CFC HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR SUPPORT FOR SLM/MINAWI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000395 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU SUBJECT: CFC HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR SUPPORT FOR SLM/MINAWI ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Cease-fire Commission (CFC) activities the week of February 26 highlighted the continued need for non-military logistical support to the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)/Minawi. This support would divert his men away from the extortion and banditry that is an all too common line in the daily Darfur security sitreps and show the other factions that "peace pays." The Sudanese government and SLM/Minawi held a meeting in late February under the auspices of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to plan for humanitarian assistance, but it is not clear whether and when the assistance will begin. End Summary ¶2. (SBU) CFC members met with Minawi during his trip to Darfur the week of February 19 and received a read-out on his meeting with international non-government organizations (INGOs) at AMIS headquarters on February 21 from EU representatives. SLM/Minawi CFC representative Adam Ali War said that Minni's trip to Darfur had two purposes: 1) educate field commanders about the importance of ensuring humanitarian access and protecting NGOs, and 2) take stock of popular support for the DPA. Some 44 persons attended the meeting with INGOs, including representatives from the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS),the World Food Program (WFP),the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA),International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF),and Relief International. An EU observer characterized Minawi as "evasive" and "accepting no responsibility for SLM indiscipline" while suggesting that there were many armed groups in North Darfur, most of which are tribal and cannot be identified. MSF-Spain then asked who was responsible for civilian actions in the absence of state authority, and Relief International stressed that INGOs would only work where commanders accepted responsibility. Minawi answered that the "SLM was not responsible for civilian elements." -------------- EXTORTION IN TAWILA MARKET -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The theme of SLM/Minawi lacking resources and control played out in several of the 12 cases brought to the CFC this week. One goes back to November when SLM/Minawi fighters reportedly attempted to collect 500 dinars in "protection" money from a shopkeeper who refused to pay and drew his sword to make his point. The SLM/Minawi commander's statement to the CFC concedes that "everybody here knows that we collect the money from the traders for providing security while they are sleeping at their homes, and we stay awake right through the night guarding their shops and all of Tawila area because everybody knows that we don't have salary or money resources." He went on to explain that they were demanding not 500 dinars, but merely 200. The case was a minor infraction that would not have come to the CFC, but it provided a useful window on Minawi's lack of a stable resource base and the resulting problems. -------------- ATTACK ON AMIS CAMP -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The CFC also reviewed an attack on MGS Umm Baru near Tine (Sector 5) on December 4. The facts of the case are not definitive, but it appears that a Sudanese government soldier came to the MGS base complaining that he was captured by SLM/Minawi fighters in the MGS area and relieved of his boots and winter coat. Later that night, a group of three SLM/Minawi fighters shot at the base, hitting several tents and bathrooms over the course of three hours in what the MGS investigators believed were shots fired "directly against the camp intending to randomly kill." The MGS managed to capture one of the SLM/Minawi perpetrators during the night. They later released him to the local commander. -------------- KILLING IN KAZANJEDID -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Another report before the CFC involved the killing of Abdallah Ibrahim Juma in late October 2006. The MGS Shaeria in Sector 8 concluded that "the deadly act was carried out by soldiers of the SLM/Minawi party," and criticized the SLM/Minawi representatives in the area for failing "to facilitate the investigation process." As a result of the attack, the report says, "SLM/Minawi soldiers have been forced by GOS to leave Kazanjedid." They recommended various methods of reconciliation with villagers and urged party representatives to be more involved in AMIS tasks as facilitators. The perpetrators have apparently fled. -------------- CLASHES IN UMM DURMAN KHARTOUM 00000395 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶6. (SBU) A January 7-8 incident in the village of Bahr Umm Durman, 60 kilometers south-west of El Fasher, in Sector 8 was also briefed to the CFC. S/CRS Poloff suggested that the CFC headquarters element should pay a visit to the site to see if the parties had resolved the underlying issues. On March 1, the Sudanese government representative, SLM/Minawi representative, EU, UN, and U.S. observers accompanied an AMIS headquarters team to meet with the sector team at the village. The incident involved the killing of a young man at a water point, the burning of a truck, and a group of bandits who fortified themselves in the village of Bahr Umm Durman. These events led to an attack on the village by SLM/Minawi soldiers that left as many as 30 villagers and five SLM/Minawi soldiers dead and dozens more wounded. ¶7. (SBU) The SLM/Minawi faction in that area is little more than an armed gang. The "bandits" according to the investigative report were "former fighters of SLA(MM)." It appears that the fighting was between SLM/Minawi and a breakaway faction, with civilians caught in the crossfire. Acccording to the Popular Committee head, the SLM/Minawi faction arrived to expel the bandits but went on to ransack the village, stealing pieces of the town's water pump, the television from the community center, personal items from homes, and considerable livestock. "We want our stuff back," he told him. A visit by Sudanese government and tribal leaders from El Fasher to mediate between the parties following the incident produced an amicable ending and convinced the villagers to stay put. Resentment remains toward the SLM/Minawi, however, which the Sheikh said is no longer allowed near the village. Since the Sudanese government is also barred, it leaves the village without security. ¶8. (SBU) S/CRS Poloff was able to talk to some of the SLM/Minawi fighters and asked the commander about one who appeared younger than ¶14. The SLM/Minawi CFC representative said he had told them not to allow the younger fighters to come to meetings with international observers. But he lamented, "they are the most fearless fighters and the commanders like them. They are hard to keep out of our forces." The others had no uniforms, no evidence of a chain of commander, and no clear sense of purpose. It was difficult to see how they could be effective at keeping order in the area, and easy to see how they could get into so many scrapes with villagers. ¶9. (SBU) Comment: The issue of humanitarian and non-military logistic support for SLM/Minawi is an urgent one. AU DPA Implementation head Sam Ibok appealed to the international community to respond. Providing this support will accomplish multiple objectives: (a) demonstrate the benefits of having signed the DPA and encourage other splinter groups to adhere to the accord; (b) encourage greater discipline within SLM/Minawi by reducing the temptation to resort to banditry or other illicit activities; (c) strengthen the linkages between the Sudanese government and the rebel groups, and (d) pave the way for integration of SLM/Minawi and other Declaration of Commitment (DoC) elements into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Without addressing this issue in the near term, we can expect to continue to see SLM/Minawi cited as a source of instability within the CFC and throughout Darfur. End comment. HUME