SE NATSIOS MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000360 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO PINR AU UN SU CD LY ER SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR NAFIE, NISS DIRECTOR GHOSH REF: NDJAMENA 00070 KHARTOUM 00000360 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings with Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Salah Ghosh, SE Natsios outlined the three goals of USG policy in Darfur: advancing the political process, ensuring the continuation of humanitarian operations, and facilitating deployment of an effective peace-keeping force to stabilize the region. He acknowledged that fragmentation of the rebel movements, which are backed by other regional powers, impeded the peace process. Nafie and Ghosh encouraged the U.S. to use its influence to address the situation and declared their support for the UN/African Union (AU) coordination of the political process. Reacting to SE Natsios' condemnation of Sudan's delay on implementation of the peace-keeping force stipulated in the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements, Nafie and Ghosh were noncommittal on the UN/AU hybrid force but said that Sudan had agreed to the Heavy Support Package and would issue a reply to UNSYG Ban Ki-moon's January 24 letter in the near future. SE Natsios urged both officials to remove specific bureaucratic obstacles to humanitarian operations, which they agreed to consider. He also asked for a resolution of the Abyei border dispute and an acceleration of the disarmament of militias in Southern Sudan. SE Natsios urged Nafie and Ghosh to facilitate the immediate release of the containers for the New Embassy Compound from customs in order to avoid further deterioration of the bilateral relationship. End summary. -------------- Political Process -------------- ¶2. (C) In separate meetings on March 3 with Nafie and Ghosh, SE Natsios acknowledged that a political settlement--not just a UN peace-keeping operation--was needed to end the Darfur crisis. He said that regional powers, such as Chad, Libya, and Eritrea, were not serving as neutral mediators in Darfur and that the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories were an impediment to the peace process. He described his January meetings with non-signatories in Chad, when he had emphasized that they should: 1) unite and engage in negotiations with the Sudanese government within the framework of the DPA, 2) develop a set of realistic priorities for the negotiations, and, 3) renounce violent regime change (reftel). SE Natsios said that the USG would continue to use its influence in the region to support the joint UN/African Union (AU) peace process and said that he was traveling to Tripoli on March 8 to encourage President Qadafi to play a constructive role. SE Natsios also noted that numerous provisions of the DPA had not been implemented and that effective implementation of some of the provisions could serve as a catalyst to bring the non-signatories to the agreement. ¶3. (C) Nafie said that the Sudanese government supported negotiation with the non-signatories--without preconditions--and "fully" agreed with the U.S. on the need for a single negotiating platform. He called on the international community to realize that "enough was enough" and to pressure the rebels to "come to the negotiating table." Nafie asserted that Chad and Sudan would need to improve their bilateral relationship in order to defuse the Darfur crisis and said that President Deby had to "de-link" his support for the rebels in Darfur. According to Ghosh, President Qadafi and President Afwerki had pressed Deby to end his support for the rebel movements. Nafie requested that SE Natsios also raise this with Deby. "We're very genuine in wanting peace with Chad," said Nafie, adding that "U.S. pressure would dramatically influence" the political situation. Ghosh said that Deby needed assurances that Sudan did not threaten his regime. Nafie voiced his support for the UN/AU initiative on the political process and said that the NCP had told President Afwerki that a coordinated process should exist between the UN, AU, Libya, and Eritrea. Nafie stated that President Bashir had presented Qadafi with evidence of Libyan support for Darfur rebel groups. Though Qadafi had denied this claim, Nafie said that Sudan was willing to see if "Libya turned a new page." Ghosh said that Eritrea was not a "preferable host" for negotiations and acknowledged that the international community objected to a strong Eritrean role. However, he said that Eritrea was serious and would "need to be used" in the UN/AU process. KHARTOUM 00000360 002.2 OF 003 ¶4. (C) Nafie emphasized that the DPA should serve as the basis for negotiations with the non-signatories and that the issue of compensation was a practical question. He said that the announcement of a system of individual payments would lead to a rapid influx of people to the IDP camps. Nafie stated that amendments to the DPA were not necessary. He also asserted that the National Congress Party (NCP) was "definitely for elections" in 2009. He encouraged those who support regime change in Khartoum, such as Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim, to participate in the elections instead and to change the government through peaceful means. SE Natsios called Ibrahim a "destructive force." Ghosh called for a specific date for negotiations with the rebels and asked SE Natsios to raise this idea with UN Envoy Jan Eliasson. -------------- Peace-keeping -------------- ¶5. (C) SE Natsios noted that the perception in the U.S. was that the Sudanese