(C) SPLA CHIEF OF STAFF DOESN'T LIKE HIS SAF

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000350 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SE NATSIOS, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR SU SUBJECT: (C) SPLA CHIEF OF STAFF DOESN'T LIKE HIS SAF COUNTERPART Classified By: Pol/Econ Nathan Holt: Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Oyai Deng told ConGen Juba staff recently that he has a poor relationship with his Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) counterpart. Deng and SAF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Hajj Ahmed el-Jailee Hajj Ahmed ("el-Jailee") met "one-on-one" on the margins of the February Joint Defense Board (JDB) meeting in Khartoum, Deng recounted, and Deng pressed el-Jailee to accelerate SAF withdrawal from Malakal in southern Sudan's Upper Nile State. Malakal was the scene of sharp fighting November 30-December 1, 2006, between the SPLA and a combination of SAF and SAF-affiliated militia. Recent reports from Malakal indicate continuing tension over the presence of SPLA, SAF, and SAF-affiliated militia. ¶2. (C) El-Jailee's response to the request for accelerated withdrawal was "very stupid," Deng said. El-Jailee reportedly said SAF would not accelerate withdrawal from Upper Nile, which must be complete by July 2006 under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). El-Jailee also accused the SPLA of violating the CPA by maintaining forces too close to Malakal. Deng said he found the recently-appointed el-Jailee difficult to work with and less reasonable than his predecessor. ¶3. (C) SPLA Maj. Gen. Thomas Cirillo, currently commander of the national Joint Integrated Units (JIUs),agreed with this assessment in a conversation with PolOff February 28. El-Jailee is "an example of what we're up against," Cirillo commented. Originally slated to take over national command of the JIUs in January, Cirillo said the transfer from his SAF counterpart was delayed until March by mutual consent. ¶4. (C) Both Deng and Cirillo welcomed the adoption of a common military doctrine at the JDB's February meeting. The agreed doctrine was revised heavily by SAF and Sudan's Ministry of Defense, Cirillo said, before final negotiations brought it back to a form more acceptable to the SPLA. Adoption of the common doctrine should pave the way for common training, equipment and command of the JIUs. To date, the JIUs have functioned largely as co-located SAF and SPLA units, with little integration. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) For the CPA to be implemented effectively, SAF and SPLA military commanders need to forge effective relationships and keep open lines of communication--both inside and outside the structures of the JIUs. In some high-tension areas, including Malakal, local commanders appear to be doing this. It is therefore all the more worrisome that the relationship between the chiefs of staff of the SPLA and SAF is off to a rocky start. End comment. POWERS