UNSYG REP DISCUSSES HUMANITARIAN, PEACEKEEPING AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000256 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU CD LY UN US SUBJECT: UNSYG REP DISCUSSES HUMANITARIAN, PEACEKEEPING AND POLITICAL ISSUES KHARTOUM 00000256 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a recent meeting with CDA Hume, the acting head of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) described the Sudanese government's obstruction of UN operations, the deteriorating security environment confronting the humanitarian community, and the difficulties in implementation of the three-phase UN support program for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) due to AU resistance and bureaucratic disputes within the UN system. He also noted the destabilizing influences of Chad, Libya and Eritrea on the peace process. CDA Hume expressed USG support for the UN's efforts and pledged to work with aid organizations and the Government to resolve some of the most acute obstacles to humanitarian operations. Hume also recommended that the UN, AU, and USG dispatch a team of senior military advisors to trouble-shoot the joint UN/AU deployement. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- GOVERNMENT DIVISIONS ON UN, HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a February 14 meeting with CDA Hume and poloff, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Taye Brooke-Zerihoun noted the divisions within the National Congress Party (NCP) leadership on implementation of the three-phase approach to UN support for AMIS. He said that the hard-liners "had not been pleasant to the UN since the beginning of 2007," and while admitting that Sudanese government actions may not be deliberate or coordinated, the cumulative effect was "unremitting harassment" of UN operations. These obstacles included unwritten "regulations" requiring 48-hours notice for UN flights and that all personnel depart from the main terminal of Khartoum airport, which caused delays. In addition, the Government has required detailed manifests for all equipment imported for the Light Support Package, ostensibly to verify that nothing has been made in Israel. ¶3. (C) While noting the deteriorating security environment within which humanitarian organizations are operating in Darfur, Taye said that Sudanese officials had called the recent assault on aid workers in Nyala "intolerable" and that many elements of the Government, including Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al Khalifa, were embarrassed by the incident. UN morale has further declined due to terrorist threats against the UN in recent weeks, according to Taye. CDA Hume sympathized with the UN for the difficulty of its mission. He encouraged Taye to put some of the logistical issues behind him and focus on how to implement the UN's mandate under the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements as soon as possible. CDA Hume also expressed a willingness to work with the UN and representatives of humanitarian organizations to engage with the Sudanese government to resolve the mounting pressures on aid operations. -------------- STATUS OF THE THREE-PHASE PEACEKEEPING PLAN -------------- ¶4. (C) According to Taye, "the moment of truth is fast approaching" on the Heavy Support Package and the UN/AU hybrid force. He said that the UN and AU were not on the same page on either phase, while the UN and the Sudanese government "were not even on the same chapter." CDA Hume relayed that President Bashir had told former President Carter than he would accept the hybrid force if all the "combatant troops" were African. Taye explained that of the 17,000 troops envisioned for the force, 50 percent would be combat troops, and it would be difficult to draw these from Africa only. He added that the Sudanese government's condition that every UN advisor be junior to an AU officer was also unworkable. ¶5. (C) Taye indicated that the AU viewed even the Light and Heavy Support Packages as a "hostile take-over." As of February 13, 38 of 105 military staff officers, 32 out of 33 civilian police, and four out of 48 civilian staff had deployed to Darfur. AMIS had assigned positions to 12 staff officers, only two of which had received taskings within the operation. Taye said that AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) Commissioner Said Djinnit, "who was the most reasonable among them," had been "harassed" by AU Chairman Alpha Omer Konare before the recent AU summit in Addis Ababa for trying to push forward AU agreement to the terms of reference with the UN. "The AU is not sold on the idea of transition," said KHARTOUM 00000256 002.2 OF 002 Taye. He also characterized the UN's financial rules as "intrusive," saying that the AU would find it difficult to comply with them. ¶6. (C) The UN, however, faces its own constraints. "In the end, we want to increase our presence," said Taye, "but we're doing it by cutting bureaucratic corners and putting our people at risk." He had sent a message to New York decrying that UNMIS was being pulled in two directions: UN Department of Peace-keeping Operation's (UNDPKO) desire to deploy and the UN Department of Safety and Security's (UNDSS) stringent security requirements. He explained that UNDSS had been held responsible for the security lapses that led to the destruction of the UN compound in Baghdad and was therefore reticent to move forward with UN deployment in Sudan. The lack of force protection units for the Darfur operation exacerbated UNDSS' fears. Taye asked that the USG remain aware of these "cross currents." He said that of the four principal sites for UN deployment -- El Fasher, Nyala, El Geneina, and Zalingei -- land for UN operations had only been acquired in the last city. CDA Hume recommended that senior representatives from UNDPKO, the AU, and the USG (either from AF or IO) conduct an assessment of the deployment in Darfur and trouble-shoot to advance the process. -------------- OUTSIDE ACTORS' INFLUENCE POLITICAL PROCESS -------------- ¶7. (C) Discussing the political process in Darfur, Taye underscored the negative effects of Chadian, Eritrean, and Libyan intervention in the conflict. He said that the Libyan representative in the AU PSC had admonished Chad and Sudan for sponsoring mutually-antagonizing rebel movements during the most recent PSC meeting on February 12, but Taye explained that Libyan President Qaddhafi was funding the Sudanese opposition in Chad. Taye further blamed Eritrea for having trained and recruited Zaghawa fighters for the rebellion in Eastern Sudan and then transporting "100 to 120" of them to Jebel Marra to fight the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). CDA Hume said that Libya had long interfered in Darfur and had stationed two battalions in El Fasher in the 1970s and 1980s. He stated that Sudan had recently confronted the Libyan government with evidence of its support for Sudanese rebel groups, and the Libyan government had responded by expelling Sudanese diplomats from Tripoli. CDA Hume also said that Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail had asked the USG for assistance in limiting Libyan meddling in the region and noted that Qaddafi had been explicit that he did not want the UN in Africa. In the past, Qaddafi had lost interest in Darfur after a short burst of activity, according to Taye, who predicted the pattern would repeat itself. ¶8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. HUME