NATSIOS-BASHIR MEETING, MARCH 7, 2007

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000362 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU CD LY US SUBJECT: NATSIOS-BASHIR MEETING, MARCH 7, 2007 KHARTOUM 00000362 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: SE Natsios met President Bashir at his residence for a two-hour frank exchange on Darfur, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),and the U.S.-Sudan bilateral relationship. Bashir said he agreed to see him despite doctor's orders that he rest. Foreign Minister Lam Akol was present. Natsios delivered tough messages on the need for full implementation of the November 16 Addis agreement, stressing the importance of accelerating deployment of the three-phase peacekeeping plan, supporting the AU/UN-led political process, ending harassment and bureaucratic impediments on humanitarian workers, and breaking the deadlock on key CPA implementation issues. He stressed the importance of the New Embassy Compound in Khartoum to our ongoing bilateral relationship, and called for the immediate release of the containers without payment of customs duties. ¶2. (C) Summary continued: Bashir said he had just signed the response letter on the heavy support package and that it would be sent imminently. In his view, a large peacekeeping force is not necessary in Darfur if the political process is successful, but he accepts a hybrid force if there is an African commander reporting to Addis (who determines the size of the force); UN command and control means merely supportive mechanisms (and funding) for the AU; and the troops are African (with the exception of UN advisors and technical assistants). Bashir pledged to end harassment of humanitarian workers by eliminating bureaucratic obstacles, and committed to release the NEC containers without payment of duties. In a one-on-one meeting at the end, Natsios told Bashir candidly that &Plan B8 was real and that elements would be implemented in the coming days. The faster we resolve Darfur, said Natsios, especially the deployment of the peacekeeping operation, the better it will be for the future of the bilateral relationship. End Summary. ¶3. (C) Special Envoy Natsios opened the meeting by delivering to President Bashir a letter from President Bush. Referencing the CPA, he said that the United States and Sudan can achieve much through cooperation, but that obstacles in Sudan prevented improvements in the relationship. Bashir welcomed the opportunity to meet with Natsios, noting his objective and balanced statements on Sudan (a likely reference to Natsios, recent Hill testimony),in contrast to others in the U.S. government committing &fouls.8 He noted that both Natsios and CDA Hume had recently stated publicly that the security situation in Darfur had evolved, while some in the Department of State had made harsher judgments. Natsios explained that the UN and NGOs in Darfur had told him that current violence was partly due to anarchy ) banditry, theft, and inter-tribal fighting -- as opposed to solely government and rebel engagements, but that many in the United States media and advocacy community were convinced that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed continue to massacre and abuse civilians on the same scale as 2003-2004. The Sudanese government's continued obstruction of the peacekeeping mission and its harassment of NGO workers fueled this perception. -------------- Humanitarian -------------- ¶4. (C) Natsios pressed President Bashir to immediately end harassment of the NGOs and UN agencies in Darfur, and extend all permits to January 31, 2008, process visas within 48 hours, waive all bureaucratic fees, and end customs tie-ups on the supplies (including medicines) used by the NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance. Bashir said that he would ensure procedures are accelerated, by instructing the appropriate ministers to take the necessary action. He said one-year multiple entry visas should be issued to humanitarian workers. He specifically told Foreign Minister Lam Akol to follow-up. On the harassment incident in Nyala, Natsios referenced Akol who told him earlier that the Minister of Justice had been asked to quash the charges on the humanitarian aid workers and request a full investigation. Bashir said this was a localized incident, without instruction from Khartoum. (Note: Later, SE Natios' Chief of Staff told Akol that real progress on the humanitarian issue in time for the Darfur donors meeting preceding the Sudan Consortium on March 19 would be useful. End note.) -------------- KHARTOUM 00000362 002.2 OF 003 New Embassy Compound -------------- ¶5. (C) Returning to the bilateral relationship, Natsios said the facts show that Sudan is not a state sponsor of terrorism, but that the tense political environment in Washington over Darfur will not allow President Bush to take steps to improve the relationship. Nevertheless, we still hoped for an improved relationship in the future, which is why it was in Sudan's interest to allow the building of a New Embassy Compound in Khartoum. Bashir made a firm commitment to allow the NEC containers in customs to be released without payment of customs fees, and that the policy would go into effect immediately. Natsios also mentioned that he continued to push in Washington for the transfer to Sudan of two Sudanese Guantanamo detainees eligible for repatriation. -------------- Darfur Political -------------- ¶6. (C) SE Natsios said that the rebels are a significant obstacle to a renewed peace process in Sudan. He appreciated the willingness of the government to renew talks with the rebel groups without preconditions. Natsios stressed that we fully support the Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliasson-led AU/UN political effort agreed to in Addis Ababa. Natsios told Bashir of his trip to Chad, and his efforts to convince the rebel groups to unify and offer realistic demands. He said that he was considering issuing a statement with other donors fingering the rebels for holding up peace in Darfur. He also mentioned that we planned to take measures against one particularly obstructionist rebel leader. The Tripoli/Asmara track was worrisome, as it might provide forum shopping for the divided rebels. Natsios said he planned to visit Libyan President Qadafi on the next part of his trip and would advise him to support one peace process for Darfur. Bashir joked that while Qadafi meddled in Darfur, he was removed from the terrorist list and had become America's friend, while Bashir had done no less, and was still on the list. Natsios asked Bashir to support SPLM outreach efforts to the non-signatories, traditional leaders, and IDP camp representatives. Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi and the DPA must be strengthened by providing non-military logistics assistance and standing-up an effective Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA),in full consultation with the signatories. These efforts will help attract the non-signatories to the DPA as part of a holistic effort coordinated with the work of the AU and UN. -------------- Darfur Peacekeeping -------------- ¶7. (C) Natsios and President Bashir had a long and heated exchange on the phased support and hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping operation. Bashir said he signed a letter on the heavy support package and that it would be sent to the AU and UN before Natsios returned to Washington. Natsios stressed the importance of accelerated deployment of the force, including the need to improve security on the ground, as a way to give confidence to the political process. He urged the rapid approval of land grants in Darfur for the UN camps, particularly for phases one and two. Bashir explained that a large peacekeeping force is not necessary in Darfur if the DPA security arrangements are implemented. He said what was needed was accelerated integration of rebel forces into the Sudanese Armed Forces. ¶8. (C) In a staccato exchange, Natsios strafed Bashir with multiple reasons to accept UN command and control of the force. He noted the linkage between command and funding, noting that some members of the UNSC would veto a resolution that provided funding of a force without adequate control. Bashir backtracked on our understanding of Addis, stating his acceptance of a hybrid force only if there is an African commander reporting to Addis (who will determine the size of the hybrid force),that UN command and control means merely supportive mechanisms (and funding) for the AU, and the troops are African (with the exception of lower-ranked UN advisors and technical assistants). He said that he had pledges from AU countries, such as Rwanda and Nigeria, to provide additional troops if the UN provided funding. Natsios said that the troops would not be effective without strong UN leadership, and that Africa lacked enough trained peacekeeping troops to satisfy the force level requirements. KHARTOUM 00000362 003.2 OF 003 Bashir countered saying that there are over 2 million African soldiers, and that the reason many of the troops now in Darfur had no will to carry out their mandate was because they had not been paid in many months. Natsios said that a credible force was needed to disarm the rebels, implement the peace agreement, and prevent outbreaks of violence ) referencing the UN's response to the incident in Malakal. Bashir downplayed the UN role, saying that they only showed up in Malakal after the situation had calmed. Natsios said he was criticized in Washington after agreeing to the hybrid force, and that he could not compromise further. ¶9. (C) Natsios noted our knowledge and outrage that Bashir had privately discouraged troop contributors. He asked him to demonstrate his commitment to the peacekeeping plan by sending a letter to the UN encouraging troop contributions for Darfur. --- CPA --- ¶10. (C) Natsios asked Bashir to fully fund the census and border commission, take steps to end the presence of non-aligned southern militias and resolve the Abyei border dispute. Bashir said that the border commission had the resources it needed to carry out an initial program to pinpoint reference points along the border before the rainy season, and then follow-up with full demarcation after the rainy season. He lamented the failure of the donors to come through on pledges, especially for the new currency. -------------- Suleiman Jamous -------------- ¶11. (C) Natsios asked that the government release Suleiman Jamous from Kadugli, as he could be a helpful influence on the younger rebel commanders in bringing them to the peace table. Bashir said that Jamous was responsible for establishing the Darfur rebellion. He said he would release Jamous if Natsios gave a personal guarantee that he would not stir up militant action in Darfur. Natsios pledged to call Jamous and get back to FM Akol. -------------- One-on-One -------------- ¶12. (C) Bashir told Natsios privately that he needed 120 million dollars to pay the pensions of 10,000 militia members and tens of thousands of southern members of the Sudanese Armed Forces who did not want to join the SPLA. He had traveled to Qatar to ask for the funds, and planned to ask Saudi Arabia if Qatar was unable to come through. Bashir said the South is a mess and that First Vice President Salva Kiir is not meeting Southern expectations. He said they need the SPLM to effectively run in the elections as partner of the NCP. ¶13. (C) Natsios stressed that Plan B was real, and said that it was better for Bashir to cooperate now, especially on peacekeeping. While elements of Plan B were moving forward, said Natsios, the faster Darfur is resolved, the better it would be for the Sudanese government. Natsios specifically mentioned that 29 companies and three individuals would be sanctioned imminently and that further sanctions were being proposed in the Congress. Bashir replied, "I understand." ¶14. (U) SE Natsios cleared this message. ¶15. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. POWERS