government was obstructing implementation of the November Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements. He explained that Sudan faced a broad coalition of liberal, conservative, and even Muslim organizations in the U.S. Nafie bemoaned the influence of U.S. advocacy groups, intimating that they were driven by anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment under Jewish and Christian influence. He said that the actions of these groups led to "factions in Arab countries leaving the system," an allusion to the roots of terrorism. He said that the belief in the region was "the more you compromise (with the West),the more you'll be squeezed--squeezed almost to the point where you can't be squeezed anymore." SE Natsios said that Sudan's response to UNSYG Ban Ki-moon's January 24 letter on the UN Heavy Support Package would indicate whether the Sudanese government was interested in cooperation with the international community. He also called on President Bashir to issue a letter to troop contributing countries (TCCs) to encourage them to participate in the UN/AU operation. ¶6. (C) Nafie demurred on this request until "we are clear on what the operation is. Troops? Technical expertise? We need clarity on the force." He said Sudan had agreed to the first two phases of UN support for AMIS with the sole condition that the forces come under an AU "umbrella." He said that Sudan had never agreed to the phase three hybrid force. SE Natsios underscored that UN command and control was essential to USG support for the Addis Ababa agreement and that TCCs were reticent to contribute to the Heavy Support Package without a firm Sudanese commitment to the hybrid operation. Nafie said that Sudan wanted an African command with technical support from the UN, adding that a peace-keeping operation would not be necessary if an agreement could be reached between the Sudanese government and the rebels. SE Natsios said that the rebels would not disarm without the facilitation of a neutral body like the UN. Ghosh said that Sudan was committed to the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements and that there "was not any idea in the Government to get around what we agreed to." He said that the response to the UNSYG's letter was ready "last week" and that it would be sent soon. He added that the way forward meant "finalizing phase one while moving forward on phase two, and finalizing phase two while moving forward on phase three." He said that implementation would advance through the Tripartite Commission. -------------- Humanitarian Operations -------------- ¶7. (C) SE Natsios called on the Sudanese government to implement the moratorium on permits for humanitarian workers until January 31, 2008, release the assets of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) from customs, waive fees associated with humanitarian organizations, and fast-track all visa applications for INGO workers. He further demanded that Sudan take disciplinary action against the local officials in Nyala who assaulted humanitarian workers in January and said the false charges against the workers be dropped. These actions would send a signal to officials in Darfur and to the West that the central government wanted to facilitate humanitarian operations in the region. "This is an area where real cooperation can be achieved," said SE Natsios. Though Nafie was noncommittal, KHARTOUM 00000360 003.2 OF 003 Ghosh agreed that all of these issues should be addressed and promised to review them. -------------- Southern Sudan -------------- ¶8. (C) Nafie was optimistic on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),pointing to the establishment of electoral mechanisms and the recently-passed political party law. He said the National Congress Party (NCP) was looking forward to elections and was confident it would win. SE Natsios told Nafie that he had encouraged the Masseriya and the Dinka to engage in dialogue to break the impasse over Abyei during his last visit to Sudan in December. Nafie agreed with SE Natsios on the importance of Abyei and said that a resolution to the dispute would be a confidence building measure for the NCP and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). "We have no problem admitting there is a problem in Abyei," said Nafie. He explained, however, that the Abyei Border Commission report was unacceptable and attributed the problem to Minister for Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor, who is from Abyei and considered the issue too "explosive" to address. SE Natsios said that progress on disarming militias in the South was also essential. Ghosh responded that a lack of money was delaying the disarmament of militias, whose members required money in exchange for their weapons. -------------- NEC Containers -------------- ¶9. (C) SE Natsios warned Nafie that the Sudanese government's delay in releasing the containers for the New Embassy Compound would worsen bilateral relations, which was not in Sudan's interest. He said that Overseas Building Operations (OBO) would terminate the project on March 7 and so an immediate decision needed to be made. "There is no reason not to move forward on the containers," said Nafie. With Ghosh, SE Natsios noted that duties on materials for diplomatic missions contravened the Vienna Convention and that the USG did not pay customs duties on the materials for new embassies in any other country. Ghosh promised his help and said that President Bashir would need to make the final decision. ¶10. (U) SE Natsios cleared this message. ¶11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. POWERS