SUDAN: END OF TOUR REPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000272

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SE NATSIOS, NSC FOR
PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: END OF TOUR REPORT


Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Note: the following represents the end of tour report
of departing Political/Economic Counselor Eric Whitaker, who
served at Embassy Khartoum from August 2005 ) February 2007.
The opinions expressed are his own reflections on his
experiences over the course of his tour, as well as from his
brief service at Embassy Khartoum in 1993 as Refugee Affairs
Coordinator. End note.

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Overview: 12 Years and a Cloud of Dust
--------------


2. (C) In August 2005, I returned to Khartoum after a 12-year
absence. The first thing I saw in the dark of the evening
was a colorful Ferris wheel, and an airport completely
surrounded by the lights from oil-fueled development. In the
first few days, I was impressed to see signs of growth
throughout the burgeoning urban area of Khartoum, which had
doubled in population from around 3 million to nearly 6
million. Despite a new shopping mall, and the presence of 18
airlines, it soon became evident that while there was new
money, it stayed in Khartoum. And, beneath the surface, the
cultural animosities between the North and the South
continued despite the newly found peace. Furthermore,
petroleum export revenues now permitted the government to
prosecute retribution upon Darfur, even as the civil war was
coming to an end at long last.

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CPA and the North-South Challenge: No Fabric to Mend
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Many speak of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
as bringing an end to a 21-year North-South civil war.
Actually, it ended overt combat between two different
cultures that had fought from 1955 ) 1972 and from 1983 )

2004. Others speak of using the CPA and oil money to re-knit
the fabric of Sudan, when actually the North and the South
had never been parts of the same fabric. The sheer size and
ethnic diversity of Sudan make central governance difficult.
The perceived exoticism of the South, with the Dinka, Nuer,
Shilluk, and Azande, mask the true nature of the North )
which is tribal itself. To many in the North, stewardship
and control of Sudan is the charge of the Northern, riparian
Arabized people ) the Ja'alin, Dongoladeen, and Shaygiya
peoples. The ruling clique, composed of a few dozen
representatives from among these three groups, regards their
guidance as a sacred trust.


4. (C) The CPA is a marvelously complex document negotiated
over nearly three years. It creates some 52 commissions,
boards, committees, and working groups, guaranteeing a
complex, deliberative process of@QQY! questions remain as to its sincerity, the
sequencing of implementation, and the selectivity of those
sections which have so far been put into practice. The
government has harvested the low hanging fruit already,
leaving the difficult stages fQ last. The CPA gradually is
taking shape, although many key elements ) at least in the
eyes of the South - are lacking: implementation of the Abyei
Boundaries Commission findings, completion of the North-South
Technical ad hoc Border Committee's research, and formation
of a national electoral commission ) a necessary step for
the 2009 general elections.


5. (C) The Government of National Unity (GNU) commenced in
September 2005; its first anniversary passed quietly, with
the North valuing the July 2005 founding of the Presidency,
and the South prizing the January 2005 signing of the CPA.
The National Congress Party, an Islamic clique, continues to
dominate Sudan, with Southern ministers rendered ineffective
by their underlings and Southern state ministers given minor
portfolios. To a large extent, the South has checked out of
the GNU, as the North's "mechanical majority" renders many
issues moot. Many Southerners from the inception chose to
focus on the South to the detriment of the national level,
although the prospect of the 2009 national elections invites
the South to revisit that calculation.


6. (C) Following the July 2005 death of John Garang, the
South has not fully recovered. Garangists abound, declaring
that Sudan would not be as it is today if John were still
alive. Garang, a larger than life persona filled with

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charisma and articulating a vision for all of Sudan's
marginalized peoples, indeed left difficult shoes to fill.
Salva Kiir, however, has done well in many aspects since,
particularly in that he continues to wear four hats: First
Vice President of the GNU, President of the Government of
Southern Sudan (GoSS),Chairman of the SPLM, and Commander in
Chief of the SPLA. His leadership style is deliberative,
collaborative, and tactical, in contrast to Garang's sharp,
autocratic, and strategic approach. He has consolidated his
power base, in part by reaching out and including key
individuals from diverse sources. Kiir, who only spends a
couple of days each month in Khartoum, travels abroad
frequently, building a network of foreign support for the
South's development efforts.


7. (C) The GoSS with a cabinet rumored soon to change, is
hard pressed to invest oil revenues wisely in building the
infrastructure and health and education sectors of the South.
A limited pool of talented human resources, slow trickle of
returning diaspora from the intelligentsia, and avenues for
corruption mitigate against more rapid development, although
the blossoming of the long-suppressed industriousness of
Southerners and the fast growing trade linkages with Kenya
and Uganda bode well.

--------------
Darfur: A Harsh Climate for a Lasting Peace
--------------


8. (C) The Darfur conflict now stands at the four-year mark.
The media seeks to frame it as a war between light-skinned
Arabs and black Africans over grazing land and watering
rights, despite the reality that all Darfurians are black
Muslim Africans, with some more Arabized than others, and
that the conflict involves a government-sponsored land-grab
and forced eviction of the less Arabized. The conflict is
far more difficult to define, as it involves center versus
periphery control issues and deeply set cultural animosities.


