SUDAN REJECTS UN HEAVY SUPPORT PACKAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000392

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU UN US
SUBJECT: SUDAN REJECTS UN HEAVY SUPPORT PACKAGE

REF: USUN 00193

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) President Bashir's March 6 letter to UNSYG Ban Ki-moon
on assistance for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)
rejected the UN's Heavy Support Package. Bashir's response
contradicted the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements of November
2006 and the Presidential Statement in the UN Security
Council (PRST) of December 19. Furthermore his letter
rejected the advice in President Bush's March 1 letter, which
SE Natsios delivered. Bashir's letter has told the
international community there is only one avenue for
peace-keeping in Darfur: an AU mission, under AU command and
control, financed by the UN, but subject to the Sudanese
government's step-by-step approval for each component of the
operation.


2. (C) Such an extension of the current AU arrangements is
neither practical nor sustainable, as stated by the AU's Said
Djinnit in discussions at the UN. USUN 193 is a first rate
analysis of the constraints on peace-keeping in Darfur and
the difficulties of moving forward with alternative
solutions.


3. (C) The USG needs to marshall a comprehensive, realistic
response, within the Security Council, at the upcoming Sudan
Consortium meeting in Khartoum, and bilaterally. UN
financing for peace-keeping in Darfur can be available only
through the untested authority of Chapter VIII (a mechanism
never before used, perhaps for good reasons) or because the
"hybrid" operation--joining forces recruited by both the UN
and AU--is subject to UN command and control, as well as to
UN financial procedures. In essence Bashir's letter suggests
that financing and support be given with no conditions
attached, a position rejected last year even by some members
of Sudan's "heat shield" in the Security Council, such as
China and Russia. First, in one way or another, it would
seem essential for the Security Council to give strong
support to UNSYG Ban for a direct, firm response to Bashir's
letter, pointing out that cooperation with the international
community must be based on the agreements reached in Addis
Ababa and Abuja and on the plans developed by the AU and the
UN.


4. (C) Second, on the occasion of the Sudan Consortium
meeting on March 19, the United States and other donors
should make statements calling on Sudan to welcome the heavy
support package, as proposed by the UNSYG. Although the
Consortium concerns primarily the implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),including efforts toward
elections in 2009, the chaos in Darfur has become the major
impediment to implementation of the CPA.


5. (C) Third, the United States must continue its own direct,
bilateral efforts to insert a UN peace-keeping force into
Darfur. Bashir signed his letter when he was already aware
that Plan B sanctions were beginning to be implemented, as
explained by SE Natsios. Perhaps more sanctions would lead
to a changed Sudanese position. However, there is no
evidence that increased U.S. pressure without commensurate
steps taken by other governments would budge the Sudanese.
Nevertheless, the United States needs to express directly at
a high level to the Sudanese government its assessment of
Bashir's letter. As read by Embassy Khartoum, Bashir's
letter fails the test laid out in President Bush's letter
that the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements had to be
implemented "without further delay or compromise."
HUME