STATE OF DARFUR: PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000281 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU CD US SUBJECT: STATE OF DARFUR: PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: From February 19-21, CDA Hume visited Nyala, Zalingei, El Geneina, and El Fasher to meet with Sudanese government officials, UN agency heads, and representatives of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). This message--the last of three cables on these meetings--focuses on the security situation and provides an update on the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and UN peace-keeping operations. The UN plans full deployment of the Light Support Package (LSP) by March 31, and it expects the Sudanese response to the Heavy Support Package (HSP) proposal by February 27. The AU has improved Cease-fire Commission (CFC) activity but is making no progress on plans to increase its own troop strength by two (or six) battalions. UN/AU coordination is minimal. For progress to occur, the USG needs to make continuous efforts with the AU, UN, and the Sudanese government. End summary. -------------- Security Situation -------------- ¶2. (C) In recent weeks, rebel groups have proliferated and the Sudanese government has failed to control the security situation. In North Darfur, violence results primarily from large confrontations between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), rebel groups, and the Arab militias; Chadian rebels and armed bandits have caused the chaos in West Darfur, according to AMIS, UN officials, and INGO representatives. The head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) in Zalingei told CDA Hume that the Chadian and Sudanese governments' backing of rival rebel factions on both sides of the border has led to an influx of weapons. In one instance, OCHA staff observed 129 vehicles driving into the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) compound in Zalingei, which were then dispersed in groups of 20-30 throughout Jebel Marra. ¶3. (C) Other rebels, such as those allied with Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Abdul Wahid al-Nur, have obstructed AMIS operations throughout West Darfur, either through armed confrontation or by fomenting anti-AMIS and anti-DPA sentiment within the population. The Sudanese government continues to arm and support the Arab militias. All Arab boys over the age of 15 in one locality were recently ordered to register with the Border Intelligence Units. Despite this government sponsorship, the Arab militias have begun raiding areas controlled by the regular security forces. The head of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) in El Geneina said that the "Government has opened up a Pandora's box by arming the Arabs, who now act on their own and sometimes ally with the Chadians, doing harm to the GoS." He added that "a mass of Arab tribes are definitely upset with government," making them unpredictable. Sudanese officials in the three Darfur states, however, deny the security environment is deteriorating. UN and AMIS officials insist that AMIS' mandate does not allow it to reign in the armed elements and relegates it to an observation role. -------------- - Status of the Light and Heavy Support Packages -------------- - ¶4. (C) In a February 21 meeting with CDA Hume, UN agency heads in El Fasher confirmed that a signing ceremony is set for February 25 to secure the land in El Fasher needed for UN deployment of the Light and Heavy Support Packages, after which expedited construction by PAE will begin. Almost half of the 105 military officers for the Light Support Package are in country, with 15 scheduled to deploy to Nyala, El Geneina, and Zalengei. Deployment to these locations is stalled pending resolution of UNDSS requirements for security measures, but containers are in place in all three locations and could/could be made operational within three weeks after suitable land is secured for expanded UN camps. Most of the civilian police have deployed to El Fasher, but less than half of the civilian staff have arrived. All equipment, except for half the night vision goggles, has arrived and will be transferred to the AU. Integration of UN and AU staff is, at this point, truly minimal and limited primarily to the civilian police. ¶5. (C) On the Heavy Support Package, local UN headquarters expects to receive President Bashir's response by February ¶27. Whatever it contains, expediting deployment will require: 1) identifying two engineering companies able to manage construction of the UN camps (local UN staff said that KHARTOUM 00000281 002 OF 002 the Chinese and Bangladeshi companies currently with UNMIS in the south have the capacity to perform these tasks if/if they are made available); 2) identifying and securing appropriate sites in Nyala, El Geneina, and Zalingei; 3) continuing to move forward the supplies needed to construct the bases from the El Obeid warehouses; 4) at the same time, recruiting the troop units. When the UN identifies appropriate camp sites, the USG may again be able to play a useful role in securing Sudanese government agreement, as it did for El Fasher. ¶6. (C) AMIS commander Aprezi has made significant progress in activating the cease-fire mechanisms, and several administrative issues (such as payment of per diem to non-signatory rebel observers) should be soon resolved. The USG now has military observers in seven of the eight sectors, and S/CRS officers are active in work of the Cease-fire Commission. The Joint Commission has begun to meet in Darfur in the AU Peace Implementation Secretariat facility provided by the USG. Aprezi acknowledges, however, that AMIS cannot fulfill its mandate without the cooperation of the local population--cooperation that it lacks among most internally displaced persons (IDPs) and among the general population. He has given less attention to this issue. ¶7. (C) In response to questions from CDA Hume regarding the plans for AMIS to restructure itself from eight battalion sectors into three sectors, each with several battalions, Aprezi confirmed that he intended to move ahead. He said that Nigeria and Rwanda had committed to provide one additional battalion each. According to both Aprezi and PAE there was no definite agreement on sites for facilities to house the additional troops, nor was any activity underway to accomplish the restructuring of AMIS (which is expected to take place before launch of the AU/UN hybrid operation). According to one UN source, the AU was still considering an alternative plan that would involve deployment of as many as six additional battalions. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) AU/UN planning and coordination present a serious challenge to both the Light and Heavy Support Packages, let alone to the hybrid operation. As a start it would seem essential to resolve the issues of UN camp sites for the Heavy Package and the number and location of additional AU forces expected to deploy during the time frame of the Heavy Support Package between now and July 1. The time required to construct a site averages four months, and it is important to expedite that process before the start of the rainy season in May, after which many roads in Darfur become impassable for four months. End Comment. HUME