CFC HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR SUPPORT FOR SLM/MINAWI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000395

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU

SUBJECT: CFC HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR SUPPORT FOR SLM/MINAWI



1. (SBU) Summary: Cease-fire Commission (CFC) activities the week of
February 26 highlighted the continued need for non-military
logistical support to the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)/Minawi.
This support would divert his men away from the extortion and
banditry that is an all too common line in the daily Darfur security
sitreps and show the other factions that "peace pays." The Sudanese
government and SLM/Minawi held a meeting in late February under the
auspices of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to plan for
humanitarian assistance, but it is not clear whether and when the
assistance will begin. End Summary


2. (SBU) CFC members met with Minawi during his trip to Darfur the
week of February 19 and received a read-out on his meeting with
international non-government organizations (INGOs) at AMIS
headquarters on February 21 from EU representatives. SLM/Minawi CFC
representative Adam Ali War said that Minni's trip to Darfur had two
purposes: 1) educate field commanders about the importance of
ensuring humanitarian access and protecting NGOs, and 2) take stock
of popular support for the DPA. Some 44 persons attended the
meeting with INGOs, including representatives from the UN Mission in
Sudan (UNMIS),the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS),the
World Food Program (WFP),the UN Office for Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA),International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC),Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF),and Relief
International. An EU observer characterized Minawi as "evasive" and
"accepting no responsibility for SLM indiscipline" while suggesting
that there were many armed groups in North Darfur, most of which are
tribal and cannot be identified. MSF-Spain then asked who was
responsible for civilian actions in the absence of state authority,
and Relief International stressed that INGOs would only work where
commanders accepted responsibility. Minawi answered that the "SLM
was not responsible for civilian elements."

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EXTORTION IN TAWILA MARKET
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3. (SBU) The theme of SLM/Minawi lacking resources and control
played out in several of the 12 cases brought to the CFC this week.
One goes back to November when SLM/Minawi fighters reportedly
attempted to collect 500 dinars in "protection" money from a
shopkeeper who refused to pay and drew his sword to make his point.
The SLM/Minawi commander's statement to the CFC concedes that
"everybody here knows that we collect the money from the traders for
providing security while they are sleeping at their homes, and we
stay awake right through the night guarding their shops and all of
Tawila area because everybody knows that we don't have salary or
money resources." He went on to explain that they were demanding
not 500 dinars, but merely 200. The case was a minor infraction
that would not have come to the CFC, but it provided a useful window
on Minawi's lack of a stable resource base and the resulting
problems.

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ATTACK ON AMIS CAMP
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4. (SBU) The CFC also reviewed an attack on MGS Umm Baru near Tine
(Sector 5) on December 4. The facts of the case are not definitive,
but it appears that a Sudanese government soldier came to the MGS
base complaining that he was captured by SLM/Minawi fighters in the
MGS area and relieved of his boots and winter coat. Later that
night, a group of three SLM/Minawi fighters shot at the base,
hitting several tents and bathrooms over the course of three hours
in what the MGS investigators believed were shots fired "directly
against the camp intending to randomly kill." The MGS managed to
capture one of the SLM/Minawi perpetrators during the night. They
later released him to the local commander.

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KILLING IN KAZANJEDID
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5. (SBU) Another report before the CFC involved the killing of
Abdallah Ibrahim Juma in late October 2006. The MGS Shaeria in
Sector 8 concluded that "the deadly act was carried out by soldiers
of the SLM/Minawi party," and criticized the SLM/Minawi
representatives in the area for failing "to facilitate the
investigation process." As a result of the attack, the report says,
"SLM/Minawi soldiers have been forced by GOS to leave Kazanjedid."
They recommended various methods of reconciliation with villagers
and urged party representatives to be more involved in AMIS tasks as
facilitators. The perpetrators have apparently fled.

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CLASHES IN UMM DURMAN

KHARTOUM 00000395 002 OF 002


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6. (SBU) A January 7-8 incident in the village of Bahr Umm Durman,
60 kilometers south-west of El Fasher, in Sector 8 was also briefed
to the CFC. S/CRS Poloff suggested that the CFC headquarters
element should pay a visit to the site to see if the parties had
resolved the underlying issues. On March 1, the Sudanese government
representative, SLM/Minawi representative, EU, UN, and U.S.
observers accompanied an AMIS headquarters team to meet with the
sector team at the village. The incident involved the killing of a
young man at a water point, the burning of a truck, and a group of
bandits who fortified themselves in the village of Bahr Umm Durman.
These events led to an attack on the village by SLM/Minawi soldiers
that left as many as 30 villagers and five SLM/Minawi soldiers dead
and dozens more wounded.


7. (SBU) The SLM/Minawi faction in that area is little more than an
armed gang. The "bandits" according to the investigative report
were "former fighters of SLA(MM)." It appears that the fighting was
between SLM/Minawi and a breakaway faction, with civilians caught in
the crossfire. Acccording to the Popular Committee head, the
SLM/Minawi faction arrived to expel the bandits but went on to
ransack the village, stealing pieces of the town's water pump, the
television from the community center, personal items from homes, and
considerable livestock. "We want our stuff back," he told him. A
visit by Sudanese government and tribal leaders from El Fasher to
mediate between the parties following the incident produced an
amicable ending and convinced the villagers to stay put. Resentment
remains toward the SLM/Minawi, however, which the Sheikh said is no
longer allowed near the village. Since the Sudanese government is
also barred, it leaves the village without security.


8. (SBU) S/CRS Poloff was able to talk to some of the SLM/Minawi
fighters and asked the commander about one who appeared younger than

14. The SLM/Minawi CFC representative said he had told them not to
allow the younger fighters to come to meetings with international
observers. But he lamented, "they are the most fearless fighters
and the commanders like them. They are hard to keep out of our
forces." The others had no uniforms, no evidence of a chain of
commander, and no clear sense of purpose. It was difficult to see
how they could be effective at keeping order in the area, and easy
to see how they could get into so many scrapes with villagers.



9. (SBU) Comment: The issue of humanitarian and non-military
logistic support for SLM/Minawi is an urgent one. AU DPA
Implementation head Sam Ibok appealed to the international community
to respond. Providing this support will accomplish multiple
objectives: (a) demonstrate the benefits of having signed the DPA
and encourage other splinter groups to adhere to the accord; (b)
encourage greater discipline within SLM/Minawi by reducing the
temptation to resort to banditry or other illicit activities; (c)
strengthen the linkages between the Sudanese government and the
rebel groups, and (d) pave the way for integration of SLM/Minawi and
other Declaration of Commitment (DoC) elements into the Sudanese
Armed Forces (SAF). Without addressing this issue in the near term,
we can expect to continue to see SLM/Minawi cited as a source of
instability within the CFC and throughout Darfur. End comment.

HUME