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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
07KHARTOUM394 2007-03-13 16:14:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DPA SIGNATORIES CLAIM HELP NEEDED NOW

Tags:   PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU 
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VZCZCXRO4069
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0394/01 0721614
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131614Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6452
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
					  UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000394 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN US SU

SUBJECT: DPA SIGNATORIES CLAIM HELP NEEDED NOW




1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Ongoing frustration at the lack of Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) implementation boiled over in El Fasher as signatory
factions forcibly entered the USG-funded Peace Secretariat to demand
that their concerns be addressed. The factions claim that their
soldiers are "starving" and in dire need of humanitarian assistance.
Having committed to the DPA and no longer relying on raiding
Sudanese Government forces to re-supply, the factions intimated that
their only option may be returning to the bush. The USG should
support the formation of the Logistics Coordination Committee (LCC)
of the DPA to provide a mechanism for international assistance to
the signatories. END SUMMARY.



2. (SBU) Leaders of the political arms of the Sudan Liberation
Movement (SLM)/Minawi, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)/Peace
Wing, and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Free Will met with S/CRS
Poloffs on March 6 to convey their mounting frustration with the
lack of DPA implementation, the dire need for humanitarian
assistance for their fighters in the field and their apologies for
brusquely barging into the Peace Secretariat the previous day, with
some movement members carrying weapons. The faction leaders, all of
whom participate in the joint Sudanese Government-DPA Signatories
Security Arrangements Committee, complained that without sufficient
resources - including office space, vehicles, access to computers
and basic supplies - they cannot promote the DPA to their
constituencies nor carry out their respective obligations.



3. (SBU) The factions observed that the Sudanese government
succeeded in carrying out its strategy of co-opting rebel groups,
only to leave them "high and dry." Additionally, with little or no
support forthcoming from AMIS, the factions have become increasingly
desperate for sustenance and resentful toward AMIS. S/CRS Poloffs
concurred that no one, including the international community, was
pleased with the pace of DPA implementation and that the underlying
problems that led to conflict in Darfur would only be exacerbated
without the goodwill of the parties to fulfill their commitments.




4. (SBU) The SLM/Minawi representative explained that another factor
in the groups' dissatisfaction related to recent attempts by the
Sudanese government to distribute humanitarian assistance to the
signatories. Through consultations at the Security Arrangements
Committee, the Sudanese government agreed to provide varying
quantities of sorghum, sugar, cooking oil, lentils, and salt to the
factions. According to the signatory representatives, they showed
up to receive their supplies in El Fasher only to discover that
media was present to document the event. The movements refused to
accept the humanitarian assistance, rationalizing that the Sudanese
government would use the media to create propaganda that would
tarnish the image of the rebel factions. Furthermore, the movement
leaders explained that the quantities offered by the Government were
inadequate and that there was no AU or UN presence at the event to
provide transparency and act as an impartial observer. Meeting
these conditions - no press, greater quantities and an AU or UN
witness - would be necessary for the movements to accept Government
humanitarian aid. In the absence of assistance from the government,
AMIS or the international community, the leaders implied, the
movements might have little choice than to return to the bush and
re-supply themselves through force. (Note: The movements claimed
that their respective counterparts in both South and West Darfur
received supplies in late February from the Sudanese government
without press or problems. End Note.)



5. (SBU) S/CRS Poloffs protested the signatory factions' uninvited
and armed intrusion into the USG-funded Peace Secretariat on March
7, where the movements congregated following their aborted attempt
to receive Sudanese government supplies in El Fasher. Frustrated
with AMIS' apparent lack of interest in witnessing and facilitating
the Government logistics delivery, the factions went in search of a
place to gather and to vent their frustrations. After a verbal
confrontation with AMIS staff at the Peace Secretariat, the rebels
proceeded to the Force Commander's office to air their grievances.
The movement leaders apologizedt S/CRS Poloffs for their rash
behavior at the Peace Secretariat and affirmed their understanding
that no weapons would be brought onto the premises. (Note: The
fact that the movement leadership was not aware of the Peace
Secretariat - despite a representative from each non-signatory

SIPDIS
faction being assigned there - underscores the groups' lack of
internal organization and coordination, which is illustrated in
other examples ranging from control over local commanders to
arranging humanitarian access. End note.)



6. (SBU) Comment: The signatory movements' increasing frustration
with the Sudanese government and AMIS regarding the delay in DPA
implementation has the potential to drive many of them out of the
peace process. Besides further complicating the political and
security landscape, additional defectors would make implementation
of even the most superficial DPA-related activities less likely and

KHARTOUM 00000394 002 OF 002


less credible. It is difficult to assess the factions' claim that
their "forces are starving in the field." However, without taking
supplies from the Government by force--their previous logistics
mechanism--they must now look to new sources.



7. (SBU) Comment continued: Desperate for resources, many of the
rebels are freelancing in banditry or other illicit activities (like
vehicle theft or hijacking food convoys). The DPA provision for
non-military logistical support was raised by AU DPA Implementation
Team head Sam Ibok at the February 7 Joint Commission meeting and
has been discussed in the context of the Ceasefire Commission. In a
February 10 diplomatic note to the AU, Senior Assistant to the
President Minawi requested that AMIS establish the Logistics
Coordination Committee (LCC) called for in Article 28 of the DPA.
This body is intended to act as a joint mechanism involving the AU,
the UN, the movements, and international donors to assess the
logistical needs of the signatory factions, procure the items, and
distribute them. Within the framework of USG legal restrictions on
provision of food aid to combatants, the LCC could be an expeditious
instrument to allow the U.S. to provide in-kind assistance to the
rebel signatories while also maintaining some influence on how the
supplies are disseminated. End comment.

HUME