SUDAN REJECTS UN HEAVY SUPPORT PACKAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000392 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU UN US SUBJECT: SUDAN REJECTS UN HEAVY SUPPORT PACKAGE REF: USUN 00193 Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) President Bashir's March 6 letter to UNSYG Ban Ki-moon on assistance for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) rejected the UN's Heavy Support Package. Bashir's response contradicted the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements of November 2006 and the Presidential Statement in the UN Security Council (PRST) of December 19. Furthermore his letter rejected the advice in President Bush's March 1 letter, which SE Natsios delivered. Bashir's letter has told the international community there is only one avenue for peace-keeping in Darfur: an AU mission, under AU command and control, financed by the UN, but subject to the Sudanese government's step-by-step approval for each component of the operation. ¶2. (C) Such an extension of the current AU arrangements is neither practical nor sustainable, as stated by the AU's Said Djinnit in discussions at the UN. USUN 193 is a first rate analysis of the constraints on peace-keeping in Darfur and the difficulties of moving forward with alternative solutions. ¶3. (C) The USG needs to marshall a comprehensive, realistic response, within the Security Council, at the upcoming Sudan Consortium meeting in Khartoum, and bilaterally. UN financing for peace-keeping in Darfur can be available only through the untested authority of Chapter VIII (a mechanism never before used, perhaps for good reasons) or because the "hybrid" operation--joining forces recruited by both the UN and AU--is subject to UN command and control, as well as to UN financial procedures. In essence Bashir's letter suggests that financing and support be given with no conditions attached, a position rejected last year even by some members of Sudan's "heat shield" in the Security Council, such as China and Russia. First, in one way or another, it would seem essential for the Security Council to give strong support to UNSYG Ban for a direct, firm response to Bashir's letter, pointing out that cooperation with the international community must be based on the agreements reached in Addis Ababa and Abuja and on the plans developed by the AU and the UN. ¶4. (C) Second, on the occasion of the Sudan Consortium meeting on March 19, the United States and other donors should make statements calling on Sudan to welcome the heavy support package, as proposed by the UNSYG. Although the Consortium concerns primarily the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),including efforts toward elections in 2009, the chaos in Darfur has become the major impediment to implementation of the CPA. ¶5. (C) Third, the United States must continue its own direct, bilateral efforts to insert a UN peace-keeping force into Darfur. Bashir signed his letter when he was already aware that Plan B sanctions were beginning to be implemented, as explained by SE Natsios. Perhaps more sanctions would lead to a changed Sudanese position. However, there is no evidence that increased U.S. pressure without commensurate steps taken by other governments would budge the Sudanese. Nevertheless, the United States needs to express directly at a high level to the Sudanese government its assessment of Bashir's letter. As read by Embassy Khartoum, Bashir's letter fails the test laid out in President Bush's letter that the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements had to be implemented "without further delay or compromise." HUME