9. (C) The parties involved have multiplied dramatically, as
have the forms of violence taking place. Dozens of rebel
groups ) Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signatories,
non-signatories, and Declaration of Commitment signatories,
as well as Chadian rebels ) all remain stakeholders in the
conflict, with civilians and a small civil society having
minimal impact on the course of events. Rebels, aided by
Chad, Eritrea, and/or Libya, are fickle, recalcitrant, and
prone to shifting loyalties. The time-honored practice of
the Sudanese government of dividing and conquering has
rendered rebel unity an oxymoron. Gaining unified support
for the DPA is thus made even more difficult. If rebel unity
were to occur, however, it could give the Sudanese Armed
Forces, already overmatched, an even harsher setback.


10. (C) Efforts to gain further adherents to the DPA straggle
on, with issues of further compensation and janjaweeed
disarmament going unaddressed. Aside from a singular and
theatrical disarmament ceremony in June 2006, no effort is
underway to undertake this core element of the DPA. Instead,
one can watch janjaweed engage in calisthenics in El Fasher
as they are incorporated in the Sudanese Armed Forces, the
Popular Defense Forces, the border security forces, or local
police units.


11. (C) Perhaps in an attempt to decrease the number of
foreign witnesses and those who can report to the outside
world, humanitarian presence and operating space will
increasingly wither. Recent events demonstrate a willingness
to not only tolerate but to instigate abuses of those who
have come to provide basic relief goods and services for the
two million Darfurian internally displaced persons QDPs).
Further disruptions of humanitarian efforts are likely to
take place, as those who serve the IDPs are increasingly
identified as a reason why the conflict will not go away. As
well, the IDPs are seen not as victims, but as the problem,
for if they returned to their home villages, the
international community might have fewer visible things to
point to when the media come to cover another colorful and
compelling IDP story. The ability of humanitarian
organizations to operate successfully in Darfur may further
erode over time, with recruitment for future workers becoming
more challenging.


12. (C) The introduction of a UN peacekeeping operation, in
contrast to the current African Union ceasefire monitoring
effort, holds promise, but falls short of the UNCSR 1706
dream of many. The UN cannot recruit or accommodate its
essential transition corps, and will take far longer than the

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international community has patience for, even assuming that
the Sudanese government has a change of heart about accepting
a hybrid force. It is likely that Sudan will keep recrafting
its verbiage, slowly permitting a carefully defined
peacekeeping force that meets the low troop estimates it
pushes the African Union to provide. Western impatience,
combined with Sudanese recalcitrance and UN bureaucratic red
tape, is a recipe for frustration all around.

-------------- --------------
Human Rights: Understated Problems, Unspoken Grievances
-------------- --------------


13. (C) All manner of human rights problems persist in Sudan,
from the multiple atrocities heaped on the citizenry of
Darfur to continuing violence against women, child camel
jockeys in the Persian Gulf, curtailment of press freedom,
and child soldiers. Such is the extent and banality of human
rights abuses that they are not high on the agenda of Sudan's
nascent civil society. Only once the Darfur conflict has
been resolved and the national elections further advance the
north-South political equation can attention turn to what
should be a major concern of Sudan's populace.


14. (C) Religious freedom, however, shows a number of signs
of progress, with the recent appointment of the Chair of the
CPA-provided Commission on the Protection of the Rights of
Non-Mulims in the National Capital. Unfortunately, this
Commission has yet to be established. Even so, it is
projected to have 28 members, raising the prospect of
difficulty in attaining a quorum at meetings and almost
guaranteeing that any actions taken will be highly
deliberative and likely conservative. That said, churches
abound, and people worship or do not worship in freedom, even
as it is a very difficult and time consuming process to
obtain land and building permits to construct new churches
(but not new mosques). Sudan, however, is not like Eritrea
or Saudi Arabia, locations where this writer has spent time,
and should not be considered within that same, harsh
category.

-------------- --------------
U.S.)Sudan Bilateral Relationship: Frustration All Around
-------------- --------------


15. (C) Working relations with the MFA are cordial, although
minimally productive. Over the past one and one-half years,
we have seen a rapidly changing cast on each side of the
relationship, with one thing constant: Sudanese chafing at
what it sees as a series of U.S. sticks without any carrots.


16. (C) Despite the extensive U.S. economic sanctions ) with
little interest so far expressed regarding opportunities in
the South, Three Areas, etc. stemming from the Darfur Peace
and Accountability Act ) business folk advise that they are
able to purchase U.S. goods in the Persian Gulf. Bought
retail rather than wholesale, goods simply cost more and take
longer to get. The sanctions have pushed Sudan toward China,
India, and Gulf suppliers of goods and services, but
increasingly also Turkey and South Africa.


17. (C) It is likely that the bilateral relationship will
muddle along, with occasional improvements and frequent
setbacks owing to misunderstandings, talking past each other,
and the issuance of multiple messages. The single factor
holding the prospect for most significant ) but negative )
change in the bilateral relationship would occur if efforts
to advance a Plan A success in Darfur fall victim to a well
intended but poorly thought-out stampede toward Plan B. If a
Plan B were launched, hopes for a New Embassy Compound, New
Consulate Compound, and other positive, future-oriented
activities would be dashed, and mission drawdown would become
a central concern. An evacuation of personnel, unfortunate
and avoidable, would thus take us back to where this writer's
story with Sudan began.
HUME