as specified under the
HCFA. End Note.)


6. (SBU) JEM Senior Negotiator and Chief of External Affairs Ahmed
Tugod Lissan reinforced Niam's arguments and emphasized JEM's
perception of AMIS' "failure to consult" and deliberate attempts to
exclude the rebel group. He demanded that JEM representatives
return to the field and asserted that the Force Commander's plan to
place representatives only in MGS areas where they exerted control
would lead to more in-fighting as rebel groups vied to expand their
territories. He endorsed Niam's recommendations to AMIS, namely to
(1) improve consultations with JEM; (2) formalize correspondence in
writing, to include the CFC proposals; (3) reconsider the
functioning of the CFC and immediately redeploy JEM representatives
throughout Darfur; and (4) de-link implementation of the ceasefire
with the issue of DPA signatories versus non-signatories and
"concentrate on saving lives."


7. (SBU) Lissan noted that JEM was prepared to facilitate AMIS'
mission as long as the rebel group had a seat at the table in
accordance with the HCFA. He declared that the perpetually delayed
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) field commanders' conference in Umm Rai
(Ref C) would lead to greater divisions within the movements,
postulating that at least three groups would emerge, led
respectively by Sharif Hariri, Khamis Abdallah and Ahmed Abdul
Shafi. Lissan did not give any indication of JEM outreach to SLA
rebels, though he claimed that both groups were ultimately united in
their objectives. He suggested that the international community
should sponsor a joint military-political conference rather than
just one for field commanders, as they lack political experience and
will only further confuse the situation.


8. (SBU) Regarding efforts by the AU-UN Joint Mediation Support Team
(JMST) to facilitate political dialogue with the non-signatories,
Lissan rejected the participation of AU Special Envoy Salim Salim
and DPA Implementation Team Chief Sam Ibok. "I have nothing against
them personally," the JEM leader claimed, "but we cannot accept them
as they are the ones responsible for the DPA." Lissam clarified
that he did not oppose the AU's role in political mediation, just
those individuals associated with the Abuja negotiations.

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COMMENT
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9. (SBU) The visit to Abeche provided another window on Force
Commander Aprezi's strengths and weaknesses. Over the past six
months, he has demonstrated sincerity in reaching out to the JEM and
SLA Non-Signatories Factions (NSF),meeting with their
representatives on a regular basis, traveling to their strongholds
(in Umm Rai, Jebel Moon and Abeche),and pressing the Sudanese
Government to accept the non-signatories' return to the Sectors.
His proactive approach, however, also underlines the deficiency of
AU political capacity and the linkages between the organization's
political and military branches. Neither the Deputy Head of Mission
nor his lone political officer in El Fasher attended the meeting
(both have been repeatedly ill or otherwise absent) and there were
awkward moments when the FC was drawn into political territory. In
contrast to his predecessor, Aprezi has demonstrated an interest in
hearing first-hand his subordinates' problems. However, he
continues to delve into the weeds (e.g., giving a lengthy lecture on
the necessity of documenting the MGS's generator failure) and is
unwilling to delegate decision-making authority to the appropriate
staff officers. End Comment.

HUME